AFRICA WITHOUT QADDAFI: THE CASE OF CHAD

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AFRICA WITHOUT QADDAFI: THE CASE OF CHAD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the long reign of Muammar Qaddafi, killed on 20 October in his hometown of Sirte, opens the way to democracy in Libya. His fall has also left the country and its neighbours facing a multitude of potential new problems that could threaten stability in the region. Chad is a case in point. Qaddafi made his presence felt in all the country’s conflicts, for good and ill, and he maintained a close relationship with President Déby. Because the latter supported his doomed benefactor politically at the start of the insurgency and only belatedly aligned with Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC), the new era of Chad-Libya relations has started on the wrong foot. The NTC’s accusations – denied by N’Djamena – that Chadian fighters supported Qaddafi militarily, racist attacks against black Africans, refugees and related displacement issues, and the volatile situation on the border increase forthcoming challenges.

During his 42-year reign, Qaddafi was time and again an actor and mediator of Chad’s conflicts, while using his southern neighbour as a testing ground to achieve his regional ambitions. Under Déby, N’Djamena was a willing subject, and relations between Tripoli and N’Djamena improved significantly. The two leaders’ relationship had its ups and downs, but Déby allowed Qaddafi to increase his influence through patronage in return for political and economic support.

Qaddafi’s involvement in Chad became paradoxical. After initially playing an active role in destabilising the North, he contributed in recent years to bringing relative peace to that historically rebellious zone by mediating between armed groups. In view of this, Déby saw Qaddafi as essential to his own regional policy and was, therefore, reluctant to accept the possibility of his fall when the Libyan insurgency broke out and slow to realise its full consequences. When the crisis began, Déby tried to defend Qaddafi’s legitimacy by accusing the rebels of colluding with Islamists. Though his government denied it was providing any military support, the presence of Chadian fighters in Libya among Qaddafi’s troops stripped his statements of weight.

However, Déby’s accusations naturally made the NTC suspicious of N’Djamena, which it considered as favouring Qaddafi’s continued rule. This had serious consequences for the treatment of Chadian nationals in Libya in areas where the insurgents gained control. It was only when NATO intervened and power shifted away from Qaddafi, that the Chadian government took a more strategic and realistic stance, calling for negotiations and establishing preliminary contacts with the NTC.

Déby knows from recent history that hostile relations with Tripoli could quickly endanger the stability of northern Chad. The recent normalisation of relations with Sudan that he achieved with Qaddafi’s help is far from irreversible, so he would like to avoid tensions with the new authorities in Tripoli. N’Djamena is also concerned for the plight of Chadian nationals in Libya, who frequently have been perceived and treated as mercenaries, though at least the overwhelming majority have been in the country for years for purely economic reasons. It is likewise aware of the need to maintain economic relations, particularly trade and investments, between the two countries.

Given the security and economic interests at stake, the Chadian regime has now recognised the former rebels, and Déby has met with the NTC leader, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. But despite this rapprochement, uncertainty about the future of relations remains. Will the new rulers of Tripoli and Déby be able to win each other’s trust and put aside grievances born during the eight-month crisis? How will the volatile situation in southern Libya impact on these relations? What will be Libya’s new policy on the Chad-Sudan equation? More generally, what will be Libya’s new relationship with the rest of Africa?

Due to the length of his reign, his influence abroad and strong patronage politics, Qaddafi’s shadow will continue to be felt in Libya and neighbouring countries. The upheavals that preceded and followed his fall have created new and potential problems, including massive displacement of populations; tribal tensions within Libya and racist attacks against nationals of sub-Saharan countries; a possible resurgence of Islamism; and the proliferation of fighters and weapons. It is too early to say whether the changes will evolve into medium- and long-term factors of instability in the region, notably in the Sahel and Darfur. However the issues faced by Chad, a country bridging sub-Saharan and North Africa and east and west Sahel, highlight some of the dangers the region faces in the post-Qaddafi era.

N’Djamena/Nairobi/Brussels, 21 October 2011
AFRICA WITHOUT QADDAFI: THE CASE OF CHAD

I. QADDAFI AND CHAD: THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE

The outbreak, in February 2011, of the insurrection that ended eight months later with the fall of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and his death,1 occurred at a time when the Tripoli/N’Djamena axis had become one of the most important alliances in the Sahara-Sahel region.

After a period of hostilities in the 1970s and 1980s, the two countries led by the Qaddafi/Déby duo began to cooperate in the 1990s, as analysed in an earlier Crisis Group briefing.2 Forced by military defeats and international setbacks3 to curb his ambitions of domination, the Libyan leader changed course in order to improve relations with his neighbours. In less than five years, he succeeded in acquiring an undeniable political influence in Chad and restored an image tarnished by earlier military interventions. Between 1990 and 2005, he worked with President Idriss Déby to normalise relations, intensify bilateral cooperation and bring peace to northern Chad. In 2005, following the deterioration of the situation in eastern Chad, he acted as mediator and guarantor of the balance of forces between Chad and Sudan.4

During these two periods, Qaddafi’s relations with the Chadian regime was sometimes complex and ambiguous. Although Idriss Déby worked hard to maintain good relations with the “Guide”5 and obtain his political support in order to deal with internal and regional turmoil, he also constantly sought to maintain his independence from a demanding and troublesome ally.

A. THE GUIDE’S DUAL ROLE: MEDIATOR AND ACTOR

Having been a destabilising force, Libya paradoxically helped to bring a semblance of peace to Tibesti6 by brokering a series of agreements between the government and armed groups operating in this border region of northern Chad. In addition to these official agreements, Libya fa-

1 “Libya’s Col Qaddafi killed”, BBC, 20 October 2011.
2 See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°71, Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence, 23 March 2010, which gives a detailed description of Chad-Libyan relations from the reign of King Idriss I to the dispute over the Aouzou Strip, including Colonel Qaddafi’s coup, Libyan interventions in the Chadian civil war, the war between the two countries and finally the return to normality at the beginning of the 1990s. The present briefing analyses the future of Chad-Libyan relations in the context of Qaddafi’s fall and the post-1990 changes he promoted. Also see Appendix C for a chronology of Chad-Libyan relations.
3 Ever since he came to power on 1 September 1969 in the coup that toppled King Idriss, Muammar Qaddafi wanted to raise Libya’s profile in the world arena. In pursuit of this objective, he conducted a regional policy characterised by intervention in the affairs of neighbouring countries and support for pan-Arab and third world “revolutionary movements” aiming to overthrow the governments in place. He supported armed groups in Chad and tried to take advantage of the civil war in that country to annex the Aouzou Strip and declare a merger of the two countries in the Jamahiriya. His troops suffered resounding military defeats. In the Maghreb, he was also tempted by merger projects with Egypt and Tunisia but these were unfruitful. At the global level, he posed as a “defender of oppressed peoples” and supported radical terrorist groups. The result of this policy included military defeats in Chad, a questionable image in the Maghreb and international setbacks with the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. For more details, see Mansour Al Kikhia, Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction (Florida, 1998); René Otayek, La politique africaine de la Libye 1969-1985 (Paris, 1986); and Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya, 6 June 2011.
4 Between 2004 and 2009, Chad and Sudan were in a “state of belligerence”, exchanging accusations of destabilisation through support for respective armed rebellions based in Darfur. Open war was only avoided thanks to the many mediation attempts by African actors. In 2009, the two countries engaged in a direct dialogue that led to gradual return of peace.
5 As he liked to remind everyone, Muammar Qaddafi did not consider himself to be like any other head of state. He claimed the Jamahiriya had no executive powers, that it was administered directly by the citizens themselves through people’s committees (Mutamar as Shaab ala’um) and that he simply played the role of a “Guide”. Consequently, protocol in the Jamahiriya required use of the word “Guide” or “Brother Guide” when addressing Qaddafi. This designation became current in the press and in most works on Qaddafi. See Muammar Qaddafi, La troisième théorie universelle du Livre Vert (Tripoli, 1976).
6 Tibesti is a region in north-western Chad, on the border with Libya. It is mainly populated by the Toubou, who are also present in Libya and Niger. This region has been the scene of recurrent armed conflicts.
cilitated secret contacts between President Déby and his opponents. For example, Qaddafi’s good offices helped to obtain support and peace agreements from the main factions of the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Chad, MDJT), the last active armed group in the extreme north of the country. While strengthening its influence, Tripoli’s interventions also aimed to stop instability in Tibesti overflowing into southern Libya, where many Toubou tribes lived.7

Under the presidency of Idriss Déby, Qaddafi recognised the change in the geopolitical context and consequently adopted a different attitude towards his neighbour. Knowing that he was no longer able to intervene in Chadian politics as he had done in the past, he became an important mediator in the country. Qaddafi was involved in almost all internal Chadian negotiations in one way or another and brokered many peace agreements, including the Sirte Agreement in 2007 between President Idriss Déby and a coalition of armed opponents backed by Sudan.8 Because of the indirect armed confrontation between Chad and Sudan in the 2004-2009 period and the crises in Darfur and eastern Chad, the Libyan leader was in a position, as from 2003, to consolidate his position as regional facilitator. He used his contacts with the warlords in eastern Chad and Darfur to encourage them to sign ceasefires. He also re-established contact between N’Djamena and Khartoum and perhaps prevented open war between the two regimes.9

However, the Guide was not content with this diplomatic role. He also played a more subtle role in readjusting the balance of forces between Chad and Sudan, a process that was initially very unfavourable to Idriss Déby. Qaddafi’s strategy consisted of dividing the united Chadian armed opposition front and putting pressure on Khartoum to seek a negotiated arrangement with Déby rather than driving him from power. Qaddafi, who always had a difficult relationship with the Sudanese leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir,10 did not want to see him overthrow his Chadian counterpart.

In May 2008, rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)11 attacked the suburbs of Omdurman, the twin town adjoining Khartoum, in the first such attack so far from their bases. The Sudanese authorities were convinced that Idriss Déby instigated the attack in revenge for Sudan’s backing of the Chadian rebel military offensive two months earlier.12 However, the Sudanese secret services discovered that Libya was also involved and had supplied arms to the JEM via Chad.13

Both Idriss Déby and Qaddafi subsequently made use of Khalil Ibrahim, the rebel movement’s leader. His forces acted as reinforcements for the Chadian army and were incorporated into the presidential guard. In April 2010, after his expulsion from Chad, where his presence hindered reconciliation with Sudan, Qaddafi welcomed him at Déby’s request. At the beginning of the Libyan insurrection, he was suspected of fighting with loyalist forces.14 On his return to Darfur after the fall of Tripoli, he denied this allegation, affirming without really convincing anyone that he was under house arrest during his stay there.15 His return was apparently organised by supporters who were able to cross the border between Chad, Sudan and Libya despite the surveillance of Khartoum and N’Djamena.16

This dual policy of mediation and maintaining the balance of forces was also apparent in Central Africa, this time to Idriss Déby’s disadvantage. In 2002, Qaddafi supported the Central African Republic president, Ange Félix Patassé, who was under threat from rebels sheltered by Chad and forced Idriss Déby to curb his vague attempts to intervene in the CAR. The JEM is one of the factions of the armed rebellion in Darfur that has benefited most from Chad’s military support in recent years. Its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, lived in exile in Tripoli from April 2010 until the fall of Qaddafi. The NTC and Sudan accused him of having supplied mercenaries to pro-Qaddafi forces during the Libyan insurrection. “Sudan plays down presence of JEM leader in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 12 September 2011.

11 In February 2008, rebels probably armed by Sudan conducted a surprise attack, crossing Chad from east to west and arriving at the doors of the presidential palace in N’Djamena. They only failed to take power because of last minute divisions. Déby had recourse to Libyan and French logistical assistance to repel this attack. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°144, Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, 24 September 2008.

12 The Sudanese discovered that Libya supplied arms and munitions to the JEM twice through Chad, in March 2008 and May 2009. Libyan support was coordinated by Moussa Koussa, head of the intelligence services, working with the Chad National Security Agency. “Who Shot First?”, Africa Confidential, vol. 50, no. 9 (May 2009); and Jérôme Tubiana, “Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of the Chad/Sudan Rapprochement”, Small Arms Survey, working paper no. 25, March 2011.

13 He was suspected of having fought alongside Qaddafi’s forces with some of his men and Sudanese fighters recruited in Libya. Crisis Group interviews, Sudanese journalist based in Nairobi, 12 September 2011.

14 Crisis Group interviews, journalist, specialist on Sudan, Nairobi, 12 September 2011.

15 According to the Sudanese press. See “JEM leader says he has arrived in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 11 September 2011.

8 For more details, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°149, Chad: Powder Keg in the East, 15 April 2009.
9 See Crisis Group Briefing, Libya/Chad, op. cit.
10 A certain distrust, if not hostility, was a constant feature of relations between al-Bashir and Qaddafi because of Libyan interference in the Darfur crisis and Sudan’s internal affairs. Moreover, Sudan depends more on Libya than Chad for its security.
11 The JEM is one of the factions of the armed rebellion in Darfur that has benefited most from Chad’s military support in recent years. Its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, lived in exile in Tripoli from April 2010 until the fall of Qaddafi. The NTC and Sudan accused him of having supplied mercenaries to pro-Qaddafi forces during the Libyan insurrection. “Sudan plays down presence of JEM leader in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 12 September 2011.
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15 Crisis Group interviews, journalist, specialist on Sudan, Nairobi, 12 September 2011.
16 According to the Sudanese press. See “JEM leader says he has arrived in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 11 September 2011.
in his southern neighbour. After Patassé was overthrown in 2003, the Libyan leader offered his support to the new president, François Bozizé, who feared that Sudan would attempt to destabilise his country because of Khartoum’s incursions in the northeast, in pursuit of Darfur rebels.

The Tuareg crisis in Mali and Niger is another example of Qaddafi’s attempts to maintain a regional balance of forces. In both countries, he supported Tuareg rebel groups and the governments at the same time. His support for the rebels generally consisted of guaranteeing their protection in exchange for promises to stop attacking the governments, who were Libya’s allies. Qaddafi’s claims of being a peacemaker in these countries sometimes led him to be a negative mediator, who threatened to sabotage any negotiations in which he had not acted as guarantor or had not been consulted. However, in Chad and elsewhere, this ambitious and disorganised policy to increase his influence helped to strengthen his reputation as a controversial and ambiguous figure.

B. IDRIS DÉBY AND MUAMMAR QADDAFI: AN AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP DESPITE APPEARANCES

Less than one month before the first uprisings in Derna, Tobruk and Benghazi, the Libyan leader visited N’Djamena for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Chad’s independence. Fate had it that this would be his last journey abroad as Libyan leader. He arrived on 11 January 2011, as a special guest of his sub-Saharan ally, ignored protocol arrangements and made a spectacular appearance at an impressive military parade. At the end of the ceremony, he and President Déby led Muslim prayers at N’Djamena racecourse, a vast area in the heart of the city that Chad had just handed over to Libya for the construction of a cultural and university complex.

Despite their apparent closeness, Idriss Déby and Muammar Qaddafi had a very complex relationship. When he came to power in 1990, the Chadian president took some time to establish direct contact with the Guide because he wanted to avoid any compromising relationship with a leader ostracised by the international community. Qaddafi expressed his support for Idriss Déby, who had brought down his former enemy Hissène Habré, but treated his interlocutor with circumspection and was rightly suspicious of the Chad president’s prioritisation of his relations with France. Although, Déby ended up seeking Qaddafi’s help to defend himself from Sudan and his opponents during his twenty years in power, France nevertheless retained the regime’s main supporter. Consequently, Qaddafi’s political support sometimes appeared uneasy and even troublesome.

Moreover, while expressing his gratitude to Qaddafi for successive offers of mediation between his government and armed opponents, Idriss Déby was sometimes critical of the Libyan leader. In 2002, speculating that Qaddafi was playing a double game, he declared: “our Libyan brothers should play fair … in the role they want to play and which consists of facilitating national reconciliation between Chadians. It is well-known that armed groups have operated from bases in Libya … I think that the construction of the African Union sought by Libya depends first on respect for a certain number of fundamental elements, such as the stability of African states. All of us must do our best to achieve this”. Moreover, while supporting Idriss Déby during his recent conflict with Omar al-Bashir, Qaddafi never went as far as to clearly align

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17 Support for Patassé took the form of sending 100 Libyan soldiers mandated by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to ensure his security. At the same time, Qaddafi set about trying to facilitate mediation between Déby and Patassé. “Qaddafi pleased with Déby/Patassé meeting”, Panapress, 10 April 2002.


19 The arrangements provided for the attending fourteen heads of state to remain together in a single vehicle at the Place de la Nation where the military parade was to take place. Only President Déby, host of the ceremony, was to arrive in a separate procession. The Guide’s delegation deliberately ignored these arrangements and Qaddafi made his appearance escorted by several vehicles after all the other heads of state. This breach of protocol did not particularly irritate the Chadian authorities. Crisis Group interview, State Protocol Service official, N’Djamena, 3 March 2004.


21 See Crisis Group Briefing, Libya/Chad, op. cit.


23 As in 2007, when the Libyan leader had pressed him to refuse the deployment of an international force in eastern Chad. See Roland Marchal, “Chad/Darfour: vers un système de conflits”, Conjoncture, no. 102 (2006).

himself with Chad, to the great irritation of his ally. Qaddafi even threatened to abandon N’Djamena.25

For example, in 2009, after another attack by armed opponents based in Sudan, the Chadian government launched air raids on Sudanese territory. In order to avoid an escalation of a war likely to provoke international intervention in “his own backyard”, Libya used its influence to get Idriss Déby to take a more flexible position. The latter had previously threatened to refuse any mediation by the African Union and listen “only to the United Nations”.26 Involving the UN in an affair which Tripoli wanted to retain exclusive control was a worrying prospect and Qaddafi therefore took advantage of the summit meeting of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), held on 29 May 2009, to ask (“threaten” according to some sources) the Chadian head of state to change his mind.27

The leading circles of the Jamahiriya sometimes perceived Idriss Déby as an unpredictable but clever person who was only interested in staying in power and receiving Libya’s political support and economic investments.28 On several occasions, tension developed between Ali Triki, coordinator of Libya’s African policy for years, and the Chadian authorities. Triki criticised N’Djamena for being too close to France.29 Meanwhile, the Chadian head of state, who is the African leader with the best understanding of Qaddafi’s character and power system, always avoided a direct clash with him. However, he would not countenance Libyan intervention in three key areas: France’s military presence in Chad, relations with western countries and oil policy. Outside these three areas, he let Qaddafi exercise his influence in negotiations with armed opponents.

The ambivalent relationship between Muammar Qaddafi and Idriss Déby was symbolically demonstrated in recent years by the choice of ambassadors to Tripoli and N’Djamena. In 2009, Idriss Déby appointed his brother, Daoussa Déby as ambassador to Tripoli to indicate the “special” nature of his relationship with the Guide, but also to allow his brother to closely monitor the movements of Chadian opponents and the political situation in Libya.30 The Libyan ambassador to N’Djamena until the Guide’s fall was Grène Saleh Grène, known for his work in the 1970s as the official dealing with the armed Chadian groups supported by Libya and therefore for his many contacts with local military leaders.

Twenty years of mutual distrust, give and take and a unique relationship between Tripoli and N’Djamena explains Chad’s management of the Libyan crisis. The eight months of war that ended in Colonel Qaddafi’s fall must have seemed very long to Idriss Déby whose initial strategy consisted of trying to remain loyal to his partner while avoiding any associated political costs.

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27 Crisis Group interview, former member of the Chad government, N’Djamena, 18 September 2010.
28 Crisis Group interview, former Chad minister of foreign affairs under Déby, Paris, 2 June 2011.
29 Crisis Group interview, Chad Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, N’Djamena, 24 February 2011.
30 During his stay in Tripoli, Daoussa Déby made many contacts with close associates of Qaddafi, notably Moussa Koussa, the head of intelligence services. At the start of the Libyan crisis, it was said that he enjoyed Qaddafi’s support and believed he could turn this situation to his advantage. He was recalled to N’Djamena for consultation in March 2011 and did not return to Tripoli because of the deterioration of the situation. Crisis Group interview, journalist, N’Djamena, 11 August 2011.
II. CHAD AND THE LIBYAN CRISIS: GOVERNMENT PRIORITISES REALPOLITIK

The Libyan crisis again demonstrated Idriss Déby’s capacity to navigate through the regional storms, even though it meant he had to retreat from his initial position. It also showed how exposed Chad is to changes in the regional geopolitical situation. Déby had tirelessly repeated that he would align himself with the African Union but he recognised the National Transition Council (NTC, the political organ of the Libyan insurgents) even before the African Union took a position, confirming that his major concern was to adapt to what was happening on the ground. Three weeks before this announcement, Idriss Déby had led an enthusiastic crowd in clapping for Qaddafi’s representative, who was attending his investiture for another term of office as Chad’s head of state.

One could debate the reasons for this “U-turn” for hours on end but it was fundamentally an expression of realpolitik. Déby refused to abandon Qaddafi for as long as he thought he had a chance of staying in power. When he realised this was no longer possible, he preferred to end his support in order to protect his own immediate regional interests. However, Chadian government policy revealed a poor appreciation of the changing international context, a certain disorientation and the lack of strategic vision of the events in Libya.

A. Déby’s Loyalty to Qaddafi

There are many indications suggesting that Idriss Déby tried to help his ally Qaddafi at the beginning of the Libyan crisis. Was N’Djamena preparing to intervene militarily as affirmed in some media reports and by the NTC? Like many other aspects of the Libyan war, the full story is yet to be revealed. This question has however provoked much debate, fuelled rumours and given rise to interpretations that would be useful to analyse in the light of the facts and the Chadian authorities’ statements to the media on this subject.

The Chadian government initially believed Qaddafi’s thesis that the Benghazi inscription was orchestrated by Islamists claiming to be part of the Arab Spring. At the beginning of March 2011, in his first response to the Libyan crisis, Idriss Déby said he “had reliable information” that the insurgents had links with Islamists belonging to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and had supplied the latter with missiles stolen from barracks in Benghazi. Later, the Chadian authorities insisted several times in Libya that the Benghazi insurrection was orchestrated by heavy weapons against demonstrators, The Telegraph, 20 February 2011; and “Libye: un avenir incertain. Compte-rendu de la mission d’évaluation auprès des belligérants libyens”, Centre international de recherche sur le terrorisme – Aide aux victimes du terrorisme (CIRET-AVT), Paris, May 2011.

31 The NTC (in Arabic, al-Majlis al-Watani al-Intiqali) was the political organ created to organise the Libyan towns taken by the anti-Qaddafi coalition, politically coordinate the insurrection and act as a reference for external supporters. It was not a provisional government. On 10 March 2011, France was the first country to recognise it as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan people”. For more on the NTC and its main components, see the Crisis Group Report, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya, op. cit.
32 Chad was expected to make an announcement only after the AU had adopted an official position, but N’Djamena announced that it recognised the NTC’s victory and consequently “its legitimacy as the sole authority of the Libyan people” on 24 August 2011, even before the capture of Tripoli. “Le Tchad reconnaît le CNT comme seule autorité légitime du peuple libyen”, Radio France Internationale, 25 August 2011.
33 Among the foreign guests at President Déby’s investiture on 8 August 2011 was Bechir Saleh, Qaddafi’s cabinet director and manager of the Libya Africa Portfolio Investment financial fund. On his entry into the ceremonial “tent” (which Qaddafi had installed during one of his visits to Chad), the arrival of the “representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” was greeted by long applause by those present, including members of the Chadian government.
34 See Acheikh Ibni Oumar, “Reconnaissance du CNT: pourquoi le Tchad n’avait pas le choix”, Tchadactuel, 6 September 2011.
times on the seriousness of the Islamist peril for all Sahel states if Libya became unstable.39

Did Chad really believe this or was it only an attempt to legitimise what Qaddafi and his supporters were saying? The Chadian security services did not take kindly to the Libyan uprising, not because they were afraid of a similar uprising in Chad,40 but because of the potential regional collateral effects. At first, like many other African capitals, N’Djamena did not envisage the Guide’s fall but feared that foreign intervention might result in the collapse of the Libyan clan system, causing lasting instability that would overflow into neighbouring countries.41 Chad was fearful of proliferation of arms and upheavals in trade with southern Libya, on which the economy of part of northern Chad largely depends.

By insisting that AQIM posed a threat, President Déby tried to show the international community that destroying the Libyan leader would threaten regional stability.42 Like many African presidents, Déby did not hide the fact that before NATO’s intervention he was in direct and regular telephone contact with Qaddafi and that he viewed the NTC as “rebels”, despite whatever legitimacy the NTC might have for the international community.

Several media broadcast NTC accusations43 that Chadian government troops were fighting alongside pro-Qaddafi troops, including elite soldiers from the presidential guard. As from February 2011, many television reports and press articles interviewed witnesses who confirmed the participation of “Chadian troops” and “African mercenaries” under their command. The television channel Al-Jazeera broadcast images of Chadian nationals as prisoners of the insurgents and the French newspaper Le Figaro published an article claiming that Déby’s presidential guard took part in the fighting and “played an important role in countering the advance of the insurgents”.44 Other witnesses said that the tactics employed by pro-Qaddafi troops were very similar to those used by the Chadian army (use of 4X4 vehicles carrying mounted machine guns and rocket-launchers, use of rezous,45 etc.).

The Libyan insurgents themselves said that their biggest losses were inflicted by “seasoned” Chadian soldiers.46 Did Chad intervene militarily? Are the accusations to be believed?

Like many other nationals of Sub-Saharan countries, Chadians fought alongside pro-Qaddafi troops.47 No reliable figures have been given of their number, although the NTC and the press say they saw thousands of “black soldiers”.48 However, according to N’Djamena, these soldiers, among which Chadians were a long way from being in the majority, did not belong to the presidential guard and were recruited either in Libya or in neighbouring countries by intermediaries working for Qaddafi. The Chadian authori-

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39 See the interview with the Chadian minister of foreign affairs, Moussa Faki Mahamat, on the television channel Africa 24, 17 May 2011.
40 After the uprisings in Derna, Tobruk and Benghazi, Chadian opposition websites called on the population “to show the same courage displayed by the Libyans and overthrow the dictator Déby”. A few pamphlets and graffiti were seen in N’Djamena with the slogan “Twenty years is enough, down with Déby!” The Chadian intelligence services ensured that these were quickly removed. According to Amnesty International, students who called for demonstrations were abducted by the National Security Agency (Agence nationale de sécurité, ANS). The Chadian opposition also said that some rallies took place in Moundou in the south of the country, but it seems that these were related to the electoral process rather than an indication that the Arab Spring was spreading to Chad. From April 2011, no other incidents were reported in the country and the presidential election that resulted in Idriss Déby’s victory took place in a peaceful atmosphere. Moreover, the authorities met by Crisis Group in February 2011 all played down the events in Benghazi and said it was very unlikely that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions would spread to Libya, where “the context is not the same”. Nobody in N’Djamena, including the general public, doubted Qaddafi’s capacity to quickly put down the insurrection. Crisis Group interviews, members of the security services and various personalities, N’Djamena, February-March 2011.
41 In one interview, Idriss Déby warned against “hasty” foreign intervention in a “complex” Libyan situation in a regional context marked by the threat from AQIM. “Si la Libye implose, les conséquences seront incalculables pour la région”, Jeune Afrique, 6 April 2011.
42 Ibid.
44 “Du cash pour les milliers de mercenaires de Qaddafi”, Le Figaro, 3 April 2011.
45 Rezou (rapid surprise attack) is a fighting tactic used during the Chadian civil wars and involves the use of columns of 4X4 vehicles driven at speed. Each vehicle carries a dozen men equipped with small arms and rocket-launchers. The aim of this tactic is to catch the enemy off-guard and deny him any opportunity to respond. In former times, rezous were conducted on horseback. See Roger Charlton and Roy May, “Warlords and Militarism in Chad”, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 16, no. 45-46 (1989).
46 Ibid.
48 The use of mercenaries is a long-standing part of Qaddafi’s power system. Even before 1980, Chad had itself accused Qaddafi of recruiting mercenaries to occupy southern Libya. In that period, Qaddafi created an “Islamist legion” manned by nationals from sub-Saharan African countries. After this legion’s dissolution at the end of the 1980s, many of its combatants joined the Libyan army. The Africans fighting alongside Qaddafi’s forces were not only from sub-Saharan countries – Algerians and Saharans were also taken prisoner by the NTC. “Racist violence overshadows Libya’s revolution”, Deutsche Welle, 7 September 2011.
ties denied coordinating the recruitment efforts made by these intermediaries, who allegedly acted in Chad without their knowledge.\(^\text{49}\) According to information gathered by Crisis Group, Chadian opposition reports of a recruitment unit in the Chad presidency were false.\(^\text{50}\) On the other hand, it would have been impossible for intermediaries\(^\text{51}\) to recruit without the knowledge of the intelligence services.

In August 2011, as Chad was preparing to officially recognise the NTC, the Chadian authorities presented to the press individuals arrested for “recruiting mercenaries”.\(^\text{52}\) This coincidence indicates that Chad was using the arrest of presumed mercenaries and their recruiters to send a positive signal to the NTC. Interlocutors have told Crisis Group that the Chadian authorities were aware that recruitment was going on at the start of the conflict but did not act in order to avoid confirming that the NTC’s accusations were well-founded.\(^\text{53}\) In the Faya-Largeau region, for example, young men were recruited for money.\(^\text{54}\) In addition, Chad’s embassy in Tripoli and its consulate in Sebha did nothing to dissuade Chad nationals living in Tripoli and the south of Libya from being recruited.\(^\text{55}\)

In April 2011, the Chadian minister of foreign affairs presented to the press officers who, according to the NTC,\(^\text{56}\) had been taken prisoner after fighting in Libya. Meanwhile, NATO made no official pronouncement on Chadian intervention. However, some sources have indicated to Crisis Group that the Chad-Libyan border was under surveillance and the Chadian authorities had been warned about the consequences of intervening.\(^\text{57}\)

Chad’s line of defence has been to say that, prior to NATO’s intervention, Colonel Qaddafi had no need of external support to put down an insurrection that was initially not very well organised and lacked enough seasoned fighters or adequate weaponry to confront the government’s repressive machinery.\(^\text{58}\) After NATO entered the conflict, it became very costly politically for Chad to intervene, knowing that NTC accusations had already contributed to surveillance measures against the authorities.

**B. TIME FOR PRUDENCE AND REALPOLITIK**

By May 2011, it seemed that Idriss Déby had understood the need to change his position, although the official Chadian discourse remained legalist and favourable to Qaddafi. The intensification of NATO strikes and the firm involvement of his French ally\(^\text{59}\) hardly left him any choice. Moreover, during this period, contacts with the Libyan Guide became increasingly rare and even non-existent, as the latter was forced to avoid external telephone communications that could be used to identify his whereabouts.

The Chadian government’s appeals for negotiations and condemnation of international strikes moved closer and closer to the AU’s position.\(^\text{60}\) After initially denouncing

\(^\text{49}\) Crisis Group interviews, member of the security services, Faya-Largeau and N’Djamena, 9, 11 and 13 August 2011.
\(^\text{50}\) The website www.tchadactuel.com has noted the connivance (denied by the Chadian government) between Daoussa Déby, the head of state’s brother and ambassador to Tripoli, with Grène Ali Grène, the Jamahiriya’s ambassador to N’Djamena, who quit his post in March 2011 to settle in Sebha (south Libya) where he tried to rally Toubou tribes to Qaddafi’s cause. Crisis Group interviews, journalist, N’Djamena, 11 August 2011.
\(^\text{51}\) Recruitment of Tuareg and Toubou fighters in the Sahel was coordinated by Agaly Alambo, a Niger rebel chief who had found protection and financial support in Libya. Asked about Agaly Alambo’s arrival in northern Chad to recruit combatants, the security services said they had no information on this. Crisis Group interview, member of the security services, Faya-Largeau, 9 August 2011.
\(^\text{52}\) Communiqué issued by the state prosecutor, 18 August 2011.
\(^\text{53}\) Crisis Group telephone interview, journalist based in Chad, 3 September 2011.
\(^\text{54}\) Crisis Group interview, journalist based in Chad, 9 August 2011.
\(^\text{55}\) See “Statement of the Transitional National Council”, op. cit.
\(^\text{56}\) Ibid.
NATO’s “hasty” involvement, the Chadian authorities were careful not to pronounce on the course of events in Libya, leaving it to the AU to propose a political plan to end the crisis. Certain of NATO’s support, the NTC rejected this plan, ending any illusions that countries such as Chad and South Africa may have about the objective of international strikes. The defence of civilians seemed to be only one element of the strategy followed by France and the United Kingdom, who wanted regime change in Libya.

In this context, and as support for Qaddafi crumbled, Chad did not want to appear to be ready to support Qaddafi to the end. Paris’s express recommendations also led the Chadian authorities to revise their pro-Qaddafi position. However, Idriss Déby successfully insisted that no air-strikes be conducted from French military bases in Chad. In addition, he let it be known that he would not execute any arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court against Qaddafi.

Neither did N’Djamena want to be the country in the region to suffer most from a change of regime in Libya, knowing that the first consequence would be an upheaval in regional alliances. In its not entirely resolved dispute with Khartoum, the Chadian regime feared an alliance between the NTC and Sudan. Unlike Déby, who had emphasised the Islamist peril when warning of the consequences if Qaddafi should fall, Omar al-Bashir had fully supported the NTC from the start of the rebellion. Tension with the NTC following the affair of the Chadian mercenaries indicated that relations between N’Djamena and Tripoli might never be the same again, and that President Déby might have to face yet another regime suspicious of his intentions.

When he declared, on 8 August 2011, that the Libyan conflict was at an “impasse” and that the only way out was through negotiations, Déby already had no illusions. He had made his first contact with the NTC, emissaries of the movement having arrived in N’Djamena in June or July. Even though no meeting initially took place with Idriss Déby, his closest associates assured the emissaries that Chad wanted a political solution and would take note of any change in the balance of forces on the ground: N’Djamena had already turned the pro-Qaddafi page.

Its recognition of the NTC on 24 August after the fall of Tripoli was only the culmination of a change in direction begun when NATO began to hit Qaddafi hard. The government’s official communiqué announcing its recognition of the NTC made no mention of Qaddafi or “changes on the ground” and called on “the new government to assume full responsibility for protecting Chadian nationals resident in Libya”. Neither did the communiqué refer to the vandalism of the Chad Embassy in Tripoli by the insurgents.

The recognition confirmed a development that was at the same time historically and geopolitically inescapable: N’Djamena cannot allow itself to have hostile relations with its northern neighbour, whose open and concealed influence has made itself felt throughout Chad’s recent political history. Geographical proximity has always brought the two countries together and this relationship is strengthened by their shared religion (Islam), the economic links between northern Chad and Libya and the existence of the Toubou ethnic group on both sides of the border.

It was consideration of this situation that led the Chadian authorities to opt for realpolitik in their management of the Libyan crisis.

61 “Si la Libye implose”, op. cit.
62 Crisis Group interview, journalist, N’Djamena, 11 August 2011.
63 See Crisis Group interview, Chadian politician, N’Djamena, 11 August 2011.
64 See “Communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l’Intégration africaine sur les événements se déroulant en Libye”, N’Djamena, 24 August 2011. Three days after this communiqué was released, the Chadian presidency announced that Déby had accepted an invitation from France to attend an international conference on the new Libya to be held in Paris at the beginning of September.
65 See Crisis Group Briefing, Libya/Chad, op. cit.
III. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES AND SECURITY UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CRISIS

Although it is too early to make a definitive assessment of the crisis or see what lies ahead in the post-Qaddafi era, the conflict’s spectacular consequences for Libya and neighbouring countries are clear. In addition to the promise of democracy and the establishment of a more representative government, the end of Qaddafi’s reign has had negative collateral effects: the economic cost, waves of migration and the exacerbation of tensions between Libyans and sub-Saharan. As in Mali, Niger and other sub-Saharan African countries, the effects in Chad have been three-dimensional: a humanitarian dimension affecting the situation of migrants in Libya; an economic dimension characterised, at least in the short term, by a halt to Libyan investment in Chad; finally, a security dimension that has highlighted the precarious nature of peace in northern and eastern Chad.

Post-Qaddafi political scenarios and regional reconfiguration will remain uncertain until the new government in Tripoli stabilises the situation and define its relations with its neighbours, especially those in the Sahel area. Although Chad and the NTC have announced that they want good relations, will the new Libyan government agree to sweep all the tensions that appeared during the crisis under the carpet? Chad, more than anything wants Libya to be a regional ally that will work together to ensure security along its northern border. Will the new Libyan leaders want to play such a role? Will the future Libyan government need Chad to stabilise southern Libya? After years of peace, will we see a return of the tensions that previously existed between Chad and Libya? At the continental level, will the new regime follow the same policies as Qaddafi and focus on sub-Saharan Africa or will it turn towards North Africa and Europe? Relations with Chad could provide some answers to these questions.

A. FROM EL DORADO TO AN INFERNAL TRAP: THE REPERCUSSIONS FOR MIGRANTS IN LIBYA

The deteriorating situation in Libya caught many migrant workers in a trap and they were forced to return to their country in difficult conditions. Until the onset of the crisis, nationals of Chad, Niger and Sudan constituted the most numerous and established sub-Saharan communities in Libya. Between March and August 2011, about 80,000 sub-Saharan, a large majority of them from Chad, left Libya for Chad. Humanitarian care for these returnees was organised by the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Chad, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

These organisations arranged transport for migrants, who arrived in Chad in dramatic conditions. The migrants described how they had been badly treated and had their property stolen by Libyan insurgents and the general public, who equated “blacks with mercenaries”. Chadian authorities set up a crisis unit to manage the issue and provide migrants with humanitarian assistance through local NGOs.

The press, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have all published witness statements about the atrocities committed against black Libyan nationals and immigrants of sub-Saharan origin in Libya. After the fall of Tripoli, many nationals of sub-Saharan countries fled Libya but found their way blocked at Sebha in southern Libya while awaiting evacuation. According to Amnesty International, others were arrested and detained arbitrarily. The AU explained its initial refusal to recognise the NTC as being partly due to the persistence of these atrocities. AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping said he was africaines en Libye”, in Laurence Marfaing and Steffen Wippel (eds.), Les relations transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine, (Paris, 2004). For estimates of the number of Chad nationals in Libya, see the monthly bulletins of the OCHA office in Chad.

Situation of returnees from Libya”, IOM weekly update, 15 August 2011.

Many of these immigrants are former combatants in the Chadian wars or people who have broken off all contact with their country of origin. Some of them dreaded going back to Chad and chose instead to go to Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt or tried to reach Europe. For further details, see the monthly bulletins of the OCHA office in Chad.

See “The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture”, Amnesty International, 13 September 2011. Since the fall of Tripoli, the initial accusations of being mercenaries have been replaced by allegations of “public drunkenness, witchcraft and spreading AIDS”. See “Voyage en Libye libre”, Jeune Afrique, 25 September-1 October 2011.

See the communiqué issued by the Chadian minister of foreign affairs, 18 April 2011.


72 According to estimates, before the crisis there were about 300,000 Chadian nationals in Libya. For more on African migrants in Libya, see Emmanuel Grégoire, “Les migrations ouest-africaines en Libye”, in Laurence Marfaing and Steffen Wippel (eds.), Les relations transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine, (Paris, 2004). For estimates of the number of Chad nationals in Libya, see the monthly bulletins of the OCHA office in Chad.

73 “Situation of returnees from Libya”, IOM weekly update, 15 August 2011.

74 Many of these immigrants are former combatants in the Chadian wars or people who have broken off all contact with their country of origin. Some of them dreaded going back to Chad and chose instead to go to Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt or tried to reach Europe. For further details, see the monthly bulletins of the OCHA office in Chad.

75 “Situation of returnees from Libya”, IOM weekly update, 15 August 2011.

76 Many of these immigrants are former combatants in the Chadian wars or people who have broken off all contact with their country of origin. Some of them dreaded going back to Chad and chose instead to go to Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt or tried to reach Europe. For further details, see the monthly bulletins of the OCHA office in Chad.
waiting for “assurances” from the NTC about the situation of black Africans in Libya.\textsuperscript{80} These assurances were apparently forthcoming, because the AU officially recognised the NTC on 21 September 2011.\textsuperscript{81}

The first migrant reception centres for returnees arriving in Chad were in the towns of Faya-Largeau, Ounianga Kébir and Kalait. The population of these towns doubled within a few months, while the breakdown in trade with southern Libya led to an increase in prices of consumer goods.\textsuperscript{82} Historically, northern Chad’s distance from N’Djamena and its location favoured trade with southern Libya. Local traders imported products along caravan routes or by lorries crossing the border on their way to Sebha, Maaten Es-Sahara or Gatroun. Even though the crisis did not close the borders, local shopkeepers took advantage of the situation and increased the price of imports from Libya.\textsuperscript{83}

Despite the violence, many Chadian migrants originally from Chad did not want to return and remained on the other side of the border. Some of them were born in Libya or acquired Libyan nationality. In the long term, N’Djamena and the new Libyan authorities must reach a political agreement on the situation of Chadian migrants and cross-border trade. Chad needs the remittances sent home by these migrants and Libya could also need them just as much for post-crisis reconstruction work.\textsuperscript{84}

B. A HALT TO LIBYAN INVESTMENTS

At the end of the 1990s, Libya started using an increasing proportion of the capital generated by oil profits for investments in sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad) were the first to benefit from these investments, which later extended to other countries.\textsuperscript{85}

The Libyan crisis could halt economic cooperation between N’Djamena and Tripoli. Continued cooperation will largely depend on the new Libyan government’s policies towards their Sahelian neighbours. At the onset of the crisis, Chad and Libya had just organised a joint commission to formulate new guidelines for bilateral cooperation. Held in N’Djamena in August 2009, the sixth joint Chad-Libya commission stressed the desire of the two states to extend cooperation beyond security issues and henceforth prioritise joint economic projects. The commission arranged the transfer of thousands of hectares of agricultural land\textsuperscript{86} (in addition to the N’Djamena racecourse)\textsuperscript{87} to Libya and signed many agreements on agriculture, taxation and customs.

The intensification of economic cooperation advocated by the sixth joint commission confirmed the increase and diversification of Libyan investments in Chad over the last ten years. Since 2002, Libya has made extensive investments in its southern neighbour: in property, with the construction of a hotel complex in N’Djamena; in manufacturing, with the funding of a mineral water factory; and in increasing agricultural and energy capacity, which Libya believed would benefit future investments. Libya is also present in the banking sector, through the Chari Commercial Bank (Banque commerciale du Chari, BCC) and the Sahel-Saharan Bank for Investment and Commerce (Banque sahélo-saharienne pour l’investissement et le commerce, BSIC), which is an organ of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

The BSIC-Chad is part of a network of twelve banks in thirteen sub-Saharan states,\textsuperscript{88} with headquarters in Tripoli. It is 99.99 per cent owned by BSIC Libya. The BCC is not part of the BSIC network, but the Libyan Foreign Bank and the Chadian state own equal shares (50 per cent).\textsuperscript{89} After the European Union and the United States froze the Jamahiriya’s foreign assets, these two banks (like most of

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\textsuperscript{80} Crisis Group interview, African Union official, Addis Ababa, 14 September 2011.
\textsuperscript{81} See the communiqué issued by the Chair of the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, 21 September 2011.
\textsuperscript{82} The price of basic goods doubled: sugar from CFA1,000 to CFA2,000 (€2 to €4), soap from CFA500 to CFA1,000 (€1 to €2) and oil from CFA1,500 to CFA3,000 (€3 to €6). Crisis Group interviews, shopkeepers, Faya-Largeau, 12 August 2011.
\textsuperscript{83} Crisis Group interviews, shopkeepers, Faya-Largeau, 12 August 2011.
\textsuperscript{84} Crisis Group interviews, shopkeepers, Faya-Largeau, 12 August 2011.
\textsuperscript{85} For more on this investment policy, see Luis Martinez, “Transformations socio-économiques et mutations politiques sous l’embargo”, Centre d’études et de recherches internationales/Sciences po (Paris, 2009).
\textsuperscript{86} The conditions for transfer of this land remain vague: the N’Djamena city council was not involved in the decision, which was taken directly by the presidency of the Republic. Was it a sale or was it a transfer in exchange for property investments made as part of the policy to reorganise the capital’s urban landscape, launched by the Chadian authorities in 2009? Contradictory information circulates on this subject, but the second hypothesis is the most likely as the funds were quickly released by the Sahel-Saharan Bank for Investment and Commerce for the construction of a wall around the land. Crisis Group interviews, journalists, N’Djamena, March and August 2011.
\textsuperscript{87} 20,000 hectares in Bongor in southern Chad, 20,000 hectares in Mandadila, 60 kilometres from N’Djamena and 15,000 hectares in Mara on the outskirts of N’Djamena. See “Les travaux de la commission mixte Tchad/Libye ont pris financial”, Tchad-online, 5 August 2009, at www.tchadonline.com/les-travaux-de-la-commission-mixte-tchad-libye-ont-pris-fin/.
\textsuperscript{88} For more on this network and member countries, see the bank’s website: www.bsicnet.com/spip.php?rubrique4.
\textsuperscript{89} Crisis Group interview, Treasury official, N’Djamena, 5 August 2011.
the banks connected to Libyan establishments) found themselves short of currency.90

In 2009, President Déby officially launched construction work for a Libyan commercial complex. In 2010, the Libyan telecommunications operator Réseau vert, subsidiary of the Libyan sovereignty fund, Libyan African Portfolio Investment, acquired almost all the capital of the Chad Communications Company (Société de communication du Chad, SOTEL) for $90 million and anticipated investing $100 million in the company’s development.91 The Libyan crisis ended this operation and the Chadian authorities are preparing a new invitation to tender for the company.92

Libya’s growing economic presence was encouraged by President Déby, who believed an influx of Libyan capital was very useful for his economic policy. He believed that giving Libyan investors full access and providing them with political facilities would diversify Chad’s economy. At the same time, the Chadian authorities wanted to reduce the risks of such a presence. With the exception of SOTEL, Libya has not invested in enterprises essential to Chad’s economy or the oil industry, except for the distribution sector, where Oil Libya owns some service stations.

The Chadian government is currently seeking funds to compensate for the halt to financial flows from Libya. It has had to organise a forced loan to finance, among other things, projects begun by Libya.93 On 12 September 2011, the government also adopted a bill amending the state’s general budget, approved by parliament on 26 September 2011. This law increased state expenditure by CFA309 billion from CFA1,263 billion to CFA1,572 billion.94 The Chadian government justified this increase by the “exceptional security expenditure” (deployment of troops to the north) required by the Libyan crisis and the provision of care for repatriated Chadians.95 Of this CFA309 billion increase, around CFA200 billion was allocated to just two ministries – Defence and Security. Contrary to Rwanda for example, which seized Libyan assets after the onset of the crisis, Chad has not taken such measures.

C. SECURITY AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS: TOWARDS A NEW ORDER?

Chad may suffer political and security collateral effects from the Libyan crisis. Although the Benghazi uprising is very unlikely to be repeated in Chad, there are three main risks. The first risk, which is not specific to Chad, is the proliferation of arms that could become a factor in destabilising the entire Sahel.96 The second risk is that of instability along the very sensitive and strategic Chad-Libya border. The third risk, which is already current, is a new round of destabilisation of Darfur and eastern Chad caused by Khalil Ibrahim’s return to the region.

As in the 1980s, part of the threat to internal security could come from the northern border. Although the government fears that the major consequence of instability in Libya will be the proliferation and trafficking of arms in northern Chad, it is even more afraid of the threat posed by Toumbou combatants in the historically rebellious region of Tibesti. The proliferation of arms could benefit the Chadian Toumbou, residual elements of the MDJT97 or combatants wanting to pick a fight with Idriss Déby.98 Such a development would destabilise northern Chad and southern Libya especially if hostile forces link up along the border. N’Djamena and Tripoli would need to cooperate in order to deal with such an eventuality. Does the Chadian army, which is currently on alert in two risk zones (in the east, where the peace with Sudan continues to be threatened by the JEM, and the border with the Central African Republic where various armed groups operate) have the resources to ensure an impenetrable security cordon given the im-

90 For more on the establishments targeted and the conditions regulating the freezing of their assets, see the list compiled by the French Treasury (Direction générale du Trésor et de la politique économique).
92 Crisis Group interview, Treasury official, N’Djamena, 5 August 2011.
93 This loan was not initially linked to the Libyan crisis, but it was deemed useful to make liquid assets available to the government immediately. Ibid.
94 See the Chad presidency’s summary, 27 September 2011.
95 See the minutes of the Council of Ministers, 12 September 2011.
96 Observers mention the threat posed by AQIM, which has reportedly acquired quantities of arms during the Libyan crisis. AQIM is a more “distant” threat, as the group does not currently operate directly in Chad and its operations are focused more on Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Algeria. A meeting on the question (not attended by Chad) was held in Algiers on 7 September 2011. The risks posed by AQIM are therefore not detailed in this report.
97 Armed group created in 1998 by a former Toubou minister under Idriss Déby, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Chad) is thought to be the last rebel movement claiming a presence in Tibesti. However, this presence is questioned by many observers. The movement is divided into several factions that are only active on the internet and its main leaders have signed peace agreements with N’Djamena. For an analysis of the MDJT, see Crisis Group Briefing, Libya/Chad, op. cit.
98 The scene of many armed uprisings throughout Chad’s history, peace is precarious in Tibesti. The central government closely monitors any armed groups that might be hidden in the region’s mountains waiting for a favourable opportunity to make an appearance. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°78, Chad’s North West: The Next High-risk Area?, 28 February 2011.
The Chadian president criticised NTC supporters for targeting his countrymen in the Tripoli region. He accused the council of doing nothing to protect Chad’s embassy or the ambassador’s residence, which were both looted and vandalised. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2011, he appealed for international aid to deal with the influx of Chadians and sub-Saharan refugees fleeing from events in Libya. He estimated the number of repatriated Chadians at 100,000 and again called for an end to atrocities against Chadians who remained in Libya.

Idriss Déby, aware that the new government in Tripoli will need time to assume control over the immensity of southern Libya, would be ready to cooperate in stabilising the situation in exchange for assurances that Tripoli would not be hostile to him despite his initial position on the Libyan conflict. By recognising the NTC, he would like to consign any tensions that surfaced during the crisis to the past and convince his new interlocutors of the need for good relations. In other words, he is already working to promote continuity of his security and partnership with Libya, this time without the Guide’s interventionist policies and their intrusive consequences on internal Chadian politics. However, it is by no means certain that the Libyan leaders will agree to continue a partnership with a neighbour who, in addition to being perceived as a friend of their former enemy, is in a weaker position than themselves. Such is the equation that Déby will try to resolve over the next few months. He will certainly use his contacts with former associates of Qaddafi who have joined the NTC in order to iron out political differences.

Although Qaddafi’s fall raises the question of the relationship between Chad and Libya, it also indirectly raises the question of relations with Sudan. In the Chad/Libya/Sudan triptych, if N’Djamena does not play fair in its relations with the new Libyan government and, in addition, with regard to the warlike plans of Khalil Ibrahim, there is a strong possibility that Khartoum and Tripoli will form an alliance against him. The new Libyan government would not accept Chad harbouring possible enemy fighters. Moreover, the definitive neutralisation of the JEM remains a national security issue for Sudan, which would do anything to avoid any resumption of the rebellion in Darfur.

By strengthening its military patrols in the region, the Chadian government is currently trying to reassure its regional partners. Meanwhile, the Sudanese army has been deployed along the border zone of Ennedi, but this has however not prevented Khalil Ibrahim’s return to Darfur.

In a communiqué published on 8 September 2011, the JEM confirmed his return and accused the Chadian and

99 Crisis Group interviews, analysts and diplomats, French ministries of defence and foreign affairs, Paris, 30 September 2011.
100 See “Les Toubou veulent leur place dans l’après-Qaddafi”, Le Monde, 30 September 2011.
101 Natives of this region have only occupied a few low-ranking officer posts. See Patrick Haimzadeh, Au cœur de la Libye de Qaddafi (Paris, 2011).
102 Ibid.
103 See “Les Toubou veulent leur place dans l’après-Qaddafi”, op. cit.
104 Déby recadre le CNT, La Lettre du Continent, no. 619, 8 September 2011.
105 This was not the first meeting between the two men. Idriss Déby had already met Moustafa Abdel Jalil several times, including when he was still Qaddafi’s minister of justice.
106 See the monthly bulletins of the OCHA in Chad.
107 Crisis Group telephone interview, Chad presidential adviser, 5 September 2011.
108 JEM leader says he arrived in Darfur”, op. cit.
Sudanese armies of launching a large-scale joint attack against his positions. N’Djamena has denied this claim.109

Khartoum’s intelligence services do not exclude the possibility that the JEM will try and use its contacts in Chad to once again seek a rapprochement with N’Djamena. In addition, the circumstances in which Khalil Ibrahim returned to Darfur remain a mystery.110 How did he evade the surveillance of the security services? Did he pass through Chad? In which case, who helped him? According to the Sudanese press,111 a JEM convoy crossed the Chad/Libya/Sudan border to meet Ibrahim and get him out of Libya. If such an operation took place, it means that surveillance of this immense zone by the security services is ineffective.112

The Sudanese authorities however believe that Khalil Ibrahim, who now has a stockpile of arms acquired in Libya,113 enjoyed the “complicity” of others to return to Darfur after travelling through Niger and Chad. After the announcement of his return, the Chadian president dispatched one of his close advisers to Khartoum to provide assurances to the Sudanese government.114 In the short term, Idriss Déby could find himself in difficulties with regard to the JEM situation. In order to convince his Sudanese interlocutors of his good faith, he needs to put into practice his official political line of cooperation with Khartoum.115 In the past, the Sudanese have criticised him for maintaining ambiguous relations with the JEM leader. After expelling him from Chad in April 2010, he agreed to meet him again in Tripoli in June 2010 under the good offices of Qaddafi.116 This meeting provoked questioning by the Sudanese authorities at the time.

Will Idriss Déby manage to deal with the JEM situation without provoking dissent within his own clan, the Zag-

hawa, which remains divided on the question? A Zaghawa with Sudanese nationality, Khalil Ibrahim has clan-based ties with Chad, including with Idriss Déby’s family. He boasts of being the defender of all “oppressed” Zaghawa, and seeks the support of all those who, in one area of the border or another, want a political alliance of this community and his goal is to make it the dominant group in Darfur and eastern Chad.117 At the beginning of September 2011, reports indicated that Zaghawa officers had refused to participate in joint operations with Sudan and that N’Djamena had to cut telephone communications in the east of the country to avoid military information being intercepted by infiltrated JEM contacts. However, the Chadian government spokesperson denied the existence of any joint military operation.118

There are currently few indications of either the extent of Khalil Ibrahim’s support in Chad119 or the exact location of his forces.120 The fact remains that the JEM issue gives cause for concern and raises doubts. On 3 October 2011, Khalil Ibrahim announced his intention to create a new military alliance with Darfuris of the Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic and the rebel faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-North), which is fighting the Sudanese army in the Kordofan region.121 If such an alliance is confirmed, it will further destabilise the region.122

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109 See press briefing by Chad minister of communication, government spokesperson, N’Djamena, 9 September 2011.
110 Crisis Group interviews, journalist, specialist on Sudan, Nairobi, 7 September 2011; and analyst, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 30 September 2011.
111 Sudan plays down presence of JEM leader in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 12 September 2011.
112 Crisis Group interview, journalist, specialist on Sudan, Nairobi, 7 September 2011.
114 See “Chad’s president reassures Sudanese counterpart over border security agreement”, Sudan Tribune, 27 September 2011.
115 On 7 October 2011, a Sudanese delegation led by General Mahamat Ata al-Maoula Abbas arrived in N’Djamena, with a “verbal” message from President al-Bashir. Crisis Group has learned that this message was mainly about developing joint strategies to counter Ibrahim. Crisis Group telephone interviews, journalist based in Chad, 9 October 2011.
118 See the interview with the minister, Hassan Syla Bakari, Radio France Internationale, 9 September 2011.
119 Timane Déby, the president’s half-brother (and more important, Khalil Ibrahim’s cousin) was named as being a discreet supporter of Khalil Ibrahim. Previously Sultan of Wadi Hawar (Chadian canton located on the Sudanese border, where JEM fighters sometimes find refuge), Timane Déby was stripped of his title in November 2010 for not respecting the head of state’s order to break with the JEM. He was among those, in President Déby’s entourage, who reportedly challenged his decision to expel Khalil Ibrahim from Chad in April 2010. Unhappy with this step, his relations with Idriss Déby are said to have been strained since then. Crisis Group telephone interview, journalist based in Chad, 29 September 2011.
120 Spotted at the beginning of September in the Wadi Hawar region in North Darfur, near the border with Chad, JEM troops were reportedly seen inside Chad territory (to obtain fuel supplies) and in the Kordofan region of Sudan. Crisis Group interview, journalist, specialist on Sudan, Nairobi, 30 September 2011.
121 The SPLM-North is the northern branch of the former rebel movement now in power in the new state of South Sudan. See “Un important chef rebelle annonce une nouvelle alliance contre Khartoum”, Agence France Presse, 4 October 2011.
122 Also worth noting because of the consequences for the region is that on 12 October 2011 the Sudanese vice-president, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, accused Uganda of being part of a “wide-ranging anti-Arab plot” to overthrow the Khartoum gov-
IV. CONCLUSION

Chad is the country where the regional geopolitical dimension of the Libyan crisis has had the most impact, because of Qaddafi’s repeated intervention in its internal politics and its pivotal geographical position at the crossroads between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, and between western and eastern Sahel. The fate of Chadians trapped by events in Libya is the most immediate and tragic manifestation of this dimension. They are among the main collateral victims of the crisis. Some had been recruited as fighters, whilst others had to hurriedly flee a country they previously saw as an El Dorado. Those who have remained in Libya will see an era of change that may prove a threat to their continued presence in the country.

The second regional dimension of this crisis is manifested through the policy of the Chadian government, which, like many sub-Saharan African regimes was unable to quickly and correctly analyse the extent of the changes underway in Libya. A prisoner of Qaddafi’s political influence, it took positions that were perceived if not as military support, then at least as political support for Qaddafi. Chad tried to readjust its strategy in the light of the rapidly developing situation and changes in the political and military balance of forces. It will nevertheless suffer the effects of the predictable regional upheavals set in motion by the new Libyan order, including the disruption of regional alliances; the weakening of regimes supported by Qaddafi; and the increasingly inevitable divorce between Libya and sub-Saharan Africa.

Many questions remain about the post-Qaddafi security situation. Libya’s neighbours, particularly Chad, are worriedly watching the development of the situation in order to anticipate the collateral effects with regard to the proliferation of arms, terrorism threats and the deterioration of the situation in Darfur. The future of Chad-Libyan relations depends in part on three main factors. The first is related to the orientation of the new Libyan government’s foreign policy. Early signs seem to indicate that Libya will turn towards the Arab world and Europe to the detriment of sub-Saharan Africa. However, Libya has many investments in this part of the African continent and it will therefore need to reach a political understanding with these countries.

The question of the many black Africans remaining in Libya is also an important factor. Many countries, with Chad at the top of the list, have denounced the treatment meted out to these migrants. If appeals to the new Libyan government are not heard, the regional diplomatic tension on this issue risks stirring up mutual hostility. Finally, the development of the situation in southern Libya will be decisive. This region could easily become a disputed area that will destabilise the length of this highly strategic and sensitive border. Until the new Libyan government ensures total control of this region, distrust towards neighbouring countries is likely to continue.

N’Djamena/Nairobi/Brussels, 21 October 2011
APPENDIX A

MAP OF CHAD
APPENDIX B

MAP OF SOUTH LIBYA’S BORDER WITH CHAD, NIGER AND SUDAN
APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

1 September 1969: Coup led by Muammar Qaddafi overthrows King Idriss I. Qaddafi lays claim to the Aouzou Strip. The claim is based on a colonial treaty signed by Italy and France in 1935 but not ratified.

27 August 1971: Chad accuses Egypt and Libya of supporting a coup against President Tombalbaye, organised by recently amnestied Chadians. Tombalbaye cuts all diplomatic relations with Libya and Egypt, and invites Libyan opposition groups to establish bases in Chad.

17 September 1971: Qaddafi officially recognises the National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale, FROLINAT), an armed group in northern Chad that he supports, as Chad’s only legitimate government.

October 1971: The Chadian Foreign Minister denounces Libya’s “expansionist ideas” at the UN.

17 April 1972: Chad and Libya resume diplomatic relations thanks to French pressure on Libya and mediation by President Hamani Diori of Niger.

28 November 1972: Tombalbaye breaks off diplomatic relations with Israel and is reported to have secretly agreed to sell the Aouzou Strip to Libya for $40 million.

December 1972: Chad and Libya sign a friendship treaty. Qaddafi withdraws his official support from FROLINAT, forcing his leader, Abba Siddick, to move his headquarters from Tripoli to Algiers.

June 1973: De facto annexation of Aouzou Strip by Libya.

October 1976: Division about the nature of Libyan support in the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de commandement des forces armées du Nord, CCFAN), the military arm of FROLINAT. A minority led by Hissène Habré decides to leave and form the Armed Forces of the North (Forces armées du Nord, FAN), while the majority, led by Goukouni Weddeye, accepts an alliance with Qaddafi and calls itself the Popular Armed Forces (Forces armées populaires, FAP).

February 1977: Libya supplies the FAP with hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles, dozens of bazookas, 81 and 82mm mortars and cannons.

March 1977: Chadian government armed forces attacked by FAP at Bardaï and Zouar in Tibesti and Ounianga Kébir in Borkou. The government forces lose 300 men and a large quantity of military equipment falls into rebel hands.

June 1977: FROLINAT Congress at Faya-Largeau. The congress appoints Goukouni Weddeye as the movement’s secretary general.

September 1977: The Khartoum Accord seals an alliance between Malloum and Habré. This rapprochement is strongly supported by Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

29 January 1978: Goukouni Weddeye’s FAP conducts an offensive, supported by Libyan troops, in the north of Chad (Faya-Largeau, Fada and Ounianga Kébir). These attacks are successful and the Libyans take complete control of the entire B.E.T. (Borkou Ennedi Tibesti) region.

6 February 1978: Malloum breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya and takes the question of Libya’s involvement in the fighting to the United Nations Security Council. He again raises the question of Libya’s occupation of the Aouzou Strip.


19 February 1978: Malloum is forced to accept a ceasefire and withdraw his protests against Libya.

20 February 1978: Launch of Operation Tacaud involving the arrival of 2,500 French troops by April to ensure the security of N’Djamena.


27 March 1978: Benghazi Accord. Malloum recognises FROLINAT and agrees a ceasefire. The Accord provides for the creation of a joint Niger-Libyan military committee responsible for implementing the agreement and the end of the French military presence in Chad.

15 April 1978: Goukouni Weddeye’s FAP departs from Faya-Largeau leaving a garrison of 800 Libyan men and moves towards N’Djamena, with Libyan support.

19 May 1978: FROLINAT attacks the Aouzou Strip but is repelled thanks to the arrival of reinforcements, including French troops.

June 1978: FROLINAT suffers another defeat at the hands of government forces at Djedaa. FROLINAT withdraws to the north of the country.

27 August 1978: Ahmat Acyl, leader of the “Volcan Army” (a dissident faction of FROLINAT), attacks Faya-Largeau with the support of Libyan troops in a Libyan attempt to oust Goukouni Weddeye from the FROLINAT leadership and replace him with Acyl.

29 August 1978: Habré becomes prime minister of a government of national unity.

12 February 1979: Violent clashes between Habré’s FAN and Malloum’s FAT in N’Djamena.

19 February 1979: Goukouni Weddeye’s forces enter the capital to fight at Habré’s side against FAT.

16 March 1979: Kano Accord between Malloum, Habré and Goukouni Weddeye provides for the formation of a government of national unity (GUNT) by 25 June. Pro-Libyan currents not represented in the GUNT create a counter-government, the Provisional Joint Action Front (Front d’action provisoire conjointe, FAPC) in the north of Chad with Libyan military support.
26 June 1979: Libyan troops invade Chad. Libyan forces are halted by pro-Goukouni Weddeye forces and then forced to withdraw by the French air force.

21 August 1979: Goukouni Weddeye creates a national government for peace and claims to be the legitimate government in the terms of the Lagos Accord.

December 1982: Hissène Habré attacks Goukouni Weddeye in Tibesti, but is repelled.


25 June 1983: The OAU officially recognises Hissène Habré’s government and calls on all foreign troops to leave Chad.

6 August 1983: French Operation Man- La reseeds troops to help Hissène Habré counter the advance of Goukouni Weddeye’s forces.

30 April 1984: Qaddafi proposes the withdrawal of both French and Libyan troops.

25 September 1984: French and Libyan troops begin to withdraw. Despite the Franco-Libyan agreement, Qaddafi leaves 3,000 men in the north of the country.

10 February 1986: Following the rallying of several GUNT members to Hissène Habré, Qaddafi launches an offensive.


October 1986: Goukouni Weddeye’s FAP tries to retake Fada but is attacked by the Libyan garrison, leading to a major clash, which puts an end to the GUNT. The Libyans arrest Goukouni Weddeye but his troops rebel, dislodging them from all their positions in Tibesti. Libya begins to retake its bases but withdraws after the French army arrives.

2 January 1987: Hissène Habré begins his conquest of the north by attacking Fada.

5 September 1987: The Chadian army makes a surprise attack on the Libyan air base of Maaten al-Sahra, in Libyan territory.

11 September 1987: Ceasefire under the auspices of the OAU.

May 1988: Qaddafi declares himself ready to recognise Hissène Habré as the legitimate president of Chad “as a present to Africa”.

August 1988: The Chadian and Libyan foreign ministers meet and the two governments agree to hold further talks.

3 October 1988: The two countries resume full diplomatic relations.

31 August 1989: Chadian and Libyan representatives meet in Algiers to negotiate a framework agreement to peacefully resolve the Aouzou Strip border dispute. They agree to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a binding decision if bilateral negotiations fail.

September 1990: After one year of inconclusive talks, the dispute is referred to the ICJ.

2 December 1990: Idriss Déby overthrows Hissène Habré. Qaddafi is the first head of state to recognise the new regime. Déby and Qaddafi sign various friendship and cooperation treaties. However, the Aouzou Strip remains a contentious issue.

3 February 1994: The two parties sign an agreement on implementation of the ICJ’s ruling.

15 April-10 May 1994: Libyan troops withdraw from the Aouzou Strip, under the supervision of international observers.

30 May 1994: Official and definitive transfer of the Aouzou Strip from Libya to Chad.

October 1998: Creation of the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Chad, MDJT), a Toubou rebel group led by Youssouf Togotimi, a former minister under Idriss Déby.

7 January 2002: Libya sponsors a ceasefire agreement between the MDJT and the Chadian government.

24 September 2002: Youssouf Togotimi dies after being wounded by a landmine explosion. His supporters say Libya and Chad organised his assassination, a charge denied by the two countries.

April 2006: Attempted coup against Idriss Déby. A series of dissident movements appear in the Chadian army. Creation of many rebel groups. First rebel offensive enters N'Djamena, but is finally repelled.

October 2007: Qaddafi hosts talks between four Chadian rebel groups, who sign a peace agreement with the Chad...
government, in the presence of the Chad and Sudan presidents. Qaddafi brokers
the return to Chad of Mahamat Nour, one
of the main rebel leaders.

31 January-2 February 2008: In a se-
cond offensive against N’Djamena, re-
bels take the city except for the presiden-
tial palace. Pro-Déby forces respond with
Libyan logistical support.

9 May 2008: Sudanese rebels of the
Movement for Justice and Equality
(Mouvement pour la justice et l’égalité,
JEM) attack Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudan accuses Chad then Libya of organ-
ising the attack.

25 June 2009: Qaddafi brokers a new
peace agreement between the Chadian
government and its armed opponents.

8-9 August 2009: The prime ministers of Chad, Youssouf Saleh Abbas, and Libya,
Baghdadi Mahmoudi, lead negotiations
that end in seven accords designed to in-
crease security, trade and political coop-
eration.

15 January 2010: Chad-Sudan peace
agreement. Qaddafi helps to broker the
agreement.

20 May 2010: Chad expels JEM leader,
Khalil Ibrahim, to Libya. Idriss Déby
asks Qaddafi to welcome him.

12 January 2011: Qaddafi’s final visit to
Chad as Libyan leader.

15 February 2011: Libya’s arrest of a
human rights activist in Benghazi is fol-
lowed by riots. Hundreds of people call
for his release and confront police offic-
ers and pro-government supporters.

17 February 2011: Seven demonstrators
are killed in clashes in Benghazi, while
demonstrations also take place in El-
Beida, Zintan, Derna and Tobruk.

April 2011: The Chadian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs declares that the Libyan
crisis can be resolved through dialogue
and objects to a communiqué released by
the National Transitional Council (NTC)
that notes the involvement of Chadian
mercenaries in Libya.

23-25 February 2011: The insurgents
take control of the area along the Egyp-
tian border as far as Ajdabiya, including
the towns of Tobruk and Benghazi.

10 March 2011: France recognises the
Libyan NTC as the sole “legitimate rep-
resentative of the Libyan people” and
announces that it will soon send an am-
bassador to Benghazi. In response,