



A map of the Middle East region with several cities labeled: Aleppo, Nicosia, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Mosul, Hamedan, Tehran, Isfahan, Yazd, Basra, and Tabuk. There are several colored markers: a red star over Tehran, a red dot over Baghdad, and several yellow and orange dots over other locations. The text 'DAILY SUMMARY' is written in orange above the main title.

The Iran–U.S. Trigger List

Israel/Golan 25 October

Syrian state media [reported](#) that Israel had conducted an “aggression on the southern region”, which unconfirmed [reports](#) speculated had been targeting Syrian military or allied facilities in Quneitra province. A Syrian foreign ministry source denounced the attack and underscored Damascus’s “right and ability to respond”.

Tehran 25 October

The IAEA [reported](#) “that Iran began feeding [uranium hexafluoride gas] enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 into a single IR-6 centrifuge in R&D line 2 at PFEP [the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz] and that the resulting product and tails streams were being re-combined”.

Tehran 25 October

Confirming imminent discussions with the EU’s Joint Commission coordinator, a senior Iranian diplomat [affirmed](#) that “Iran is determined to engage in negotiations that would remove unlawful and cruel sanctions in a full and effective manner, secure normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran and provide credible guarantee for no further reneging”. “The question is if our partners are genuinely ready to fulfill their commitments”, he noted, adding: “the continuation of the failed maximum pressure policy definitely will not remove any obstacle... rather will add more to already existing negotiations’ complexities”. In related comments the day before, President Raisi had [asserted](#) that “we are committed to what we promised, but the U.S. and the Europeans are in a decision-making crisis”.

Washington 25 October

U.S. Special Representative for Iran Robert Malley [maintained](#) that “we’re in a critical phase of the efforts to see whether we can revive the JCPOA... the official reasons given by Iran for why we’re in this hiatus are wearing very thin. Particularly because at the same time as they are not coming to the table... they are taking steps to expand their nuclear program and they’re putting additional obstacles on the work of the IAEA, all of which is in contradiction or inconsistent with what they claim to be their desire to come back to the JCPOA”. Reporting on discussions with E3 and Gulf interlocutors, Malley referred to a “strong preference for diplomacy”, and that GCC officials had indicated “they wanted to engage more deeply with Iran on the economic front” if the JCPOA was revived, but noted too that “if diplomacy fails we have other tools and we will use other tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon”. He went on to emphasise that “even as we are trying to get back into the JCPOA, we are taking steps to counter and deter Iran’s

aggressive behaviour in the region... we have also said that once we're back in the JCPOA, we believe it should be a platform to help open the door for more discussions, diplomacy with Iran, with regional partners".

Tehran 24 October

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei [contended](#) that "some governments made a mistake... They sinned by normalising relations with the usurping, despotic Zionist regime [ie, Israel]. This move is against Islamic unity and solidarity. They should turn back from this path and compensate for this grave mistake".

Tehran 23 October

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi [indicated](#) the agency's monitoring capability in Iran was "no longer intact" after Tehran had [restricted](#) access to a centrifuge facility in Karaj. "It hasn't paralysed what we are doing there, but damage that has been done, with a potential of us not being able to reconstruct the picture, the jigsaw puzzle", he added, while noting: "if and when the JCPOA will be restarted, I know that for the JCPOA partners to go back to an agreement, they will have to know where they are putting their feet". Grossi further stated that so far he had seen "no indication" of Iran trying to make a nuclear weapon, but asserted that "the case of the DPRK should remind us of what may happen if diplomatic efforts go wrong... If diplomacy fails, you may be confronted with a situation that would have enormous political impact in the Middle East and beyond".