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Executive Summary

Katanga is at the heart of growing political tension in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Intentionally stalled preparations for elections scheduled for November and rushed, politicised implementation of decentralisation and break-up of some provinces (décoúpage), including Katanga, have fuelled tensions between the region and centre and between the opposition and President Joseph Kabila’s ruling majority. This assumed an overtly political dimension after the former Katanga governor, Moïse Katumbi, declared his candidacy for president, provoking Kabila to initiate investigations and issue a warrant for his arrest for undermining national security. The Congo’s fragile institutions are under great strain. A credible national dialogue to discuss how to manage a transition, a commitment not to change the constitution for political purposes or prolong the transition to preserve the status quo, and measurable progress toward elections are urgently needed. To avoid prolonged crisis and likely violence, the UN and international partners should help facilitate and build on African Union attempts to support a dialogue.

Katanga has been at the centre of the DRC’s tumultuous political history, as the seat of a failed secessionist movement at independence and as a key battleground in the second Congo war (1997-2003). Under Kabila père, then son Joseph, who succeeded him on his death in 2001, Katangans have held many critical positions in government and the security forces. Dissatisfaction with Joseph Kabila has been growing since the 2011 elections, in Katanga as elsewhere. One factor, failure to finance provincial administrations properly, has been compounded in Katanga by a sense of entitlement based on the huge contribution its mineral exports make to the national budget. This took a political turn in 2014, when Katumbi and other important local elites, mostly ex-Kabila allies, came out against the president’s apparent plans to keep power after his second – and according to the constitution final – term expires in December 2016. The central government has increased repression and augmented the already heavy military presence in the region.

In early 2015, partly in reaction to the growing opposition, the government decided to implement décoúpage, as foreseen in the 2010 constitution, increasing the number of provinces from eleven to 26. Katanga was split into four new provinces. While some local elites welcome the opportunity to run their own administrations, many in Katanga are unhappy at what they see as a divide and rule strategy. The décoúpage was rushed, ill planned, under-resourced and coincided with a budget crisis, due mostly to the drop in demand for Katanga’s minerals.

Katumbi’s emergence as a prominent Kabila opponent coincided with a split in the ruling majority, of which he was part. The opposition is strengthened but also fractured. On 4 May 2016, Katumbi declared his candidacy in the presidential elections that are still some way off, further heightening tensions. The announcement that he was being investigated prompted widespread demonstrations in Lubumbashi, Katanga’s major city, and the would-be candidate left the country for medical checks.

The looming national crisis is already damaging weak political trust and may manifest itself through an upsurge in armed violence, protest, increased state repression and even security force fractures. All these may occur, and some have already, in Katanga, which is likely to be a major arena for violent political struggle and a
symbol of wider problems. Serious tensions exist there between communities, especially local ethnic groups, migrants and the internally displaced (IDPs), who increased from 50,000 to 500,000 between 2011 and 2014. The economic downturn will also increase resentments and make problems harder to solve.

A crisis that could pose a serious challenge to stability in the region, and to international peacekeeping efforts, needs to be headed off. While national politics is increasingly zero-sum as the electoral deadline nears, some actors, including at local level, still have a strong interest in cooling the temperature to prevent conflict emerging. Early measures against unaccountable armed groups, and especially against those who encourage them, could avoid a greater problem later on. Politicians should desist from using armed groups to pressure their opponents, and national authorities should act, with support from the UN Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) to discourage them from doing so. MONUSCO should use its leverage to encourage this and deploy more assets to Katanga, especially human rights monitors and police. But this leverage is diminishing, and confronted with a gathering storm, other more radical options, such as downsizing the mission, may eventually have to be considered.

To address distrust between the centre and provinces, financial flows need to be more regular, transparent and in line with statutes. National auditors and civil society must be better empowered to monitor these flows and their use. Resolving the DRC’s national and provincial problems ultimately requires trust and dialogue, as well as electoral progress. The stalled dialogue initiative, mediated by Edem Kodjo of the African Union (AU), should be pursued and other channels of communication kept open to allow elite-level talks on national and provincial interests. Congo’s international partners should support dialogue, as the AU is doing, and ensure that the critical question of centre-province relations is kept on the table.

Nairobi/Brussels, 3 August 2016
I. **Introduction: The National Context**

This report examines links between long-term tensions in the Katanga region and the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) linked to the constitutional and electoral deadline at the end of 2016. President Joseph Kabila, in power since his father’s January 2001 assassination, has been elected in 2006 and 2011. The latter vote was controversial, marred by fraud and manipulation. A constitutional amendment early that year, favoured him, as it allowed a candidate with a plurality but less than 50 per cent of the vote to avoid a run-off in which the opposition could have united behind a single candidate. Constitutional amendments also increased the power of the central government over the provinces. However, the constitution still unequivocally limits the president to two terms.

Kabila’s mandate, therefore, should end in December 2016, but there is neither the financial resources nor political will to hold elections in November, and the electoral timetable is in disarray. The ruling majority (henceforth “the majority” in this report), an alliance of parties built around the president’s People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD, the largest in parliament), appears unwilling to relinquish power or face the electorate.

After failing in 2014 to amend the constitution to allow Kabila to stand for a third term, it turned to delaying elections, first by insisting on a prior national census. When this failed, due to sustained popular outcry in early 2015, the majority concentrated on delaying preparation and funding of elections. Updating the voter register, the most time-consuming requirement, has made almost no progress. Kabila’s government, a seasoned observer has noted, seems determined to “boycott its own election”. With only months to the end of the president’s legal mandate, the polls’ slippage has become inevitable. The calculations of the Electoral Commission (CENI) suggest a delay of up to several years. The regime’s plans to stay in power were given legal cover by the Constitutional Court’s May ruling that the president could remain until an elected successor was installed.

As discontent grew in early 2015, the government suddenly prioritised implementation of long-planned decentralisation. This started with creation of 21 new provinces carved out of six of the existing eleven, a process known as découpage. Fully implemented by July, it was poorly planned and chaotically administered, adding...
to delays in both national and local elections. In March 2016, existing provincial assemblies indirectly elected governors for the new provinces, a process that took place under tight regime control and firmly established Kabila’s dominance of the new provinces. For new provinces, existing provincial assembly members formed assemblies according to their constituencies, then elected governors.

In the course of 2015, the government announced a national dialogue on the electoral process. Most of the opposition has refused to take part, arguing it would legitimise delays or demanding broad international engagement and guarantees. The dialogue has, however, become an integral part of the international attempt to avoid a deepening of the political crisis. The African Union (AU) announced support in January 2016 and in April appointed former Togolese Prime Minister Edem Kodjo as facilitator. The need for a dialogue was also included in UN Security Council Resolution 2277 (March 2016). In June, an international support group was created for the facilitation. Other international reactions to the current blocked situation have been more forthright, including the imposition on 26 June of bilateral sanctions by the U.S. on the chief of police of Kinshasa, Celestin Kanyama.

Kabila’s attempts to keep power have been resisted by both the “old” opposition around Etienne Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and former allies, such as Vital Kamerhe. In 2015, the opposition received a boost with the defection of Moïse Katumbi, the former Katanga governor, and several important parties from the majority bloc, which formed the “G7” coalition.

Opposition and civil society organisations have sought greater unity. The former continues to struggle over whether to present a single candidate in an eventual election and whether to participate in the national dialogue. The “Citizen Front 2016”, established in December 2015, was the first attempt to create a platform bringing political and social actors together, but it faltered because of strategic differences and distrust. In June 2016, a meeting of several opposition leaders in Genval, near Brussels, led to creation of the “Rassemblement” under the leadership of Etienne Tshiskedi. The platform brings in Katumbi allies, including the G7, thus forming a potentially potent new alliance. It does not include Kamerhe, however, the leader of the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC).

\[5 \text{ Découpage is discussed in more detail in Chapter III below.} \]

\[6 \text{ “Inaugural Meeting of the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, AU press release, 4 July 2016. The Group includes: the AU, UN, European Union (EU), the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).} \]

\[7 \text{ Crisis Group interviews, politicians, diplomats and civil society members, Brussels, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Goma, February-March 2016.} \]

\[8 \text{ “Le “Front citoyen 2016”, regroupant des partis, organisations sociales et individuelles, a été formé en} \]

The biggest blow to the opposition has been the Catholic Church’s decision to pursue a less confrontational line. Divided over its political strategy, it had taken a very strong position that the elections be held as scheduled by the constitution in November 2016, but, reportedly after intervention of the Vatican, cancelled a “March of the Christians” protest on 16 February for fear it could turn violent.10 This frustrated opposition politicians, because the Church has strong moral stature, national presence and mobilisation capacity. Katumbi in particular has been identified to a large degree with it, for instance appealing for a daily two-minute prayer at noon in support of the “democratic struggle”. The Church reappeared on the political scene after the June episcopal conference, speaking out against manipulation of the constitution, but it is unclear whether this heralds more activism.11

Katumbi took a bold step on 4 May, when he announced his intention to stand for president.12 That day, Justice Minister Alexis Thambwe announced he was being investigated for “recruitment of mercenaries”. Facing hearings, growing pressure and intimidation, he was hospitalised on 13 May. On 19 May, the national prosecutor issued an arrest warrant, but Katumbi was later granted highly unusual permission to travel abroad for medical care. Since Katumbi and the G7 left the majority, tensions have increased, particularly in Lubumbashi, capital of the former province. Protests turned violent on 24 April.13 There are also more security forces, with armoured vehicles, in and around the city.

These national problems will almost certainly continue to worsen when the president’s mandate ends in December. They may take several forms: breakdown of already low political trust, explosions of popular anger, state repression and even fractures in the security forces. This report analyses a region, Katanga, that will be a major player in the coming crisis and is representative of the country’s wider troubles. After examining its place in Kabila’s Congo, it looks at perceptions of découpage, political tensions between members of the Katangan elite in the region and Kinshasa, the risk of political violence linked to armed groups in Katanga and the overall impact on national politics. Based on fieldwork in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and Kinshasa, it is part of a series on the DRC’s broader electoral process.14

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10 Earlier, in December 2015, it recalled its representative from the opposition meeting in Senegal. The Church is also divided over its political strategy. Crisis Group, interviews, diplomats, civil society members and Catholic Church official, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, March 2016.
12 He is backed by the G7 and the Alternation for the Republic (AR), a new alliance of several smaller parties.
II. Katanga: The Centre of Gravity in Kabila’s Congo

Katanga has always been central to Congo’s political dramas. Katangans’ desire for autonomy and sense of exceptionalism are fuelled by the region’s extraordinary mineral wealth, currently the source of well over half the DRC’s fiscal revenue. Only weeks after independence in 1960, Moïse Tshombe’s National Confederation of Katanga (CONAKAT), supported by Belgian and U.S. interests, declared secession. The ensuing crisis prompted the first UN deployment of peacekeepers to DRC and was a defining moment in the country’s early turmoil. The UN force and the national army ended the attempt in 1963 and briefly forced Tshombe into exile. Other CONAKAT supporters fled to Angola, where in 1968 they founded the armed National Liberation Front of Congo (FNLC), the “Katangan tigers”, and with support from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) launched failed invasions of Katanga in 1977 and 1978 (the “Shaba wars”).

Under Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule (1965-1997), the province’s mineral wealth was mismanaged, contributing to the decline of the huge state-run mining company Gécamines (Général des Carrières et des Mines) in the late 1980s. When he was forced to allow some political competition in the early 1990s, Mobutu stirred tensions between Luba immigrants from Kasaï and native Katangans to weaken his strongest opponent, Tshisekedi (who is from Kasai). He also appointed Gabriel Kyungu as Katanga’s governor, who created a new political party, the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (UFERI). In 1992, Kyungu blamed Katanga’s economic woes on Luba migrants and adopted an explicit policy of cleansing ethnic Luba from its major mining cities, which led to purges that killed more than 5,000 people. In September 2000, Kyungu formed the Union of Congolese Nationalists and Federalists (UNAFEC).

Katanga had a significant role in the 1997-1998 war, in which Laurent Desiré Kabila, a Lubakat (Luba from Katanga), overthrew Mobutu. Supported by Angola, many ex-“tigers” joined his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), which developed an important base in Katanga. Many Katangans also joined the central government. However, resentment quickly surfaced, as predominantly northern Katangan politicians staffed the new administration and its security forces, while the province’s south was deprived of the greater share of power and representation it felt entitled to as the main source of mineral wealth.

15 For more on Katangan history, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°103, Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, 9 January 2006; and Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (New Jersey, 1965).

16 Gécamines was created in 1967 as successor of the colonial Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK).

17 The Luba are DRC’s largest ethnic group. The name applies to a variety of peoples who speak closely related languages and share culture and political history, derived from the Luba kingdom of the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries. Subdivisions include Luba-Shankaji of Katanga, Luba-Bambo of Kasai and Luba-Hemba of northern Katanga and southern Kivu. Kyungu, a Labakat from Ankoro in current Tanganyika province and long-time spokesperson for the region’s frustrations, was Katanga provincial assembly speaker from 2007 until its dissolution in 2015. Crisis Group Report, Katanga, op. cit.
During the second Congo war (1998-2003), northern Katanga was heavily militarised by the regime, blocking the Rwanda-supported Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) from capturing Lubumbashi and the strategically important Kamina military base. During that period, Kyungu, Joseph Kabila John Numbi (a key security adviser) were all involved in channelling support to local armed militia groups (Mai-Mai) set-up to fight Rwanda and its proxies. After his father was assassinated in 2001, and as he turned from winning a war to winning elections, Katanga was an important base for Joseph Kabila. He could count on northern and southern elites, including the popular Kyungu and businessman and political newcomer Moïse Katumbi, a key early ally.

A. The Political Networks

Joseph Kabila is a Lubakat from Tanganyika province. From 2007 until the latest reshuffle in September 2015, all his defence ministers were from northern Katanga, as were the interior and justice ministers from 2012 to 2014. Katangans currently hold eight of 37 ministerial posts, including the strategic and lucrative infrastructure, mines and finance ministries. Powerful Katangans have included Guillaume Samba Kaputo and Augustin Katumba Mwanké (both now deceased), John Numbi and, increasingly, Kalev Mutond.

Numbi, another Lubakat and the head of the Congolese police (PNC) from 2007 to 2010, was forced into a background role in 2010, following allegations that he was involved in the killing of respected human rights activist Floribert Chebeya. Previously in the military, he maintains strong links within the army and the Republican Guard (GR), and a return to a more prominent role is possible. Kalev Mutond, a Ruund from Lualaba, is increasingly prominent as director of the National Intelligence Agency (ANR). His role as the president’s personal envoy in the 2015 national consultations

18 “Ordonnance N°15/075 du 25 Septembre 2015, portant réaménagement technique du gouvernement”, Présidence de la République, Kinshasa, 25 September 2015. It appointed the following ministers of Katangan origin: Fridolin Kasweshi Musoka (infrastructure); Henri Yav Muland (finance); Martin Kabwelulu (mines); Aimé Ngoy Mukena (hydrocarbons); Félix Kabange Numbi (health); Baudouin Banza Mukalay (culture, died 14 May 2016); Emile Mota Ndongo Khang (agriculture); and Simplice Ilunga Monga (transport, deputy).

19 Katumba Mwanké and Samba Maputo between them ran Kabila’s money, political networks and relations with Rwanda: Gauthier de Villers, Histoire du Politique au Congo-Kinshasa (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2016); “La fin mystérieuse du Richelieu congolais”, Le Soir, 7 August 2007; “Katumba Mwanké, key presidential advisor dies”, Congo Siasa (www.congosiasa.blogspot.com), 12 February 2012; and Crisis Group interview, UN official, Kinshasa, June 2015.

20 Numbi was provisionally suspended as head of the PNC in June 2010, shortly after Chebeya was found dead after allegedly having been summoned to meet him. The reason for the suspension was to allow calm organisation of the investigation. Numbi appeared as a witness at the trial that was organised from June 2011. In his statement, he denied having met Chebeya the day of his disappearance. Eight policemen were indicted and five convicted. Numbi was replaced as head of the police on 28 December 2013. See “L’affaire Chebeya, un crime d’état?”, film by Thierry Michel, 2012, which includes footage showing Numbi denying allegations of involvement. Following suspension, he remained involved in military matters in the east and relations with Rwanda. He is reportedly linked to the Bakata Katanga armed group. “Affaire Chebeya: l’ombre du général John Numbi plane sur le procès”, Radio France Internationale (RFI), 27 July 2015. According to multiple sources, Numbi also received several Katanga provincial authority contracts when Katumbi was governor. “John Numbi et Joseph Kabila: le désamour après la lune de miel?”, desc-wondo.org, 3 July 2015; Crisis Group interviews, civil society members, Lubumbashi, May 2015.
advanced his political profile. His agency is deeply involved in repression of civil society groups, raising the possibility that Katangans in the national government will be increasingly involved in repressing political activity at home, further heightening resentments.\textsuperscript{21} Mutond’s brother, Guibert Paul Yav Tshibal, was Katanga’s deputy governor and briefly acting governor in 2015 after Katumbi’s resignation.\textsuperscript{22}

Katangans dominate the security services, in particular the GR, PNC and ANR.\textsuperscript{23} This is also the case for other important state functions, such as the national prosecutor, Flory Kabange Numbi (Lubakat), and the Central Bank governor, Déogracias Mutombo Mwana Nyembo (Luba-Hemba). Kabila’s longstanding cabinet director, Gustave Beya Siku, was replaced in a reshuffle in May 2015 but subsequently appointed ambassador to Angola.\textsuperscript{24} Katangans remain prominent in the presidential cabinet, including Théodore Mugal, the influential chief of staff at the presidency. Two other prominent actors are Kabila’s twin sister Jaynet and younger brother Zoë. In 2011, both were elected legislators in what is now Tanganyika province, Jaynet on a PPRD ticket in Manono.\textsuperscript{25} Jaynet is also president of the influential “Fondation Laurent Désiré Kabila” and has extensive business interests.\textsuperscript{26}

Though many Katangans hold senior public office, some of the elite are increasingly frustrated with Kabila, blaming him as well as former Governor Katumbi for lack of development in Lubakat-dominated Tanganyika and Haut-Lomami provinces (formerly districts). In previous elections, Kabila obtained massive support from these areas and rewarded elites with key political and administration posts, including in the security services. However, he left out some prominent leaders, such as Jean-Claude Masangu (who aspired to be prime minister). Elites are also aggrieved that he is reaching out to other constituencies to broaden his base, which may threaten the region’s power. Kabila is reportedly aloof in dealing with Katangan elites, which is taken badly in his home province. Paradoxically, while most of the country sees power as concentrated in Katangan hands, Katangan elites, those close to Kabila and those now opposing him, are worried it is slipping from their grasp, especially since the 2011 election and the death of Katumba Mwanké.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{21} Crisis Group interview, Kinshasa-based diplomats, March 2016. Mutond was the agency’s domestic intelligence wing director from 2007-2011. “RDC: Filimbi, la nouvelle génération de citoyens qui ébranle le pouvoir”, GRIP, 17 August 2015.
\textsuperscript{22} During this short period, Tshibal remained in regular contact with Katumbi. Crisis Group email correspondence, Kinshasa-based diplomat, October 2015. Before becoming deputy governor, Tshibal was a leader of the Ruund (Lualaba) cultural association.
\textsuperscript{23} Kabila’s cousin, General Jean-Claude Kifwa, commander of the third military zone, including former Katanga and Philémon Yav, the Katanga military region commander, are very influential.
\textsuperscript{25} “RD Congo: Les gardiens du temple”, Jeune Afrique, 1 February 2015. Mugalu was ambassador to Tanzania and a PPRD MP. “Honorables Kabila, députés à l’Assemblée nationale congolaise”, Jeune Afrique, 14 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{26} She co-owns the Digital Congo media group and reportedly owns 50 per cent of Keratsu Holding Ltd., a stakeholder with 19.6 per cent of Congo Wireless Network Sprl., which in turn owns 49 per cent of Vodacom Congo. “Congo President’s Twin Has Indirect Stake in Vodacom Unit”, Bloom berg.com, 5 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{27} Crisis Group interviews, Katangan elites, Lubumbashi, May-June 2015, March 2016; Katangan political analyst, Lubumbashi, June 2015.
B. Economic Troubles

Copper and cobalt production in Haut-Katanga are the bedrock of DRC’s formal economy. In 2014, Katanga accounted for 71 per cent of revenue generated by the extractive sector, which is responsible for 95 per cent of total exports and a very large portion of central government revenues.28 Copper production grew from 30,000 tons in 2006 to a record one million tons in 2014.29 Katanga, which exported 68,069 tons in 2014, also accounts for approximately 55 per cent of the world’s cobalt production.30

However, the drop in commodity prices has affected this spectacular growth. In mid-2015, Glencore’s Kamoto Copper Company (KCC), producing 15 per cent of the country’s copper, suspended operations, causing a $200 million government revenue loss (approximately 4.7 per cent of total revenue).31 In May 2016, the Congolese Chamber of Mines projected a drop in the year’s copper production of 5.9 per cent. Cobalt production is projected to fall by 21.3 per cent, and production of all other minerals is also expected to decline. This seriously affects foreign currency reserves and is putting pressure on the Congolese Franc in a politically tense period.32 Aside from lower demand, unreliable energy supply and the challenging business climate have further stunted growth.33

The parastatal Gécamines is central to the Katangan economy. In 1988, it was responsible for 42.9 per cent of government revenue, but Mobutu’s kleptocracy bankrupted it in the mid-1990’s. Restructured, it now has only limited production, partly due to prohibitive costs, but is a minority partner in joint ventures such as the copper and cobalt mine Tenke Fungurumé (TFM). This huge mining investment is reportedly on the brink of being sold to Chinese investors, a sign of China’s ongoing interest in


31 Total revenue, including grants, was $4.2 billion in 2015.


Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland
Crisis Group Africa Report N°239, 3 August 2016

Congo’s minerals, despite the global economic slowdown, which is likely to have geopolitical ramifications.34

The Africa Progress Panel and Global Witness reported under-valued, secretive Gécamines sales of mining assets to foreign investors around the 2011 election. The former estimated the government should have earned $1.36 billion more from five deals between 2010 and 2015. Global Witness and other sources allege such secretive deals have continued since 2014, including with Chinese investors. Proceeds allegedly function as a parallel source of central government funding, bypassing the scrutiny of parliament and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government has denied allegations of underselling, insisting that it has published all relevant material, and vigorously defending the deals.35

Of particular concern has been the $6.2 billion Sicomines deal. Up to mid-2015, the contract funded an estimated $800 million in nationwide infrastructure projects. Another part of the deal is the development of a 240MW hydropower station in Busanga, north of Kolwezi.36 Sicomines finally started copper production in November 2015 and in this short period has become the country’s third largest producer. Under the deal, investors are protected from falling copper values, and production is tax exempt.37 Lack of transparency in allocation and spending of the money adds to the concern, including in Katanga, about the central government’s use of mining sector revenue.38

34 Marysse, Omasombo, op. cit., pp. 23-29. TFM holds some of the world’s biggest reserves. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. is the operating partner, holding a 56 per cent interest. Gécamines holds a 20 per cent carried interest (taking a share of profit not proportional to investment level). In June 2016, Freeport outlined plans to sell its share in TFM. “Lundin gets bid extension on Freeport Congo mine stake”, Reuters, 19 July 2016.

35 “Equity in Extractives”, Africa Progress Report 2013, Africa Progress Panel, pp. 55-58; “Out of Africa, British offshore secrecy and Congo’s missing $1.5 billion”, Global Witness, May 2016. Crisis Group telephone interview, businessperson, November 2015; interview, diplomat, March 2016. Stefaan Marysse, Claudine Tshimanga, op. cit., pp. 25-29; Mining Minister Martin Kabewelulu stated that “assets were ceded in total transparency”; see “Congo loses out on $1.4 bln as mine assets sold cheap – Annan panel”, Reuters, 10 May 2013. Other parties implicated also fervently deny any wrongdoing.


38 “Congo-K: les mines au cœur des réseaux ethniques”, Africa Mining Intelligence, 26 July 2013; “Ivanhoe rides into the elections”, Africa Confidential, 10 July 2015; “Défis de transparence, de la qualité et du respect des droits humains dans la réalisation des infrastructures du projet Sicomines à Kinshasa”, African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO), November 2014. There is no evidence that Sicomines itself was complicit in the misuse of funds that went to public authorities. Gécamines management was not available for comment either on the Sicomines deal or on the alleged under-selling of assets when approached by Crisis Group in Lubumbashi in May 2015.
As the province’s economy grew after the civil war, its budget exploded, from $21 million in 2006 to $973 million in 2014 and a projected $1 billion-plus for 2015.\(^{39}\) This is double the budget of Kinshasa, and almost five times that of Congo-Central (the former Bas-Congo), the second wealthiest province. Provinces currently have two sources of funding: provincial taxes and a 40 per cent share of national taxes raised in their territory, which the central government should return to them. The latter should be the largest revenue source; however, the central government has only partially kept its obligation. Nationally, it returned only approximately 14 per cent to provinces in 2014.\(^{40}\) The failure to return a perceived fair share underlies current tensions. However, with the deepening economic crisis, Kabila has few options, so uses state resources, largely generated in Katanga, to sustain central government patronage.

Despite its riches, large infrastructural and developmental inequality persists in Katanga. The major mining areas in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba (in particular Kolwezi) have relatively good infrastructure, while the northern provinces, in particular isolated Haut-Lomami, are among DRC’s poorest. The poverty rate is above the national average.\(^{41}\) Local elites often use central government failure to transfer revenue to justify lack of investment in northern Katangan development.

Even in the mining belt, large investments and growth have not translated into significant formal employment. Most Katangan miners are artisanal, selling their production to trading posts (comptoirs) in Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi, mainly owned by Chinese businesses.\(^{42}\) Many live in dire circumstances and are potential recruits for political thuggery, or even insurgency, and involvement in clashes between local and migrant labour.\(^{43}\) Tensions are likely to rise as the slump in industrial production drives laid-off workers to dig illegally on company-owned concessions.


\(^{41}\) In Lualaba, there are also huge disparities between Kolwezi, its main mining district, and other areas. “Rapport des vacances parlementaires du district du Lualaba”, Lubumbashi, 28 May 2014. Crisis Group interviews, local politicians, humanitarians and diplomats, February-July 2015. According to a 2010 study on the découpage, Katanga had the highest tax revenue but Tanganyika and Haut-Lomami would be the least prosperous new provinces. “DRC: The Impact of the ‘Découpage’”, joint study, the European Commission, Belgian Development Cooperation and UN Development Programme (UNDP), March 2010. “Resilience of an African giant”, World Bank, 2012, p. 30; “Plan Quinquennal de développement 2011-2015”, Province du Katanga (undated). According to the latter report (p. 29), the percentage of poor in Katanga is 87.8, against a national average of 71.3 per cent.

\(^{42}\) Gregory Mtumbu-Salter, “Goodwill and Hard Bargains: the DRC, China and India”, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), March 2012.

\(^{43}\) They often live in a squalor outside urban centres that contrasts with the continuous stream of trucks carrying valuable minerals. There is also concern about the mining industry’s environmental and health impact. Crisis Group interviews, local officials and civil society representatives, Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, May-June 2015. See also “L’Enfer des mines en RDC”, Amnesty International Switzerland, March 2012; and “Artisanal mining in the middle of a city: The Kasulo story in the DRC”, Southern African Resource Watch, 21 October 2015.
According to the Chamber of Mines, the drop in mineral production has already cost at least 13,000 jobs nationwide.  

This can take on ethnic overtones. The mining economy has for decades drawn in large numbers of migrant labourers, especially from Kasai province. Different communities, migrant and local, have fought for control of land, jobs and political office. Découpage has created new provincial structures that could further inflame these underlying tensions and disrupt investment plans, as examined below.

Overall, Katanga owes its particular place in Congolese politics to two factors: the Katangan origin of the president and his predecessor and its economic weight. Together these have created distinct political expectations. While many Katangan elites are happy to see one of their own in power in Kinshasa (and would like it to stay that way), they are aggrieved at the perceived failure to return to the region a fair share of the wealth it generates. In addition, within the former province, poorer areas feel disenfranchised by both the central and provincial governments.

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III. The Politics of Découpage: The End of “Katanga”

A. Découpage: From Delay to Control

The DRC’s territorial organisation and the relationship between the centre and the decentralised entities has been a major political issue since the early days of independence. The 2006 constitution mandated division of the then eleven provinces into 26 in the découpage process. The intention, which remains popular in many parts of the country, was to bring government structures closer to the people. Part of this deal was to reinforce provinces’ financial autonomy. As noted, the constitution permits provinces to levy taxes, and its Article 175 provides, in a process called “retrocession”, that they should receive 40 per cent of locally raised national revenues. It also envisages a “national equalisation fund”, to distribute 10 per cent of national tax revenues to provinces with weak local tax collection.

The reality has not matched the constitutional aspirations. Decentralisation remains more theoretical than real. The national assembly only adopted the equalisation fund bill in November 2015, and the president still has to promulgate it. Retrocession has “hovered between 6 and 10 per cent from 2007 to 2013”, not anywhere near the 40 per cent level. This has been excused by reference to low absorption capacity and concerns about transparency and corruption at provincial level, which while partly justified are also partly due to central government unwillingness to invest in provincial capacity. Additionally, the government has not transferred civil servants and policy control to the provinces. The failure to fully implement retrocession has generated much bitterness, not least in Katanga which is well aware of the amount of resources it generates for the centre.

During Kabila’s first elected term (2006–2011), the government made incremental progress adopting laws needed to implement découpage and decentralisation. However, it rolled back provincial political autonomy in the 2011 constitutional reform. Decentralisation and découpage reappeared more prominently with adoption of the “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement” (PSCF), in

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47 Congo-Central, Haut-Katanga, Kinshasa and Lualaba provinces are the only provinces that would not receive equalisation fund transfers. Crisis Group interview, government official, Kinshasa, June 2015.


February 2013 and during the national consultations organised in September-October that year.\textsuperscript{50} Following a significant reshuffle in December 2014, the government pushed through legislation needed to implement \textit{découpage}, which became a legal reality in July 2015.\textsuperscript{51} Six provinces were broken up (Bandundu, Equateur, Kasai-Occidental, Kasai-Oriental, Katanga and Orientale), one renamed (Bas Congo, now Congo-Central) and four left untouched, producing a total of 26. Katanga was split into Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami, Lualaba and Tanganyika provinces. Some new provinces had previously been territorial entities of the colonial state; others were former districts created after independence.

There are widespread concerns about implementation, particularly the lack of financial and material resources for both the transfer of responsibilities and the financial viability of the new provinces, as well as the short timeframe to deal with the issues ahead of the elections and the overall financial viability of many of the entities. There are also border issues and disputed areas, which could catalyse conflict, in particular if long delayed local and provincial elections are finally organised.\textsuperscript{52}

Following the July 2015 change, existing executive authorities (governors and their ministers) initially remained to manage affairs, though with severely weakened authority and unclear legal status, which led to near paralysis in some provincial administrations.\textsuperscript{53} Some provincial assemblies tried to flex muscles; several attempted to seize control of revenue generated in the new provinces, but the national government pushed back.\textsuperscript{54} On 29 September 2015, the interior minister suspended all plenary meetings of the new provincial assemblies created by \textit{découpage}, leaving the administrations in legal limbo.\textsuperscript{55}

Delays in electing the new governors in the second half of 2015 led the central government to ask the Constitutional Court in September for permission to appoint special commissioners to administer the new provinces, in effect suspending the authority of the governors and assemblies.\textsuperscript{56} The president appointed the new commissioners and their deputies on 29 October – all his political allies.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{50} Revision of Articles 197 and 198 allows the central government to intervene directly in the provinces’ political functioning, including to dissolve an assembly and dismiss a governor. The PSCF is an agreement by DRC and its neighbours to implement better national and regional policies, stimulated by the crisis over the Rwandan backed M23 insurgency. Crisis Group commentary, “Lubumbashi Takeover: Governance by Substitution”, 15 April 2013.


\textsuperscript{52} “La tribune de Muzito: la RDC, un Etat sans budget”, \textit{Le Phare}, 6 April 2015. For an overview, see “DRC: The Impact”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{53} Crisis Group analyst interviews in a former capacity, governor, provincial assembly members and electoral commission staff, Kisangani, October 2015.

\textsuperscript{54} Crisis Group email correspondence, Kinshasa-based official, August 2015; “RDC: les bureaux provisoires des assemblées provinciales installés dans l’ex-Katanga”, Radio Okapi, 30 July 2015; “Évariste Boshab met en garde contre tout blocage au découpage territorial”, Forum des As, 26 August 2015.

\textsuperscript{55} “Elections en RDC: les retards s’accumulent”, RFI, 26 August 2015; “Les parlements provinciaux suspendus par Kinshasa”, \textit{La Libre Belgique}, 3 October 2015. Provincial deputies were elected in 2006. In preparation for the \textit{découpage} to happen during their first mandate, the future provinces were already used as electoral districts.

Critics suspected that the government always intended this, using a compliant CENI and Constitutional Court to impose commissioners, partly in order to establish initial control over the process and exert greater influence over the deputies responsible for electing the governors. It reportedly also tasked the ANR to follow the dynamics in the provincial assemblies. An opposition coalition unsuccessfully challenged the special commissioners’ nomination at the constitutional court, arguing their function had no basis in law and calling on the public to disobey them.58

The announcement in February 2016 that gubernatorial elections for the 21 new provinces would be held on 26 March came as a surprise.59 These are indirect, by the existing provincial assembly members elected in 2006. 97 individuals registered as candidates, but 21 were barred for a variety of legal reasons, including many who posed the greatest threat to the majority.60 In former Katanga, candidates for the ruling majority, Richard Muyej and Richard Ngoy Kitangala, had only recently been appointed commissioners. The only major candidate linked to the opposition allowed to stand in Katanga was Christian Mwando Nsimba in Tanganyika.61 Still, the majority remained nervous, and Aubin Minaku, its secretary general, was sent to Lubumbashi two weeks before the vote, to drum up provincial deputies’ support for pro-government candidates. The majority won all four governorships in Katanga.62

In total, the majority succeeded in getting fifteen of its 21 candidates elected in the new provinces. In the former Orientale and Equateur provinces, several independent (often disguised opposition) candidates were elected. One of these, José Makila, Sud-Ubangui governor and Labour Alliance for Development (ATD) party leader, then co-founded the AR coalition supporting Moïse Katumbi in May 2016.
Overall the majority achieved its goal but was widely criticised for manipulation. A Catholic Church report was particularly critical of the CENI. 63

B. Katanga: A Particular Case

In a brief provincial assembly session on 16 July 2015, Katanga province officially ended, though its administration remained to manage affairs until appointment of the special commissioners. Just before the break-up, the central government re-organised several state and parastatal structures, including the security forces, to reflect the new territorial organisation. Other parts of the administration, such as taxation, remain unchanged. 64

1. The debate

While the principle of bringing government closer to the people, popular across the country, also has support in Katanga, several of its politicians, mostly in the (new) opposition, and citizens alike have been particularly critical of découpage and fearful of its outcome. The former province has a strong sense of identity derived from its wealth, history (including brief independence) and powerful, ethnic-based “cultural associations” that permeate its political, cultural and economic life. 65 Many worry découpage is intended to break its demographic, economic and political weight and weaken Katangan identity. 66 Several prominent people, including then Governor Katumbi and Provincial Assembly Speaker Kyungu, spoke against découpage, threatened to organise petitions to reunify the province and argued for keeping “Katanga” in the names of the new provinces. 67

63 The ATD is an offshoot from the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). “Election des gouverneurs et vice-gouverneurs: La CENCO dénonce la violation de la liberté et du secret de vote”, La Tempête des Tropiques, 29 April 2016.


66 This was the opinion of traditional chiefs who met in Lubumbashi, 2-16 December 2006. “Le découpage territorial … oui mais …”, and “Arguments contre le découpage, Monseigneur Fulgence Muteba”, Le Rassembleur Magazine, no. 12, (undated), Lubumbashi. 150,000, including several “notables”, signed a petition to parliament opposing découpage.

Critics suggested *découpage* was designed to provoke secessionist sentiment, possibly to provide a pretext for crackdowns or further electoral delays; that it was part of the government’s *glissement* strategy; and that it was designed to cut the ground under Katumbi’s feet as he emerged as a serious challenger to Kabila. Several noted it considerably increased executive positions, thus scope for patronage, which the central government is determined to control. Despite the criticism and fear, the process was implemented without major problems.

2. **Kolwezi and Lualaba province**

There is considerable support for the current process among elites in the poorer of the new Katangan provinces: Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami and Lualaba, where *découpage* is seen as important for development. Despite having voted massively for Kabila in 2011, these areas have long been neglected by the central government. Especially in Lualaba, which now includes the mineral-rich former Kolwezi district, and Tanganyika provinces, many see *découpage* as an opportunity to assert rights and regain control of “their resources”. In Tanganyika, the civil society platform SOCI-TANG pushed provincial legislators in 2012 to have their then district become a *découpage* pilot project, pointing to the supposed gains made by previously created new Congolese provinces.

Kolwezi, the country’s richest mining area, is one of only five districts (of 26 before the 2006 constitution) not to have become a province. As a major mining centre, its place in the new order is very sensitive. Locally, there is tension between those of Katangan origin and immigrant populations (particularly from Kasai), and between the “indigenous” Sanga and groups from the former Lualaba district, the “Tshota” or “G5” (regrouping the Tshokwe, Rund, Minungu, Ndembo and Luvale communities). A major Sanga frustration is that members of these other communities hold most of the important provincial positions and have better employment opportunities in mining companies.

In 2009, the Kolwezi-based Lwanzo Lwa Mikuba cultural association, representing the Sanga, submitted a petition to parliament with 100,000 signatures, requesting a

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69 Critics point to the contrast between the extensive farms and imposing villa owned by the president just outside Lubumbashi and the dilapidated state of his home region of Manono, in north Katanga, which was devastated during the 1998–2003 war. Crisis Group interviews Lubumbashi, June–May 2015 and March 2016. An often-heard criticism is “we have been forgotten”. Crisis Group interviews, Katangan elite, Lubumbashi, May–June 2015 and Lubumbashi residents, March 2016. See also Kris Berwouts, “Bateau sans boussole. Le régime Kabila en perte de cohésion”, Observatoire des Grands Lacs en Afrique, November 2014.


constitutional amendment allowing the district to become a province. On 8 December 2014, the association organised a protest in Kolwezi in which one person was reportedly killed. A last attempt in parliament, during the discussions on the January 2015 law fixing the future provinces’ borders, also failed. As a second option, instead of being integrated in Lualaba, Lwanzo would have preferred to integrate Kolwezi in Haut-Katanga. This reflects the close ties between this community and the Bemba, which together form the “Espace Sempya-Lwanzo”.

The central government has clamped down on these calls for a new province and other elements of dissent. It arrested the Lwanzo leader and former legislator Vano Kalembe Kiboko in Kinshasa in December 2014 and sentenced him to three years in prison for inciting racial hatred and tribalism, after he railed against the Kolwezi’s planned incorporation in Lualaba province at a Lubumbashi press conference.

During April-May 2015, several meetings to prepare for creation of the new Lualaba province were organised, including one initiated by the ex-interior minister, later special commissioner and Lualaba governor, Richard Muyej. At a May 2015 forum in Kolwezi community, representatives tried to reach a consensus on maintaining stability in the new province, including by carefully balancing community interests in its government.

According to several members of the new province’s elite, the priority should be development of infrastructure linking the mining areas in and around Kolwezi more directly to export routes, thus avoiding Lubumbashi. A particular need is to refurbish railways linked to the recently rehabilitated Benguela corridor in Angola. A second would be to repair the Kolwezi to Solwezi, Zambia road. Plans have come up against regional rivalries within the former province, however, with business elites in Kolwezi and Lubumbashi backing rival road corridors. Simmering disputes over transport links, vitally important given the money to be made from mineral transport, reflect the high stakes involved in delimiting new provinces and hurt the business climate, adding further insecurities to the economic challenges.

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72 This repeated a call in October 2013: “Kolwezi réclame son statut de province”, La Croisette, 29 October 2013.
76 The “Lobito Corridor” project is included in the “Investments opportunities brief (IOB) Consultative Process: Key findings and recommendations”, ICGLR, Office of the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, 2015, p. 32. The Congolese side of the railroad is not operational. The recently rehabilitated Angolan section is partially operational. Zambia has started work to connect to the Lobito corridor. Crisis Group interview, businessperson, Brussels, September 2015.
IV. The Region’s Rising Tensions

A. Frustration

There is a growing political dimension to the economic frustrations felt by Katangan elites and population that feeds into tensions with the centre. It is based on the strong belief among elites that, despite their many internal divisions, national power should remain in their hands following November’s electoral deadline. Local elites, especially Lubakat, grumble about receiving too little attention. They say control in Kinshasa would quell or harness dormant but real Katangan separatism. With Kabila’s term ending and his popular support declining, fewer of the region’s elites believe that sticking with him and the majority as currently configured will allow them to keep power – though this has not yet reached a point of no return. In past months, the majority has invested considerable attention on the four new provinces. Meanwhile, other provinces want to rebalance politics by transferring power to another region – the east-west cleavage is particularly potent – reflecting the principle of “la géopolitique”, wherein regional quotas and ethnic identity form a crucial part of Congolese politics.

The regime has reached out to provinces and elites beyond Katanga, both to reward them for having voted for Kabila in 2011 and to achieve better geographical balance. Most prominent among these provinces is Maniema, just north of the new Tanganyika province and home to Kabila’s mother, Sifa Mahanya, which twice voted heavily for the president. It is also Prime Minister Matata Ponyo’s base.

Ponyo is one of three PPRD politicians competing to lead the majority and possibly succeed the president. The other two are Aubin Minaku (Kwilu), the parliament’s speaker and majority’s secretary general, and Evariste Boshab (Kasai-Occidental), deputy prime minister and interior minister. Katangans note that none are from their province but may take some solace from the installation of Henri Mova Sakanyi as PPRD secretary general. Though he has a small political base, he has quickly gained prominence and concentrated on refurbishing the PPRD’s machine.

These disputes between Katanga and the centre have played into schisms in the majority over the last year. The G7 group of parties split from the majority after publishing letters between February and September 2015 criticising the functioning of the majority and underlining damage done by the ill-prepared, under-resourced découpage. The final letter, sealing the split, called for respect of constitutional

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80 In the run-up to celebrations of national independence day in Kindu (Maniema) in 2016, Kabila spent several weeks in the ex-province, attending the conference of provincial governors in Lubumbashi and inaugurating several infrastructure projects in his home province, Tanganyika.
81 Aside from Kabila’s mother, key Maniema actors are Denis Kalume Numbi, General François Olenga, Kabila’s military staff chief, Emmanuel Shadari, PPRD parliamentary group chair, and Pierre Lumbi, Movement for Social Renewal (MSR) party leader and ex-national security adviser.
deadlines, essentially a demand that Kabila step down in December.83 The G7 includes the important Katangan parties UNAFEC, the National Union of Democrats and Federalists (UNADEF) and Avenir du Congo (ACO).84 Except for the weakened PPRD, only a few remaining parties in the majority have a significant following in Katanga, including Union for the Development of Congo (UDCO), now led by Jean-Claude Masangu, and Health Minister Félix Kabange Numbi’s Awakening of Consciousness for Work (ECT).85

Some of these political frustrations have spilled onto the street. Lubumbashi saw protests in January 2015, and some incidents took place at Katumbi’s court case. These street protests have not reached Kinshasa levels, but they may become a more important factor as the electoral/constitutional crisis unfolds.86

B. Armed Groups and Possible Violence

Armed groups have recently been active in Katanga, though they do not have overt political platforms, and their generally low-profile operations are not as extensive as those in the Kivus. In some cases, their activities are probably linked to the elite frustrations outlined above and the secessionist sentiments they feed. Many are remnants from the civil war, when the region’s north was partly occupied by RCD-Goma and Rwandan troops, and local self-defence groups were mobilised in reaction.87 Tanganyika province, areas of Haut-Katanga and Haut-Lomami continue to suffer from the activities of some Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Mai Mai Yakutumba, both principally based in the Kivus.88 There is also a conflict between the pygmy (Twa) and Bantu (Luba).89

One network of armed groups with overt links to Katangan identity issues is the Bakata Katanga (“Cut off Katanga” in Swahili), led by Kyungu Mutanga, better known as Gédéon. It claims to defend the region against exploitation by Kinshasa and reportedly has ties with small secessionist organisations.90 It is held responsible for

84 The other parties in the G7 are the MSR, previously the second largest party in the majority; the Alliance for the Renewal of Congo (ARC) (Olivier Kamitatu), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (José Endundu) and the Solidarity Movement for Democracy and Development (MSDD) (Christophe Lutundula).
85 Six of seven UDCO national legislators are from the old province and eight of the ECT’s ten.
86 A future Crisis Group paper will discuss street protests in DRC and government reactions.
89 Gédéon, then leader of Mai Mai Gédéon, surrendered to MONUSCO in 2006 and was arrested. He was sentenced to death in 2009 (the DRC has a moratorium on the death penalty). He escaped in an outbreak of 1,000 prisoners in Lubumbashi in 2011. Crisis Group interview, MONUSCO official, Lubumbashi, June 2015. Groups calling for Katanga’s independence include Coordination pour l’organisation du référendum d’autodétermination du Katanga (CORAK), Congrès des Peuples du Katanga (CPK) and Conseil National de Transition du Katanga (CNTK).
most violence in what is known in Katanga as the “death triangle”. It was particularly active in 2013, when, in March, many of its fighters marched into Lubumbashi. It is mainly present in Katanga’s centre but was also reported near Sakania, on the Zambian border.

The Bakata Katanga were allegedly connected to politicians with national prominence, such as oil minister, former defence minister and now Katanga Governor Aimé Ngoy Mukena; Gabriel Kyungu; ex-CENI head Pasteur Ngoy Mulunda; former Central Bank Governor Jean-Claude Masangu; and, in particular, John Numbi. Its reported links suggest a continued pattern of politicians using armed groups for leverage; local leaders believe, an observer said, “that Joseph Kabila only understands the language of rebellion”. The UN group of experts concluded in 2014 that “the tolerance of Numbi’s support [to Bakata Katanga] indicates acquiescence at the highest levels of government”.

Violence could flare up unexpectedly and exacerbate humanitarian problems. From 2011 to 2014, IDP’s in Katanga rose 900 per cent, to 500,000. This was due to the central government’s lack of attention to security; neglect of the army (FARDC; most resources went to the GR and other elite units); and the political connections of armed groups that delayed decisive action. It was also exacerbated by poor harvests, partly caused by farmers’ displacement and crop failures caused by the El Niño. MONUSCO, with 450 troops in mid-2014 in a province the size of Spain, was also particularly weak. The security challenges were compounded by difficult logistics, due to the lack of infrastructure, the fallout of the economic crisis affecting numerous workers and the dire humanitarian situation.

In mid-2014, MONUSCO and FARDC scaled-up operations against the Bakata Katanga, bringing some security improvement. IDP’s decreased, particularly in Pweto. Kabila also reshuffled command positions within FARDC and the military regions, notably appointing his cousin, Jean-Claude Kifwa, to head the wider south-eastern military zone and Phélémon Yav, a former “Katangan Tiger”, as Katanga military

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91 An informally named area that straddles Pweto, Haut-Katanga and Tanganyika provinces, as well as part of Malemba Nkulu in Haut-Lomami province, which suffered particularly badly in the second Congo war (1998-2003).
95 Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society actor, Lubumbashi, October 2015.
96 “The Kata Katanga movement became active just before the 2011 elections. Several well-placed sources and local leaders in Katanga believe the group serves the interests of political and economic elites at the national and provincial levels. These elites may use Kata Katanga to create instability or, conversely, stability, depending on their needs”. UN Experts, op. cit., p. 16.
region commander. Dozens of Bakata Katanga have surrendered, giving up weapons. However, few in Lubumbashi believe the group has been defeated; there is fear some politicians keep it in readiness for possible future need.

These are not the only armed groups that should be a concern. On 30 December 2013, followers of the self-proclaimed prophet Mukungubila (from the same area as Kabila and an unsuccessful candidate in the 2006 election) attacked the state TV station (RTNC), the defence ministry and the national airport, all in Kinshasa. A few hours later, government troops surrounded the group’s compound in a Lubumbashi residential area and attacked after followers were said to have opened fire. Reportedly several hundred followers were killed, most in Lubumbashi.

Though the motivation of the attacks is still not entirely clear, they illustrate the potential consequences of unaddressed tensions between Katanga and the centre and between Katangan elites. Many observers believe they were an attempt by Lubakat elite to pressure the president and secure their positions in the government and security forces. The failure to address the Bakata Katanga, the opaque nature of the Mukungubila affair and recent accusations against politicians of recruiting or harbouring a militia all point to the continued role of unaccountable armed elements in uncertain political times.

C. Moïse Katumbi’s Collision with the President

Moïse Katumbi Chapwe is a Bemba from Kashobwe in Haut-Katanga province. When Mobutu was overthrown in 1997, he went into exile in Zambia, where he was close to the then President Frederick Chiluba and successful in business, especially transport. Joseph Kabila’s adviser, Katumba Mwanké, then Katanga’s governor, facilitated his return and remained a close ally and important intermediary with the president until his death in 2011. Katumbi became a Kabila supporter on his return and was elected Katanga governor in 2007 by the votes of 94 of the 102 members in


100 Around the same time, a group also attacked the airport of Kindu, Maniema province.


102 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, diplomats, Kinshasa, March 2014; Kinshasa, Lubumbashi May, June 2015. Mukungubila published a letter to Kabila on 5 December 2013 attacking his decision to name General Charles Bisengimana Rukira to head the PNC, denouncing Rukira for his supposed Rwandan origins and calling on security services to remove the president. Katumbi expressed support for the president.

Katumbi is a charismatic populist and generally credited with a good record as governor. He is also chairperson of Lubumbashi’s football team, “Tout Puissant Mazembe”, which is an Africa-wide success, and, like many politicians, has close connections to the media, including two TV stations. These, along with a hands-on style, have made him well-known and popular, in Katanga and beyond. Because the government delayed provincial elections, he was governor for eight years instead of the mandated five. He gained strong support from the province’s elite in this period, including the provincial assembly and particularly its speaker, Gabriel Kyungu.

Some have raised conflict of interest questions regarding his business and political roles, but this has generally failed to tarnish his image, in part because of the perception that “since he is already rich, he won’t steal any more”. His tenure coincided with and benefited from the commodity boom, which led to significant infrastructure development in southern Katanga that contrasted, however, with the lack of development elsewhere in the province (see above).

Over the years, the relationship between the charismatic Katumbi and the more introverted Kabila became increasingly difficult. In the run-up to the 2011 elections, a seemingly disillusioned Katumbi announced he would leave politics. His position had come under pressure, as rumours that Zoë Kabila had eyes on the governorship increased and resonated favourably with several prominent northern Katanga Lubakat. But civil society organisations collected a million signatures on a petition

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104 “Katanga’s new governor: man with a bold plan”, U.S. embassy Kinshasa cable, as published by wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KINSHASA330_a.html. For a comprehensive profile, see Jean Omasombo, *Biographie des acteurs de la Troisième République*, CEP, Kinshasa, CERDAP, Lubumbashi, and Africa Museum Tervuren (Brussels, 2009). Katumba Mwanké, governor of Katanga, 1998–2001, was from the same region as Katumbi, whom he described as “certainly one of the better hopes our country has today” in his *Ma Vérité* (Nice, 2013, posthumous), pp. 127-129. Katumbi’s only opponent for the governorship was Pasteur Ngoy Mulunda (Lubakat), later CENI president (2011-2013) who ran the 2011 elections.

105 Crisis Group interviews, Kinshasa-based diplomat, June 2015; Lubumbashi, May-June 2015. Companies linked to Katumbi include the trucking firms Hakuna Matata, Muzuri Sana and Habari Kani, the latter a collaboration between Hakuna Matata and TFM. “Millionaire governor gears up for 2016 Congo election bid”, Reuters, 11 August 2015.

106 The football club gives him a national profile and puts him at the centre of a web of business interests. He took over from his Belgium-based brother, Raphaël Katebe Katoto, also a businessperson, who was close to the rebel group cum political party the RCD-Goma, which participated in the peace negotiations in the early 2000s before joining the transitional government, and to the UDPS. Omasombo, *Biographie*, op. cit., pp. 113-115. The team’s vice president is David Malta Forrest, CEO of the Group Forrest International, a major economic actor in Katanga. Nyota TV and TV Mapendo, linked to Katumbi, had their broadcasting licences revoked in January 2016. Close media connections are relatively common for politicians. The presidential family has interests in Digitalcongo, and several other Katangan political leaders own or are close to a TV station. Crisis Group interviews Lubumbashi, May-June 2015 and March 2016.

107 Crisis Group interview, UNAFEC politician, Lubumbashi, June 2015.

imploring Katumbi to stay. A supporting rally a few weeks before the elections also highlighted the strong Katumbi-Kyungu alliance.109

Tensions between Katangan leaders and the president escalated dramatically in late 2014 when Katumbi, Kyungu and Jean-Claude Muyambo separately took strong public positions against any constitutional amendment that would allow Kabila to stand for a third term. Muyambo was subsequently imprisoned, officially for an unrelated matter. The strongest political signal came from a Katumbi speech on 23 December 2014 in Lubumbashi in which he asked, “will we accept a third penalty?” – a clear message to Kabila, who was visiting Katanga at the time.110

Kabila reacted during a meeting with the Katangan elite in January 2015, from which Katumbi, Kyungu and Muyambo were absent. Concerning découpage, he argued that opponents had not used all available legal avenues and that the provincial assembly Kyungu headed had not taken a position. He also criticised Kyungu and Katumbi for the province’s lack of social development. Days later, RG units raided the office of JUNAFEC, the youth wing of Kyungu’s party. Kabila also replaced leading customs and tax administration officials in the province to break Katumbi’s network. Muyambo responded, “... it is too late: Katanga is no longer with him [Kabila]”.111 Katumbi remained with the PPRD, but his distance from Kabila was now obvious.112

Further signs of deteriorating relations came in summer 2015. In June, the government reportedly transferred a general file on corruption to the national prosecutor with suggestions that it implicated Katumbi. This was later denied by the prosecutor, and the president appears to have backed away from levelling corruption

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allegations for now.113 In August 2015, Huit Mulongo, his former chief of cabinet, announced creation of a new platform, the Neo-Conakat, to preserve and promote Katumbi’s ideas.114 Its reference to Moïse Tshombe’s CONAKAT, which fought for Katangan independence, was remarkable.

Preparing for his new position as a Kabila opponent and with one eye on future elections, Katumbi reached out to international actors and other opposition politicians, including Kamerhe and Tshisekedi.115 Later, he joined the opposition platform “Citizen Front 2016” and took centre stage when he suggested opposition-wide primaries to choose a single opposition candidate. The idea was resisted by other opposition parties, fearful of his wealth and influence. They focused more on guaranteeing credible elections than who would contest them.116 Since he left the majority, Katumbi has been close to the G7, and several other groups and parties have rallied to him. In May 2016, a new group, the AR, emerged, consisting of a dozen smaller parties, including Mayombo’s SCODE and several affiliated to people close to Katumbi.117 He has also been underlining his links to the Catholic Church and received public support from Monseigneur Fulgence Muteba, bishop of Kilwa-Kasenga, his north Haut-Katanga birthplace.118

On 30 March 2016, the G7 formally asked Katumbi to be a presidential candidate.119 Realising that his attempt to inspire broader opposition unity had not worked, Katumbi declared his desire to stand on 4 May. On the same day, Justice Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba announced an investigation into Katumbi for allegedly employing mercenaries.

On 8-9 June, some 100 Congolese opposition politicians and civil society representatives met in Genval, Belgium. Katumbi was absent, but several close advisers and his brother, Katebe Katoto, attended. The meeting, convened by Tshisekedi, led to creation of the “Rassemblement”, led by Tshisekedi, in close partnership with Katebe

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117 Including the National Party for Democracy and Development (PND), for which Katumbi’s brother, Abraham Kitanika Soriano, is a candidate for future provincial elections and the Conservateurs de la nature et démocrates (CONADE), a new party led by the brother of Katumbi’s political adviser, Salomon Idi Kalonda Della.
119 Tweet by @G7_RDC, 30 March 2016.
Katoto. It allows Katumbi to operate in close association to the historic opposition leader.120

The defections of Katumbi and the G7 have considerably weakened the majority in Katanga and especially Lubumbashi, where it has never had to contend with serious opposition. The government’s reaction has included suppressing public events by opposition groups, closing public space and shutting down media. In early April, the army paraded tanks and armoured vehicles in Lubumbashi.121 The government reportedly blocked Katumbi’s plane from using the city’s airport, pushed members of the G7 and officials close to Katumbi out of administrative positions and intimidated others.122 The central government and PPRD have also reinvigorated attempts to retain support in Katanga, including by encouraging new parties, or factions within existing parties. This included an attempt by the government in early 2016 to hijack the UNAFEC party. However Kyungu was able to produce court documents on 5 February that confirmed his leadership of the party.123 The risk of escalation with UNAFEC remains high.

Both Kabila and Katumbi are mobilising and broadening their support. Kabila’s Katanga base seems concentrated with the Lunda-Ruund (Lualaba) and the Lubakat elite, in particular those from Malemba Nkulu. Katumbi is best established in Haut-Katanga and Kolwezi, but also has important allies in Tanganyika (Mwando Nsimba and the UNADEF), as well as some Lubakat allies, in particular Kyungu. His outreach to other Lubakat leaders seems not to have worked so far, and it remains to be seen how much découpage will reconfigure the political allegiances and dynamics between elites and the general population.124

Demonstrations and violence escalated in April and May 2016, when the government accused Katumbi of endangering national security. He was injured in a protest outside the Lubumbashi courthouse and eventually flew abroad for medical treatment, an avoidance of all-out confrontation that may have suited both sides. He was subsequently convicted in a civil dispute over ownership of property, but the ruling and three-year prison sentence can be challenged, because he was convicted in

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120 Crisis Group email correspondence with diplomatic sources, Nairobi, June 2016; Crisis Group interviews, Congolese analyst, Kinshasa July 2016.
122 Such as the mayor of Likasi, a Scode member. “Communiqué N°012/JUS/2015 by Justicia Asbl”, 28 October 2015. Another interesting example was a 12 October 2015 letter by the ANR’s Haut-Katanga provincial director to the acting governor requesting he no longer invite UNAFEC and other G7 members to provincial security council meetings, on file with Crisis Group.
123 Tweets by @AmbHenriMova, PPRD secretary general, 18-20 October 2015. This campaign included issuing new membership cards to PPRD ministers and deputies. "UNAFEC: la destitution de Gabriel Kyungu qualifiée de non statutaire”, Radio Okapi, 25 September 2015; another example of interference in the internal affairs of parties was when the interior minister recognised Patrick Bologna, a legislator close to the government, as national president of the ACO, whose leader is Danny Banza. Legal document, dated 5 February 2016, referring to court proceedings dated 10 July 2015, confirming Kyungu as the president of the UNAFEC party, on file with Crisis Group.
124 Lualaba leaders from Lunda-Ruund include Diemu Chikez, Richard Mujey and Kalev Mutond. Crisis Group email correspondence, Katangan analyst, August 2015.
absentia. Nevertheless, the government has strong cards to play and is likely to continue to bring legal cases to keep him on the defensive.

The population of Katanga and other opposition parties have stayed quiet through this round of confrontation, but no one thinks the problems have been resolved. Katumbi does not have old links to armed groups, so the high level of political tension is not linked to the outbreaks of armed violence described above, though some of his allies, in particular UNAFEC, could be involved in street clashes. But relations between government and opposition are vital indicators of the health of the political system and thus of the country’s fragile stability.

V. The Way Ahead: Repairing Kinshasa-Katanga Relations

The fundamental breakdown of trust between Kinshasa and many Katangan elite and ordinary citizens reflects countrywide discontent with the regime as it tries to delay elections in ever more inventive ways. It also reveals very Katangan concerns about identity, power and entitlement. The confusion around *découpage* and electoral delays appears intentional. Necessary legislation for the effective functioning and budgetary survival of the new provinces has stalled. In October 2015, the government froze transfer of national tax revenue to the provinces and other decentralised entities and announced an audit of all provincial budgets, which may take a long time and create further crises. All this adds to a growing feeling that decentralisation gains and Katangan identity more widely are under attack.

The breakdown in trust and rising tensions risk triggering violent escalation. The concerns are at local, provincial and national levels. The most significant danger arises when the various tensions feed off each other, as appears to have happened with the 2013 Mukungubila incident that triggered violence in both Kinshasa and Katanga. An indication that the government is worried about such dynamics is the increased military presence in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces. Particularly telling are the deployment of armoured vehicles near Lubumbashi and reinforcements in Kolwezi.

As the electoral deadline looms, government and opposition are increasingly focused on their fight to take or retain power and adopting a zero-sum approach. Real dialogue and government commitment not to manipulate the constitution for political purposes would contribute to de-escalating tensions across the country. This situation is hardly promising for solving problems at local level, but it makes finding a way forward ever more important. Officials and elites at the local level have an interest in sustainable, credible structures to deal with the many community tensions that will arise from *découpage*, including disputes over “non-native” rights and political and economic arguments between new provinces. These are most likely when local and provincial elections are organised. Responsible leadership is needed from cultural and community leaders and authorities. At the least, national authorities must allow space for local reconciliation initiatives and not take actions that might exacerbate problems. Politicians on all sides must desist from politicising identity to shore up support bases.

The approaching elections necessitate further local action to deal with armed groups. Use of such groups to further political ambitions continues, in Katanga as well as the worse affected Kivus, despite fourteen years of official peace. However, while there has been some serious violence in Katanga over the last five years, and there is reason to believe the armed groups remain a threat, the frequency and intensity of incidents do not yet indicate an explosive situation. Where possible, disarmament and demobilisation should be carried out, though this needs to be carefully considered and done case by case, so as to not inflame tensions or create perceptions that some communities are being unfairly treated. Ultimately, dealing with armed groups in Katanga, as elsewhere in the country, is a political issue, and steps should be taken to discourage politicians from manipulating them for their purposes, including through monitoring and exposing their activities.

The UN, through MONUSCO, has an important role. Its presence in Katanga, though limited, is being beefed-up to deal with a possible upsurge in violence if
political tensions continue to rise. While there are limits to what it can do when national forces confront their own citizens, MONUSCO should continue reinforcing its police component in urban centres, to help with monitoring Congolese police and military in case of urban unrest and to provide security for political officers and human rights monitors. Operations by the FARDC against armed groups should be supported in line with experiences elsewhere in the country.126

Rising political tensions in Katanga and the country at large coincide with a slump in the mineral export dependent economy. Major export prices are not expected to increase in the near future, leaving little margin to raise revenue other than by tackling corruption and increasing efficiency, but as political competition is patronage based, there is an ever more desperate fight over a shrinking cake.

The resulting drop in the budget, cut 22 per cent in 2016 to little over $7 billion, will considerably affect the national government’s capacity to maintain the previously inadequate levels of funding to the provinces. It also dispels hope of quickly operationalising the equalisation fund, so the disparities between provinces will remain. Nowhere are the problems as stark as in former Katanga, whose new landlocked provinces of Tanganyika and Haut-Lamami are among DRC’s poorest, while Haut Katanga and Lualaba are among the richest.127 The details are beyond this report’s scope, but initiatives on agriculture, energy supply, infrastructure and diversification to alleviate the immediate impact and remedy structural economic and developmental problems are vitally important to lower political resentment and prevent or slow armed groups’ recruitment.

After ten years of tentative decentralisation, which at least shifted some power to provincial assemblies and administrations, recent moves by Kinshasa have reversed the trend. Foreshadowing its probable approach in national elections, the majority has deployed all means at its disposal to ensure that nearly all provincial authorities are subject to its command. This adds to Kinshasa’s dominant position when handing out largesse in the provinces, which, even when done through Katangan politicians and officials, can fuel local resentments.

It is vital that the government makes the province-centre financial relationship far more transparent. While provincial administrations’ absorption capacity may prevent the full immediate application of constitutional and legal decentralisation provisions, progress is important so that provinces are eventually able to receive entitled resources. This should be in conjunction with a financial monitoring mechanism, so that decentralisation does not simply equate to decentralisation of corruption. The national audit office (Cour des Comptes) is mandated to take this role but is largely neutered by the president’s office. A more empowered audit office, with better civil society monitoring of financial flows, could help defuse province-centre

126 Planning is underway at MONUSCO to boost early-warning capacity for election-related violence by creating mobile teams to monitor human rights and political issues in Lubumbashi (in addition to Kinshasa and Goma). The Mission is reviewing its military and police deployments in areas at high risk of election-related violence and enhancing its ability to protect UN personnel in urban centres, including Lubumbashi, by developing evacuation plans and deploying helicopters and armoured personnel carriers. “Report of the Secretary-General on [MONUSCO]”, UNSC S/ 2016/579, 28 June 2016.

tensions. Again, the national political climate does not currently lend itself to such progress, but these issues should not be ignored if a better balance is to be found.

It is no exaggeration that electoral preparations and the government’s actions to stay in power are fundamental threats to national cohesion and stability. Katanga, because of regime ties and its disproportionate economic weight, is one of the key battlegrounds, along with major urban centres such as Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani. The lack of effective development, in particular in its north, and competing individual ambitions have pushed the Katangan elite into a dangerously polarised position. With resources distributed along patronage networks, it is determined to either keep a grip on central power (a determination potentially at odds with national democracy) or keep more resources at the provincial level. There is a danger that politicians will increasingly play the separatist card, expressed initially by desire to “reunify” in order to pressure the centre. Support for Katangan identity is not inherently illegitimate, and prospect of a strong separatist movement is currently remote, but the risk is that politicians will mobilise armed groups and networks to manipulate separatist sentiment for their political ends.

Katumbi’s declared presidential candidacy further escalated tensions from the provincial to national level. Several provincial political leaders have rallied to his camp, but Kabila retains strong Lubakat support, as well as a base in the new Lualaba province. Whether Katumbi and Kabila will ever contest an election head to head depends on future turns in the unfolding political drama, but if events since Katumbi announced his candidacy are an indication, the battle would be hard fought. Even now, the confrontation is likely to raise tensions, not just between province and centre, which are connected by multiple overlapping networks, but also by shifting elite alliances.
VI. Conclusion

To move the electoral, financial and political issues forward constructively and put in place transitional arrangements for the now inevitable delay of the November 2016 polls requires a minimum of trust between the main parties, a more coherent opposition and a step away from winner takes all politics. Genuine, credible dialogue is needed, which should include but not be limited to a formal national dialogue. As elsewhere in the vast country, the risks of unpredictable deterioration and renewed violence are real in Katanga. Now is the time to head them off.

The UN and Congo’s other regional and wider international partners need to take the risks more seriously and use their shrinking leverage more effectively. MONUSCO should reinforce its police and human rights monitoring in Katanga; donors should consider more support for local bodies that monitor activities of both state security forces and armed groups. Though the government will try hard to keep the international community out of its relations with the new provinces, mediation efforts to bring the main parties in political disputes together should keep the subject on the table. The stakes are high, as the progress achieved in DRC since 2006 could quickly evaporate, and the country, still hosting the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, could descend into a new, deep crisis reminiscent of the late 1990’s.

Nairobi/Brussels, 3 August 2016

128 Moncrieff, “The reluctance of Joseph Kabila to cede power”, op. cit.
Appendix A: Map of Katanga
Appendix B: Political Parties

ACO  Avenir du Congo, part of the G7
AR  Alternation for the Republic (alliance of opposition parties, supporting Moïse Katumbi)
ARC  Alliance for the Renewal of Congo, part of the G7
ATD  Labour Alliance for Development
CONAKAT  Confederation of Katanga Tribal Associations
ECT  Awakening of Consciousness for Work
G7  Opposition bloc consisting of UNAFEC, UNADEF, ACO, MSR, ARC, PDC and MSDD, which agreed on Moïse Katumbi as its single presidential candidate
JUNAFEC  Youth wing of UNAFEC
MSDD  Solidarity Movement for Democracy and Development, part of the G7
MSR  Movement for Social Renewal, largest party in the G7
PDC  Christian Democratic Party, part of G7
PPRD  People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
SCODE  Congolese Solidarity for Democracy and Development
UDCO  Union for the Development of Congo
UDPS  Union for Democracy and Social Progress
UFERI  Union of independent Federalists and Republicans
UNADEF  National Union of Democrats and Federalists, part of G7
UNAFEC  Union of Nationalist Federalist of Congo, part of G7
UNC  Union for the Congolese Nation
Appendix C: Glossary

AFDL  Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo
ANR   National Intelligence Agency
CENI  Independent National Electoral Commission
CNTK  National Transitional Council of Katanga
CORAK Coordination for a Referendum on Self-determination for Katanga
CPK   Katangese Peoples’ Congress
DGM   Migration administration
ETDs  Decentralised territorial entities, local entities at sub-provincial level (cities, municipalities, sectors, and chiefdoms)
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FEC   Federation of Congolese Enterprises
FNLC  National Liberation Front of Congo
GR    Republican Guard
ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDP   Internally Displaced Person
IMF   International Monetary Fund
KCC   Glencore’s Kamoto Copper Company
LUCHA Struggle for Change, pro-democracy youth social movement
LNI   Police National Intervention Legion
MONUSCO United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA  Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PAREC Peace Program Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation
PNC   National Congolese Police
PSCF  Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework signed in February 2013
RCD-Goma Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma
SOCITANG Société civile du Tanganyika
UNC   Union for the Congolese Nation
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Appendix D: List of Personalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anzuluni, Floribert</td>
<td>Coordinator of “Front citoyen 2016” and Filimbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banza Maloba, Danny</td>
<td>Party leader of the ACO, member of the G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banza Mukalay Sungu, Baudouin</td>
<td>Culture and arts minister (since December 2014), previously, youth and sports minister, leader of the UDCO party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beya Siku, Gustave</td>
<td>Ambassador to Angola, former presidential cabinet director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisengimana Rukira, Charles</td>
<td>PNC commissioner-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna, Patrick</td>
<td>MP, leader of majority ACO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boshab Mabudji-ma-Bilenge, Évariste</td>
<td>Deputy prime minister and interior minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikez Diemu, Ghislain</td>
<td>Former defence minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiluba, Frederick Jacob Titus</td>
<td>President of Zambia, 1991-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chebeya, Floribert</td>
<td>Human rights defender, found dead in early June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekanga, Moïse</td>
<td>Director, Office for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Program and close Kabila confidant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endundu Bononge, José</td>
<td>Party leader PDC, member of the G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forrest, Malta David</td>
<td>CEO and vice president of Groupe Forrest International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilunga Monga, Simplice</td>
<td>Deputy minister for transport (since October 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabila, Jaynet</td>
<td>Twin sister of Joseph Kabila, MP for Kalemie, Tanganyika province, since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabila, Laurent Désiré</td>
<td>President (May 1997-January 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabila Mwanza Mbala, Zoë</td>
<td>brother of Joseph Kabila, MP for Manono, Tanganyika province, since 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabwelulu Labilo, Martin</td>
<td>Mines minister (since 2007), PALU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalembé Kiboko, Vano</td>
<td>Lwanzo leader and former MP, currently in prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalume Numbi, Denis (Gen.)</td>
<td>Representative of President Kabila in the regional follow-up mechanism for the PSCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamerhe, Vital</td>
<td>Party leader of UNC, finished third in the 2011 presidential election, from South Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamitatu Etsu, Olivier</td>
<td>Party leader of ARC, member of the G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaputo, Guillaume Samba</td>
<td>Former head of Joseph Kabila’s cabinet, security adviser. Died in 2007 accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasweshi, Fridolin Musoka</td>
<td>Infrastructure minister (since February 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katumbi, Moïse</td>
<td>Former Katanga governor (2007-2015), businessman, opposition leader currently in exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazembe Musonda, Jean-Claude</td>
<td>Haut-Katanga province governor (elect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kifwa, Jean-Claude (Gen.)</td>
<td>Commander of the 2nd military zone, HQ in Lubumbashi, comprising former Katanga and Kasai provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyungu Mutanga, Gédéon</td>
<td>Leader of the Mai Mai Bakata Katanga (cut-off Katanga) militia group in central Katanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lumbi Okongo, Pierre</td>
<td>Party leader MSR and former national security adviser (G7 member)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lutundula Apala, Christophe</td>
<td>Party leader MSDD (G7 member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahanya (Kabila), Sifa</td>
<td>Mother of Joseph Kabila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masangu, Jean-Claude</td>
<td>Party leader UDCO, former Congolese National Bank governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matata Ponyo, Augustin</td>
<td>Prime minister, since 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbuyu Kabango, Célestin</td>
<td>Haut-Lomami province governor (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minaku, Aubin</td>
<td>National assembly speaker and secretary general of the presidential majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mova Sakanyi, Henri</td>
<td>PPRD secretary general, former ambassador in Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mubalali, Théodore</td>
<td>Chief of staff at the presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukungubila Mutombo, Paul</td>
<td>Christian religious leader and self-proclaimed prophet, ran for presidency in 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muland, Henri Yav</td>
<td>Finance minister (since December 2014, previously in presidential cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulongo Kalonda, Huit</td>
<td>Former head of cabinet for Moïse Katumbi, leader of Neo-Conakat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muteba Mugalu, Fulgence</td>
<td>Bishop of Kilwa-Kasenga diocese in north Haut-Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutombo Mwana Nyembo, Déogracias</td>
<td>Central Bank governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutond, Kalev</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency (ANR) director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyambo, Jean-Claude</td>
<td>Party leader SCODE, currently imprisoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyej Mangez, Richard</td>
<td>Lualaba province governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwando Nsimba, Christian</td>
<td>Son of Charles Mwando Nsimba, former provincial finance minister under Moïse Katumbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanké, Augustin Katumba</td>
<td>Former Katanga governor and national minister, central figure of the Congolese power structure, until 2012 when he died in a plane crash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndongo Khang, Emile Mota</td>
<td>Agriculture minister (since 2015), former head of cabinet for Laurent-Désiré Kabila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngoy Kitangala, Richard</td>
<td>Tanganyika province governor (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngoy Mukena, Aimé</td>
<td>Hydrocarbons minister (since September 2015), previously defence minister (since December 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngoy Mulunda, Daniel</td>
<td>Pastor, former CENI head, responsible for the 2011 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbi, John (Gen.)</td>
<td>Former Air Force commander and former head of PNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbi Kabange, Félix</td>
<td>Health minister (since April 2012), leader of the ECT party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbi Kabange, Flory</td>
<td>National prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olenga, François (Gen.)</td>
<td>President’s military chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sese Seko, Mobutu</td>
<td>President (1965-1997) overthrown by Laurent-Désiré Kabila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadari, Emmanuel</td>
<td>PPRD parliamentary group chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshibal, Guibert Paul Yav</td>
<td>Former Katanga deputy governor and acting governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, Etienne</td>
<td>Veteran opposition leader and party leader UDPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshombe, Moïse Kapenda</td>
<td>Founding member CONAKAT and leader of the Katangan succession after independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yav, Philémon (Gen.)</td>
<td>Commander 22nd military region, comprising the former Katanga province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuma, Albert</td>
<td>Board chair of Gécamines and president of the FEC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>