South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias

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Executive Summary

The formation of a transitional government following Riek Machar’s return to Juba in April marked the most significant milestone of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) that ended the twenty-month civil war. Yet the ARCSS, designed to address a war primarily fought between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) in the Greater Upper Nile region, is an imperfect solution to other conflict fault lines, notably in the Equatoria region. Conflicts there are driven by a combination of national governance issues – federalism, security sector reform and a new constitution – that the ARCSS addresses – and localised grievances. Though the Equatorian conflicts appear to be on the wane, the agreement’s ability to address national political and security governance issues as well as regionalspecific questions about the status of Equatorian opposition forces will determine if they revive.

Conflicts in the Equatorias, particularly in the west, intensified following the ARCSS signing, leading to persistent violence and displacing more than 100,000 people in eight of the region’s 23 original counties. The SPLA-IO capitalised on mounting grievances with a deliberate policy of support and incitement to rebellion, helping turn localised violence into low-level armed combat. This prompted retaliation from Juba that further escalated the situations.

At its core, the multiple Equatorian conflicts are based on political differences and unresolved grievances between the national government and some local communities, not between the government and SPLM/A-IO. Many Equatorians believe the government and its army (the SPLA) serve a single ethnic group, the Dinka (who are cattle keepers, government officials, businesspeople and soldiers throughout much of the region); many Dinka believe they bore the greatest burdens of the independence struggle, including famine and the depredation produced by raids on their communities, while areas such as Western Equatoria were largely spared. Nevertheless, most Equatorians are not rebelling against the government, and where there is fighting, different armed groups have their own casus belli.

Though they were not then a battleground, South Sudan’s civil war created the conditions for new conflicts in the Equatorias. After fighting broke out in December 2013, old suspicions about Western Equatorians’ commitment to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) seemed vindicated, as the region struggled to meet a government recruitment quota, and many sought to keep out of what they saw as a “Dinka-Nuer war”. In 2015, Equatorian governors presented an independent position to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, the regional organisation). The September 2015 sacking and subsequent detention by President Salva Kiir of the popular elected Governor Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro, the strengthening of relations between Dinka cattle keepers and the SPLA against the agricultural majority and the harsh suppression of local rebellions are seen as consequences of Equatorian “neutrality”.

Determinations over whether Equatorian armed groups are eligible to join the ARCSS cantonnement process as “forces previously in combat” at the time of signing have been complicated by the warring parties. The SPLM/A-IO has claimed the
Equatorian rebel groups and operations as their own, though they sometimes have not been. The government denies the SPLA-IO is active in the region, which would make Equatorian combatants ineligible for the cantonment, but some still allege SPLA-IO ceasefire violations in the Equatorias. Mutual obfuscation is compounded by the failure of ceasefire mechanisms to investigate peace agreement breaches in a timely fashion and identify armed groups’ relationships to the SPLA-IO. Failure to find a solution for forces which joined the fighting after the agreement was signed in August 2015 could lead to continued combat, a rift within the SPLA-IO and decisions by forces not deemed eligible to continue to fight in response.

Most Equatorians want the bloodshed to end; they do not want to fight the government or anyone else. Formation of the transitional government in Juba has furthered the move toward peace; Equatorians are well-represented in it, leading two of the three security ministries, and Bakosoro has been released. The tools to end conflict in the Equatorias are available, within the August peace deal and through church-led local peace efforts in conflict-affected communities.

The process to draft a permanent constitution, based on the principle of a federal system and with an Equatorian, Dr Richard K. Mulla, in a key position as federal affairs minister in the transitional government, gives Equatorians opportunities to present their federalism positions. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will make recommendations about ethnic composition of the security sector, its structure and counter-insurgency responsibilities and approaches within an overall security policy framework. Beyond ARCSS processes, reconciliation between agricultural and pastoral communities, supported by a balanced approach from Juba, is necessary to prevent further violence and enable implementation of the agreement. Without a determined commitment by political leaders to peace, not war, however, such efforts will fail, and low-level conflicts could continue indefinitely.
Recommendations

To build sustainable peace in the Equatorias

To the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU):

1. Ensure full implementation of the permanent ceasefire in the Equatorias.
2. Resolve eligibility criteria for cantonment, specifically in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal.
3. Take steps to repair trust and badly damaged relationships with certain Western Equatorian politicians, building on ex-Governor Bakosoro’s release.
4. Address the escalation in pastoralist-farmer conflict by:
   a) implementing the presidential decree ordering cattle keepers to leave parts of the Equatorias;
   b) providing impartial support for existing community-based structures used to negotiate cattle migration; and
   c) seeking to resolve conflicts in neighbouring states, such as Lakes and Jonglei, that drive cattle keepers from their homes in greater numbers.

To the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism:

5. Investigate reported violations in the Equatorias, including military resupply of forces, in a timely fashion, paying special attention to the precise relationship between different Equatorian forces and the SPLM/A-IO.

To the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and diplomatic community:

6. Prioritise the following to stop conflicts in the Equatorias:
   a) support for the TGoNU in resolving eligibility criteria for cantonment in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal;
   b) formation and funding of the National Architecture for the Permanent Ceasefire and Unification of Forces to ensure implementation of the permanent ceasefire and oversee forces in cantonment; and
   c) making clear to the warring parties that continuing conflicts in the Equatorias would be a serious ceasefire breach.
7. Ensure that Equatorian perspectives are given due weight during constitution drafting, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and other political processes.

To the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board:

8. Consider, in the context of its effort to create a new security policy framework and defence policy, the problematic nature of insurgency and current counter-insurgency policy.
To South Sudan’s church leaders:
9. Facilitate local peace agreements as and when appropriate between the TGoNU, armed groups and armed youth, local communities and cattle keepers.

To avoid further humanitarian crisis

To armed actors:
10. Provide security guarantees for humanitarian actors to access and serve displaced populations transparently and impartially.

To humanitarian agencies:
11. Maintain impartiality and transparency in accessing and serving displaced populations.
12. Ensure adequate staffing and effective risk management strategies are in place, so that, when humanitarian access is secured, agencies can deliver necessary services to populations where they are located, and those populations can feel comfortable accessing the assistance.

To the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS):
13. Accept and assist civilians fleeing active armed conflict and seeking protection inside UNMISS bases.

Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 25 May 2016
South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias

I. Introduction

The Equatorias – the southern third of South Sudan – are tremendously diverse and host the country’s largest agriculturalist populations, though many different pastoralist groups also call the region home. At independence they were divided into ten states. Following President Salva Kiir’s December 2015 creation of 28 states out of the existing ten, Western Equatoria was divided into Gbudwe, Maridi, Amadi; Central Equatoria into Terekeka, Yei River, Jubek (home to the capital, Juba); and Eastern Equatoria into Imatong and Namorunyang states.

Equatorians have been involved in all recent major conflicts: leading the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972), participating on all sides in the second (1983-2005) and serving with both SPLA and SPLA-IO in South Sudan’s civil war (2013-2015). Despite diversity, they united behind federalism; many believed it would mitigate the effects of a national government and security services they saw as dominated by Dinka, the largest ethnicity. The Equatorias weathered most of South Sudan’s civil war with minimal violence, though tensions were building, particularly in Western Equatoria, between agriculturalist communities and largely Dinka pastoralists and local communities and the SPLA. The army went from ethnically-mixed to predominately Dinka after many Nuer (the second-largest ethnicity) defected in December 2013. But armed rebellion fully took hold in eight of Equatoria’s 23 counties (seven in the former Western Equatoria) and displaced more than 100,000 only after the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in August 2015.

The SPLM/A-IO in the Equatorias is comprised of multiple groups. Since early 2015, many groups formed and later joined the SPLA-IO, seeking operational support or the peace deal’s benefits. The SPLA-IO also armed some unallied smaller groups, including, perhaps inadvertently, many criminals, which prey on civilians in remote areas but are not a significant military threat. Church-led processes have sought local solutions to these unaddressed multiple conflicts with mixed results.

This report provides a brief political and conflict history of the Equatorias. It identifies the stresses the recent civil war put on the region and the path from local insurrection into open rebellion in parts of Western Equatoria. It concludes with a discussion of the relationship between these conflicts and the ARCSS and peace prospects under the transitional government. Appendices below on the SPLA and key armed groups identify their areas of operations, structure, leadership and prospects.

1 Field research was conducted between 2013 and 2016 in South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, including interviews with current and ex-South Sudanese political and military leaders, combatants from all groups, religious leaders, civil society, civilians, diplomats and other officials.
II. Legacies of War and Peace

Many Equatorians see themselves as the first to have fought for the South’s independence. After the initial war with Khartoum ended in 1972, tensions grew between many Dinka and Equatorians, reaching a peak in the debate about Kokora (the South’s reorganisation into three regions), which Equatorians generally supported but Dinka, believing it played into Khartoum’s efforts to divide and rule, generally opposed. Its 1983 implementation led to the expulsion of many Dinka from the region. The second civil war began the same year, and the Dinka-led SPLM/A received limited Equatorian support at its outset. The SPLM/A eventually developed strategies to increase its Equatorian membership, though many communities fought against it. Political diversity, communal rivalry and the legacies of past wars continue to shape today’s conflicts.

A. The Early Equatorian Bid for Autonomy – the 1955 Torit Mutiny

The Equatorias were prominent in the South’s early autonomy struggle. The 1955 Torit mutiny, in which Equatorian soldiers in Sudan’s army mutinied against northern commanders, started a chain of events that led to the first civil war. After the army crushed it, surviving mutineers established the Anya-Nya, a faction-ridden anti-Khartoum insurgency. The divided rebels had little success until Colonel Joseph Lagu brought the factions together under the umbrella of the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1971. Pressure from Lagu’s unified SSLM (with Israeli support) was instrumental in bringing about the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement granting the South substantial autonomy.

B. Addis Ababa Agreement

After Mohammad Jafa’ar Nimeiri seized power to become president in 1969 (and a failed coup in 1971), Abel Alier Kwai Kut, a Dinka from Bor, became southern affairs minister in 1971. He represented the government in talks with the Anya-Nya in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the World Council of Churches, All Africa Council of Churches, Sudan Council of Churches, Sudan Council of Churches and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. The

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4 Joseph Lagu Yanga was an Equatorian Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officer and graduate of Sudan Military College. He defected to the Anya-Nya in 1963 and went to Tel Aviv for military training. Ibid, pp. 11, 96, 150, 155, 161.


6 Abel Alier Kwai Kut, a respected lawyer sympathetic to the Anya-Nya cause but not a member, lobbied Nimeri to begin peace talks and was instrumental in orchestrating the agreement. Ebzoni Mundri represented the SSLM. Integration and Fragmentation, op. cit., pp. 163-165.
agreement created an autonomous southern region, subsuming Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces, with an appointed president and elected assembly, and integrated Anya-Nya fighters into Sudan’s army and civil service. Yet, not all the Anya-Nya forces supported it, including Dr John Garang, who formed the SPLM/A in 1983. Many Equatorians who saw themselves as leaders of the armed struggle were soon unhappy with the new administration. Lagu expected to be appointed the region’s president but was only integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as a major general. While he was the highest-ranking southern officer, Equatorians consider it one of multiple denials of a political position for an Equatorian in favour of a Dinka. Abel Alier became first president of the Higher Executive Council (HEC), heading the regional government, and Sudan’s vice president (1972-1978).

C. Kokora and the Addis Ababa Agreement’s Collapse

By the late 1970s, Nimeri was eroding autonomy, and Equatorians were increasingly at odds with Dinka neighbours, whom they saw as dominating the southern government – especially after the 1983 institution of Kokora. For many Equatorians, Kokora was a means to end Dinka-domination and gain equal representation and government jobs. Southern Regional President James Tombura from Western Equatoria was a strong proponent. To others, particularly those from Bahr el Ghazal, it meant forcible expulsion of non-Equatorians from Equatoria, undermining southern unity and leading to charges Equatorians collaborated with Nimeiri’s government, as Kokora violated the Addis Ababa Agreement.

D. Equatorians and the Advent of the SPLA

Kokora exacerbated communal tensions between Equatorians and Dinka that formed the backdrop to the founding of the SPLA by Garang (a Dinka from Greater Bor). In 1983, when SAF battalion 105 rebelled in the “Bor Mutiny” (a Dinka area) and, with other units, formed the SPLM/A – many Equatorians hesitated to support a renewed

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7 The regional president was to be appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. “The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan”, Section 5.19, 27 February 1972.
8 John Garang was one of the most prominent members openly opposed to the agreement, because it allowed regional autonomy, not independence, but he and his supporters were unable to prevent the deal. David H. Shinn, “Addis Ababa Agreement: was it destined to fail and are there lessons for the current Sudan peace process?”, in Annales d’Ethiopie, vol. 20 (2005), p. 242; Paan Luel Wël (ed.), The Genius of John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A’s Leader, Dr. John Garang De Mabior (Seattle, 2013).
9 A History of Modern Sudan, op. cit., p. 133.
11 Kokora is a Bari language word that can be translated as “to divide”, or “division”, but can also mean “to share something”. For more, see “The legacy of Kokora in South Sudan”, South Sudan Law Society, University for Peace, Pax (co-publishers), November 2015.
12 Non-Equatorian officials were dismissed, sent to their “home areas” and lost their homes. Some families were split, including many from Bahr el Ghazal. Douglas Johnson, “Federalism in the History of South Sudanese Political Thought”, Rift Valley Institute, 2014, p. 19.
The government took advantage of this ambivalence to arm some Equatorian communities (such as the Mundari, Madi and Toposa in Central and Eastern Equatoria) against the “Dinka” SPLA, whose own local recruitment policies further divided the region. From the beginning, prominent Equatorians were in both the SAF and SPLA and also influential in the SPLM’s underground movement.

SPLA troops, even when recruiting, were often responsible for violence against civilians and destruction and expropriation of property, which turned many against them. The SPLA’s early strategy of child recruitment into the “Red Army” also was applied in the Equatorias, though less than in parts of Greater Upper Nile. These abuses were overlaid on existing communal tensions, and some Equatorian groups were armed by Khartoum; others (Bari in particular) largely kept out of the movement. Recognising these tensions and the SPLA’s need for Equatorian support, Garang recruited promising and influential Equatorians, including Thomas Cirillo Swaka (an SAF officer and brother to Khartoum’s former Equatoria governor based in Juba), Father Longokwo Kinga (a Khartoum government minister) and Louis Lobong Lojore (now the Namorunyang state governor). Over time, the SPLM/A’s support increased.

Life was difficult for many civilians during this period, as both SAF and SPLA sought to control them. This was particularly evident during the SPLA sieges of Juba and Torit towns. The SAF tried to restrict civilian movement and food supply to rebel-held areas, creating famine-like conditions. When Equatorians made it through...

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13 Among the reasons, many supported full independence, while Garang wanted a united “New Sudan” (though most SPLM/A were pro-independence). Others had made an unhappy peace with the regime and preferred stability and economic progress or opportunity to another war.


15 The underground movement operated in government-controlled territory and was responsible for political mobilisation and enabling southern Sudanese to join the SPLM/A. Crisis Group interview, SPLM leader, Juba, January 2016.


17 The Red Army was an SPLM/A youth organisation that prepared children to join the SPLA; it engaged in education, portaging, cooking and front-line combat. Many members are still in the SPLM/A. The PLA was also slower to begin systematic recruitment in western areas of southern Sudan, both Dinka and Equatorian. Mareike Schomerus, “Perilous border: Sudanese communities affected by conflict on the Sudan-Uganda border”, Conciliation Resources, November 2008; “The Lost Boys: Child Soldiers and Unaccompanied Minors in Southern Sudan”, Human Rights Watch, November 1994, p. 7.

18 “Some Comments on Militias”, op. cit. For example, many Mundari saw the SPLA’s mid-1980s atrocities in Terekeka as part of a longer Mundari-Dinka Bor conflict.

19 Recruitment of Eastern Equatorians was initially more successful, as they felt less represented by Governor Tombura of Western Equatoria. Louis Lobong defected with many Toposa, and Thomas Cirillo brought many Bari. They joined other prominent Equatorians in the SPLM such as Joseph Oduho, James Wani Igga, Dr Sampson Kwaje, Alfred Ladu Gore and Obote Mamur. Crisis Group interview, senior Equatorian SPLM member, Juba, January 2016.

20 The SPLA restricted humanitarian access to Juba, notably by closing the airport. “Starving out the South”, op. cit.; “Denying ‘the Honor of Living’: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster”, Human Rights Watch, March 1990, pp. 115-118.
the blockade, however, the SPLA often viewed them with suspicion and subjected them to reprisals.21 The government also questioned southern loyalties and subjected civilians to both random and targeted atrocities. This reached its peak in hundreds of killings and arbitrary detentions in Juba following Cirillo’s defection during the SPLA siege in 1992 – extensive atrocities the capital would not see again until December 2013.22

III. A Regional Theatre of War in the 1990s

By 1991, the SPLA controlled much of the Equatorias, save the major towns of Torit and Juba, but a major SPLM/A split led to a decade of internecine conflict during which some Equatorians stayed with the movement while others left. It was in this period that the SAF-aligned, pro-independence, anti-SPLA Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF) emerged. At the same time, the insurgency was severely weakened, as it lost its major military patron and rear bases with the fall of Ethiopia’s Derg regime. That led to huge territorial reversals, and it was pushed southwards toward northern Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni was engaged in counter-insurgency against various armed groups, particularly the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda became the new patron, and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) eventually deployed into the South, where it has since maintained a presence, for varying purposes. The Equatorias thus became embroiled in a broader dispute between Khartoum and Kampala.

A. The Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF)

The 1991 SPLM/A split gave Khartoum new opportunities to support anti-SPLA militias. In the Equatorias, this concentrated behind the Martin Kenyi-commanded EDF, which was most active east of Juba, where its members came from local ethnic groups. It did not itself have a reputation for civilian ill-treatment but was part of growing and proliferating armed groups that often preyed on civilians, and its relationship with the LRA and SAF generated mistrust. It often joined with the SAF.

23 In 1991, Riek Machar and Lam Akol split from the SPLM/A citing Garang’s “dictatorial” practices. After trying and failing to take over the movement, they established a separate southern group that was eventually supplied by the Sudanese government. The split led to devastating South-South conflict, famine and attacks on civilians. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, op. cit., pp. 91-126.
24 The EDF had alliances with other anti-SPLA southern groups, particularly the much larger Nuer-led groups, some of which eventually formed the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). Other local Equatorian groups came and went, including such disparate organisations as Peter Sule’s Imatong Liberation Front, Peter Lorot’s Didinga forces and Alfred Ladu Gore’s Patriotic Resistance Movement. These fought one another as well as SPLA mainstream and breakaway factions. Ibid. Many claim they were the country’s real liberators because, during the war, the SPLM never advocated independence. Matthew B. Arnold, “The South Sudan Defence Force: Patriots, Collaborators or Spoilers?”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, no. 4 (2007).
26 Sudan backed the LRA, which expanded into southern Sudan, as well as Ugandan opposition groups, the West Nile Bank Liberation Front and Allied Democratic Forces.
27 General Kenyi, a Madi from Magwi county, joined the SPLM at inception and was a political activist while finishing his education abroad. He returned to become an SPLA officer. The EDF’s political leader was Dr Theophilus Ochang Lotti. Other prominent members included Gelardo Modi Hurnyang, Paul Omoyo and Fabiano Odongi Oriom. It was strongest in Eastern and Central Equatoria as Western Equatoria was then largely under SPLM/A control. It drew most heavily from Madi and Acholi communities but had members from throughout the Equatorias.
28 Thus, in a 2008 household survey of 169 people in Juba, Magwi and Ikotos counties, civilians reported attacks by the LRA, SPLA, neighbouring communities and unidentified groups but not the EDF. Mareike Schomerus, “Perilous border”, op. cit., pp. 9-10. Many civilians noted the SPLA’s abusive practices and, while the EDF’s collaboration with SAF provided some protection to communities, few believed the EDF was seriously fighting for independence. Civilians were also unhap-
against the SPLA, which at times retaliated against civilians perceived to have supported the EDF (an experience being repeated by South Sudan’s army today).

B. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Equatorias

The LRA developed close relations with the EDF when it first made forays into the Equatorias in the early 1990s to escape the Ugandan army. Both groups counted Acholi, an ethnic group that straddles the Uganda-South Sudan border, among their members. The LRA set up bases in Central and Eastern Equatoria and worked with the SAF and EDF to fight the SPLA.29 Its abuses of Equatorians were initially relatively limited. Khartoum cut most support to the group during a détente with Uganda and allowed the UPDF to enter southern Sudan in 2002 to conduct “Operation Iron Fist” against it. In 2005, under increased military pressure, the LRA set up its main base in Garamba National Park across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) but continued to operate in the Equatorias.

In mid-2006, the LRA entered peace talks with the Ugandan government, mediated by Riek Machar, then vice president of Southern Sudan, who had an old relationship with the group.30 At times during the faltering negotiations, it crossed into Southern Sudan, gathering in designated locations to meet negotiators and receive food and cash from Machar.31 In 2007, as the talks faced major obstacles, including fighting with the UPDF, fighters remaining in Eastern Equatoria joined commanders in Nabanga, Western Equatoria. In late 2008, the talks collapsed, souring relations between Machar and Museveni.32

That December, the UPDF, with U.S. support, launched “Operation Lightening Thunder”, an air and land assault on the LRA’s camp in DRC that forced elements into Western Equatoria and later the Central African Republic (CAR). The SPLA played a limited supporting role in the operation but took no significant action to halt the LRA’s influx, thus leaving communities vulnerable to its brutal reprisals.33 Equatorian youth organised local defence groups (“Arrow Boys” or “Home Guards”)
to protect against an increasingly hostile and predatory LRA.\textsuperscript{34} The long-term effects – entrenchment of the Arrow Boys, perception that the SPLA will not protect Equatorian communities and deep mistrust of national officials – all contribute to the current conflicts.

IV. Greed and Grievance Post-CPA

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan’s second civil war did not end conflict in the South. After Garang’s 2005 death and Salva Kiir’s assumption of the southern presidency, the SPLM-led government made Juba its home, bringing with it a growing influx of people and significant changes in the Equatoria’s governance. Many of these, and past unaddressed grievances, generated growing resentment and laid the groundwork for the present conflicts, as well as the potential for future insurrection.

A. Post-CPA Reconciliation between Equatorians

The SPLM assumption of political power in the southern capital, Juba, which the SPLA had never captured, took years to complete. At the CPA’s signing, Clement Wani Konga, a former SAF officer, was Khartoum’s governor for the Equatorias, and Major General Samuel Abujohn Kabbashi was the SPLM/A’s. When the SPLM took over, Wani Konga became governor of Central Equatoria, and two SPLA officers, Patrick Zamoi and Aloysius Ojetuck, became governors of Western and Eastern Equatoria respectively. That these former enemies were now serving the same government was not without tensions.

The CPA process also integrated other former enemies, including the EDF and Mundari forces, into the SPLA and government. This created chaos well into the CPA period, particularly in Eastern Equatoria. While Garang’s and Kiir’s strategy worked well in Central Equatoria, where Wani Konga kept a tight hold on security, Western Equatoria remained insecure because of the LRA, intra-SPLM gubernatorial politics and long-running agriculturalist-pastoralist tensions. Dinka-Zande conflict there in 2005-2006 led to dismissal of the Zande governor, Zamoi (reinstated in 2015), and is an historical factor in the distrust of the SPLA and Juba government and in the ongoing Arrow Boys rebellion. With Eastern Equatoria Governor Louis

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38 The controversial arrest of former EDF commander and state minister Colon Paul Omoya Thomas was but one time such tensions came to a head. “Lifting of Immunity, Relief and Arrest of Col. Paul Omoya Thomas”, Eastern Equatoria State Decree no. 005/2006, 13 July 2006.
39 For more on the complex politics of this period, see “Violent Legacies”, op. cit.
40 He was replaced by Samuel Abujohn in August 2006, the former governor and a long-serving SPLA officer who was also prominent in the Anya-Nya I. Abujohn died in 2008 and was replaced by
Lobong Lojore the only remaining elected Equatorian governor (in 2010 polls), many Equatorians believe their efforts to work peacefully toward shared political goals is either not supported by Juba or actively undermined.\(^{41}\)

### B. Civil War in South Sudan

South Sudan’s civil war began in Juba in December 2013 with days of fighting and ethnically-targeted killings that left parts of the capital destroyed and 40,000 Nuer civilians sheltering in a UN base, then became full-scale war in Greater Upper Nile.\(^{42}\) The SPLM/A-IO formed, as Nuer forces across the country defected and captured major cities. At the conflict’s height, more than two million people were displaced, atrocities were widespread, and parts of the country were on the brink of famine.\(^{43}\) The conflict slowed by the end of 2014, and though heavy fighting still broke out, it never again reached the intensity of the first six months.\(^{44}\) Riek Machar quickly became head of the SPLM/A-IO, declaring Alfred Ladu Gore, an Equatorian, his deputy.\(^{45}\) Machar said the SPLM/A-IO was a national movement and actively sought non-Nuer members, though few joined the fighting. Within a week of the war’s start, a peace effort was launched by the region’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that culminated in signature of the ARCSS in August 2015.\(^{46}\)

### C. Federal Farragos

Despite their historical differences, the three Equatorian governors coalesced around a joint federalism platform as early as 2002.\(^{47}\) When the civil war began in 2013, the then governors proposed that implementing a federal system could help resolve it.\(^{48}\) However, the SPLM’s decentralised “taking the towns to the people” ideology remained largely unimplemented, and Equatorian calls for federalism raised the spectre of Nimeri’s 1983 Kokora re-division of the South.\(^{49}\) In a 2014 Independence Day public address, President Kiir said, “the issue that people are raising now, that is the same issue that came in 1983 – Kokora. And this should not again derail us”.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{41}\) He is Namorunyang state governor, following Kiir’s division of South Sudan’s original ten states into 28.

\(^{42}\) For more, see Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit.

\(^{43}\) “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), November 2015.

\(^{44}\) For more on the last major offensives before the agreement was signed in 2015, see Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan – Keeping Faith*, op. cit. p. 14.

\(^{45}\) For more on the formation of the SPLM/A-IO, see “A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO”, Small Arms Survey, September 2015. For more on Alfred Ladu Gore, see Appendix C.

\(^{46}\) Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan – Keeping Faith*, op. cit.

\(^{47}\) “Violent Legacies”, op. cit.


\(^{49}\) The doctrine of “taking the towns to the people” was how Garang summed up the SPLA/M’s development and decentralisation ideology. John Garang de Mabior, “Speech at the Signing Ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement”, Nairobi 2005.

\(^{50}\) Kiir went on to discuss the expulsion of all non-Central Equatorians from the state. “Kiir raises fears of ‘Kokora’ under federal system”, Radio Tamazuj, 10 July 2014.
At its first convention in 2014, the SPLM/A-IO adopted federalism as its political platform for the IGAD peace talks, which, despite clear differences from the Equatorian proposal, led some in Juba to suspect collusion. While both the government and SPLM/A-IO proposed new states, Equatorian leaders have focused more on fiscal federalism and devolution or confederation of the original ten states. Kiir’s December 2015 order establishing 28 pleased some proponents of federalism, but Equatorians were concerned that the president’s powers of appointment for governors and state ministers centralised rather than devolved power, despite greater number of administrative structures.

D. Conflict and Contestation over Equatorian Resources

Underlying the current conflicts and threatening future outbreaks are disputes over control of land, extractable resources and taxation. During the second Sudanese civil war, all belligerents appropriated food and other items from civilians. Over time, control of more significant revenue sources, such as customs duties, gold and timber sales and market fixing, became important means of individual and group survival, personal enrichment and political alliance building. Since the CPA, urban real estate, export of natural resources, productive agricultural and cattle rangeland have gained importance as income sources.52

Among the Equatorian population in Juba (originally a Bari town) and Nimule (originally a Madi town), it is widely believed that newer residents (specifically Dinka) now own most of the land and obtained it unfairly through domination of the security and political apparatus (and their resulting economic power). The absence of clear titles and registration or community consensus on how land should be allocated and transferred has allowed substantial corruption and maladministration. Yet, as a senior Equatorian official said, “we cannot blame this all on the Dinka; behind all of this grabbing you find Equatorians profiting”. The disputes can be deadly: in September 2013, the Madi paramount chief was killed amid ongoing differences over control of land and local government in Nimule. Land disputes in Juba often turn violent.55

Control over civilian and security institutions grants access to substantial, though often obscure, resources through various forms of market control or taxation.56 Local

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51 South Sudanese have a wide array of definitions for federalism, including establishment of more states and counties; fiscal federalism (ie, devolving resources to the lowest levels of government); autonomy, confederation or devolution of power; decentralisation of control over security forces; and ability to elect or select their own leaders. “Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought”, op. cit.
54 Crisis Group interview, senior Equatorian official, November 2015.
officials and the security forces are prohibited from engaging in taxation, but though not undertaken in conformity with official regulations, it is part and parcel of long-standing political and security patronage networks. In Nimule, the primary transit point for goods entering South Sudan from Uganda, the Equatorian population believes it should be able to collect customs duties and alleges that the SPLA dominates the local administration and colludes with long-resident Dinka internally displaced persons (IDPs) from neighbouring Jonglei.

The region is rich in teak, gold and diamonds and receives the most significant foreign investment other than the oil industry. Equatorians worry that the national government may seize the Wonduruba gold mine, near a conflict zone, either to address the budget deficit or to support Juba-based patronage networks increasingly under strain due to the dollar shortage. The Equatorias, known as the “Green Belt”, also have much of the most fertile land. Most is used for subsistence agriculture, but there is considerable interest in large-scale commercial agriculture, which may lead to future conflict if not properly managed. Farmers also clash with pastoralists, who migrate seasonally.

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58 The IDPs originally came in 1992, after the “Bor Massacre” following the 1991 SPLA split. Fighters aligned with Machar, mostly Lou Nuer, attacked Bor, reportedly killing more than 2,000 Dinka residents. Since then new IDPs have arrived, while some of the original left. Locals say they accepted the Dinka Bor following the atrocities; many allege that the new arrivals take advantage of their relations with the SPLA to secure access to land and keep their cattle safe. A Madi community leader said, “these cattle-keepers are always fighting, with those of Nuer, with those of Murle. When they find their place is spoiled by fighting they come to spoil our place”. Crisis Group interview, Juba, November 2013; Africa Report N°154, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan*, 23 December 2009, pp. 2-3.
59 Local communities, Equatorian political leaders, national officials and politically-connected investors from neighbouring East African countries and beyond control and/or profit from Equatorian resources. National laws and regulations on natural resource management are rarely followed anywhere in South Sudan, and the complex mosaic of resources and “outside” actors contesting control of resources is a source of grievance for many.
60 Crisis Group interviews, Wonduruba community leaders, Juba, February 2016.
62 For more on some of these investments, see David Deng, “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa Country Report: South Sudan”, The Oakland Institute, 2011.
V. The Current Conflicts

There is no single conflict in the Equatorias, but rather a host of often discrete ones that are the product of escalating, pre-existing local tensions exacerbated by wartime conditions at the national level. When the civil war broke out, a sharp influx of Dinka cattle keepers into Western Equatoria strained relations with local agriculturists. The preponderance of Dinka in SPLA units there after significant Nuer defections to the SPLA-IO at the start of the 2013 civil war also contributed to a real and perceived shift in the army’s relationship with Western Equatorian communities.

Juba saw regional leaders’ new political assertiveness and Western Equatoria’s failure to meet its enlistment quota at the start of the civil war as evidence of disloyalty. Following the ARCSS signing in August 2015, the detention of several leaders, including the popular, elected Western Equatoria Governor Bakosoro, alienated many Equatorians from their government. SPLM/A-IO incitement and military support began to turn largely local uprisings into full-scale rebellions, particularly in Western Equatoria’s Mundri East, Mundri West, Yambio, Ezo, Ibba, Nzara and Tombura counties. These became the “new front” between the government and SPLM/A-IO, as the agreement’s permanent ceasefire began to take hold in Greater Upper Nile – the location of most previous combat. Increased military operations and mistreatment of civilians by armed groups and criminals post-ARCSS created displacement and protection challenges in much of the western half of the Equatorias.

A. Three Phases of Conflict in the Equatorias

The conflicts can be broken down roughly into three phases. The first lasted through most of 2014 and saw the SPLA-IO claim a handful of non-strategic, opportunistic guerrilla attacks against government facilities, largely to seize weapons, though many were actually conducted by community-based groups. The second, January to August 2015, was driven by long-simmering tensions between cattle keepers and the civilian population in Western Equatoria and related conflict between the SPLA and some communities, often led by the Arrow Boys. These became increasingly embroiled in local violence against Dinka cattle keepers, involving killings and property destruction by both parties, that escalated when the cattle keepers failed to leave the state as required by an April 2015 presidential decree (see Section A. 2 below).
SPLA-IO leaders Wesley Welebi and Kenyi Loruba began organising in and around Mundri and Wonduruba, though through mid-2015 Welebi said he was fighting not as a rebel but to protect his community from cattle keepers. The Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASA) formed separately in January 2015. Its leader, Losuba Ludoru Won’go, defected from the SPLA and hoped to gain support from neighbouring countries for an independent Equatorian group (see Appendix C below). Though he had little military success, existence of an Equatorian insurgency and the SPLA-IO intent to form a front in the region shifted Juba’s view of many Western Equatorians from “neutral” to “rebels”.

Most violence during this period was driven by local agriculturalist-pastoralist tensions, but as it increased, Western Equatorians believed the SPLA favoured Dinka cattle keepers, and agriculturalist communities also began to clash with the SPLA. Relations between the SPLA and civilians further to the west were also affected. The growing tensions led to violent incidents, but they did not become outright conflict until the Arrow Boys (not then SPLA-IO members) attacked Yambio town in September 2015. That was the first assault on a major Equatorian city since the initial conflict moved out of Juba by early 2014. SPLA-IO and REMNASA activity during this time was extremely limited.

The third, current and most intense phase began just after the August 2015 peace agreement with an increase in armed rebellions among SPLA-IO forces and Arrow Boys in much of Western Equatoria. The SPLM/A-IO incited and supported armed groups, all the major ones, except some Arrow Boys and criminal entities, have since joined it. The SPLA responded aggressively, suppressing rebellions in Wonduruba, Mundri, Yambio, Ri-Ringu and Gangura, and attacking the mobile (mainly Zande) Arrow Boys.

Three of the most critical factors that led to rebellions were long-running tensions between Juba and Governor Bakosoro that culminated in his removal and detention in September 2015; escalating violence between local agriculturalists and migratory cattle keepers, beside perceptions the SPLA sided with the cattle keepers; and SPLA-IO emergence in Mundri and Wonduruba, particularly when it provided military support after August 2015.

67 SPLA Major Losuba Ludoru Won’go was then defence ministry research director. “S. Sudan army expresses concern over defections in W. Equatoria”, Sudan Tribune, 30 January 2015.
70 Local violence can quickly escalate, particularly when it collides with national conflict drivers. In mid-2015, for example, a Dinka SPLA commander lent a gun to an Arrow Boy for poaching bush-meat in exchange for a share of profits. The Arrow Boy kept the gun and bush-meat, and in response the SPLA officer killed his colleagues. Believing they could not get redress in official channels, the Arrow Boys killed several soldiers. This tit-for-tat killing combined with other grievances and reached its apex in the September 2015 Arrow Boys attack on Yambio town.
71 Crisis Group interview, former Western Equatoria official, Juba, January 2016.
72 Crisis Group interviews, government official, Addis Ababa, December 2015; Western Equatorian official, Juba, February 2016; Equatorian SPLM/A-IO members, Nairobi, March 2016. REMNASA officially joined the SPLM/A-IO in November 2015, as did Alfred Futiyo’s Arrow Boys in December (see Annex C).
1. Detention of Governor Bakosoro

In September 2015, popular Zande Western Equatoria Governor Bakosoro (the only “independent” to win a gubernatorial election in 2010) was removed and held four days. He had long played a dangerous game, not allowing rebellion in Western Equatoria but hinting at its possibility to win concessions from Juba.73 His removal and detention were critical factors in propelling the Zande Arrow Boys into open rebellion, including the attack on Yambio in September.74 His second detention, on 22 December, alienated many Zande, including those who did not support rebellion.75 The day after Machar returned to Juba on 26 April 2016, Kiir ordered Bakosoro’s release as a “gesture for peace and reconciliation”, important for bringing peace to Gbudwe and Amadi states.76

2. Conflict between Dinka cattle keepers and farming communities

The influx of predominantly Dinka cattle keepers during the war added to local perceptions that Dinka could act with impunity, and the SPLA would actively fight beside them. Cattle migration through Western Equatoria farming areas has historically led to sporadic, low-level violence, but as tensions increased, incidents escalated. By April 2015, it was clear action had to be taken to avoid major intercommunal conflict, and President Kiir ordered cattle keepers to leave the state; some did, but those who remain are better armed and more accustomed to resolving disputes violently than many locals.77 Most Equatorian farmers strongly prefer peaceful coexistence. For those affected, the conflicts with both government and cattle-keepers has been devastating, and many seek a way out.78

3. SPLA-IO conflict in Amadi and Jubek states

Most local, non-Zande SPLA-IO forces are in Amadi state and Wonduruba county in Jubek state (see Annex C below). The strongest are around Mundri, where Wesley

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74 Bakosoro had been increasingly vocal about security service mistreatment of Equatorian civilians; he advocated strongly for federalism and continued efforts to maintain a high degree of autonomy for his state. Crisis Group interview, Bakosoro, Juba, August 2015; former Western Equatorian officials, Juba, Nairobi, January, February 2016.
75 His replacement, Zamoi, though an ex-Arrow Boys patron, has taken a tough approach to rebellion, in line with his military background. Resenting Machar for LRA violence in Western Equatoria, he does not want to see him and the SPLM/A-IO gain a foothold there. “Former governor detained without charge”, Amnesty International press release, 10 February 2016.
76 “Bakosoro released by orders of President Kiir”, National Courier, 28 April 2016. A governor can decisively reduce conflict and tension. After Western Equatoria’s division into three states in December 2015, Colonel Africano Mande, who had facilitated release of more than 30 prominent Maridi youths arrested on suspicion of anti-government activity, became Maridi state governor. His ability to connect with the highest levels in Juba and the local population has helped reduce conflict in the state.
77 This is due to different experiences during the second Sudan civil war, the demands of either defending against or participating in cattle raids, the need to protect cattle while on the move and many other factors.
78 This is very different from the conflict in Greater Upper Nile, which communities have strongly supported. Crisis Group Africa Report N°221, South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”, 22 December 2014, pp. 5-6.
Welebi works closely with local, mainly Moro, Arrow Boys. They have had limited military success, largely hit-and-run attacks on government outposts and impeding road transport, but have also exercised some control over the Mundri-Gariya road and Bangolo. They have had limited military success, largely hit-and-run attacks on government outposts and impeding road transport, but have also exercised some control over the Mundri-Gariya road and Bangolo. Their operations have drawn heavy-handed government responses, including extrajudicial killings, burning of homes and looting. Security forces have struggled to distinguish criminal from insurgent attacks. This conflict is the best positioned to be resolved through the ARCSS, as the forces clearly identify with the SPLM/A-IO. There have been no major battles, and the opposition has not taken a significant town.

B. Humanitarian and Protection Challenges

Humanitarian actors have greatly increased their operational capacities since the civil war’s onset but still struggle to secure access and provide services in remote areas. Though the scale of conflicts has been much smaller than in the major Greater Upper Nile theatre, more than 100,000 have been displaced and many homes and properties destroyed. Tensions have emerged with the government, as humanitarian actors negotiate access with new Equatorian armed groups. Equatorian frustrations with the UN have also increased. Since September 2015, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has repeatedly refused to accept civilians seeking protection in its Yambio base, but has offered protection to some civilians in its temporary Mundri base. It has not explained why some civilians are allowed in and others not in different locations at different times. The failure to offer more coherent protection to predominantly Equatorian civilians, as is done for the Nuer-majority population in Juba, Bentiu, Bor and Malakal, further contributes to local perceptions that the international community only cares about Dinka-Nuer conflict and the government’s perceptions that UNMISS is only interested in protecting Nuer. At the same time, UNMISS rarely patrols locations with civilian populations under threat, such as Bari, the Bangalo road outside of Mundri or south of Yambio.

79 Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO officials, international experts, Juba, March, May 2016 respectively. For more on the larger group of Zande Arrow Boys, see Appendix C below.
80 Crisis Group interviews, SPLA officers, Equatorian civilians, Addis Ababa, August 2015; Juba, January 2016.
81 A wide spectrum operate in the Equatorias, including UN humanitarians (World Food Programme, UN Children’s Fund and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, among others); and NGOs, including Doctors without Borders, the International Committee of the Red Cross, church-based organisations and South Sudanese humanitarian organisations.
83 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Western Equatorian civilians and officials, Juba, January, February, April 2016.
84 UNMISS policy is to avoid creating any additional protection of civilians (PoC) sites. Current sites host more than 200,000. UNMISS could do much to improve relations with government officials by giving impartial protection to all threatened civilians. Crisis Group interviews, senior UN official, Juba, April 2015; Western Equatoria state officials, Juba, December 2015, January 2016; government officials, Juba, January, May, 2014, Addis Ababa, August 2015, Juba, January 2016; “The Situation in Western Equatoria”, press statement, Western Equatoria Leadership Council, 2 August 2015.
85 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Juba, February 2016.
This leaves it lacking information on the situation in conflict-affected areas and civilian-protection challenges.

C. **One Positive: Ugandan Non-Interference**

Given the UPDF’s 2013 intervention on behalf of Kiir in Juba and southern Jonglei, increasing fighting along the Uganda border could have drawn Kampala further into South Sudan’s war. Yet, despite its close relationship with Juba, Uganda has not participated in the Equatorian conflicts.86 Though these have disrupted its economic interests, they are not a national security threat, and Kampala has denied insurgents weapons and safe haven; opposition forces are on notice that if they cross the border, they will be treated as rebels; some high-profile commanders who have crossed were killed.87

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86 However, when its security interests have been threatened, such as by attacks on the Juba-Nimule road, the main supply corridor for the UPDF in Juba and Bor (before the September 2015 withdrawal), it has not been afraid to respond. “UPDF deploys along Juba-Nimule corridor”, *Daily Monitor*, 28 December 2013.

87 Including in August 2015, when veteran opposition politician Peter Abdurahman Sule (not an SPLM-IO member) and Major General Elias Lino Jada Kulang, SPLA-IO deputy chief of general staff for administration, were killed. Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan and South Sudanese officials, Kampala, August 2015; SPLA-IO officials, Addis Ababa, August 2015.
VI. Pathways to Peace

Though the ARCSS was not designed for the Equatorias, its broad national-level provisions and processes, such as cantonment of forces pending unification or demobilisation, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and promotion of federalism, offer opportunities to address the region’s grievances, including representation in the security forces and the forces’ role in the Equatorias. The transitional government, comprised of members of the wartime government, SPLM/A-IO, SPLM leaders and opposition political parties, is meant to hold power for 30 months. Equatorians, from both government and SPLM/A-IO, lead two of its three security ministries and hold other positions.

The agreement called for establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which reports to IGAD, to oversee peace implementation. It also oversees the international Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which monitors the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements (including cantonment). The National Architecture for Permanent Ceasefire and Unification of Forces, which includes the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), has a similar oversight mandate and includes direct oversight of forces in cantonments. However, it is an independent, national body, reporting to the unified chain of command that includes the SPLA and SPLA-IO chiefs of general staff.

While forces are in cantonment, the multi-stakeholder SDSR Board is to begin work on establishing the security forces’ “future command, function, size, composition and budget”, as well as demobilisation requirements, and also look at the role of different security forces and management and oversight of the security sector. Though all processes so far have experienced significant delay, a white paper on defence and security, as well as a security sector transformation roadmap, are meant to be completed within six months.

The permanent constitutional process, scheduled to take eighteen months, is to be based on the principle of a federal system and build on the SDSR’s outputs. During this period, an Equatorian, Dr Richard K. Mulla, will head the federal affairs ministry.

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88 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”, Section 1.1, 17 August 2015.
89 General Obote Mamur and General Alfred Ladu Gore are national security minister and interior minister respectively.
90 Agreement on the resolution of the conflict, op. cit., Section 7.2.7. JMEC members include the warring parties, civilian political opposition, IGAD member states, UN, African Union (AU), Troika (U.S., UK and Norway) and China. It is headed by former Botswanan President Festus Mogae and his deputy, former Guinean Prime Minister François Fall. JMEC is not an implementation body and does not have significant decision-making powers. When facing implementation challenges, it can work with the parties to overcome them but when they cannot be resolved, it reports to IGAD to take significant political decisions.
91 Ibid, Section 2.4; 7.2.7.
92 Ibid, Section 2.3; Appendix II.
93 The SDSR Board includes members of the warring parties, former detainees/SPLM leaders, political opposition parties, faith leaders and national assembly members from the government and SPLM-IO, as well as an eminent personality, an academic, a member of the women’s bloc and a representative of youth and civil society. Ibid., Section 2.6.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, Section 6.
providing further opportunity for Equatorians to present their positions on federalism. Yet, there remain points of contention in ARCSS implementation. Some provisions are problematic, particularly those related to cantonment of forces that may not have been active in the SPLA-IO before August 2015 in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal; cantonment will not proceed until these issues are resolved, which risks dividing the SPLM/A-IO and furthering conflict in both regions. Church-led peace processes in Maridi, Yambio and Wonduruba are a home-grown attempt to address the local dimensions of conflict and reach communities in ways national processes rarely do.

A. Equatorian Participation in the IGAD Peace Talks

Conflicts in the Equatorias did not receive much attention at the IGAD-led peace talks in Addis Ababa. The government’s position was that fighting was solely in Greater Upper Nile, and all security aspects of the cessation of hostilities and peace agreement should only apply there. It also frequently denied the SPLM/A-IO’s presence in the Equatorias and blamed the sporadic violence there on criminals. The SPLM/A-IO sought to present itself as a national movement, and though it had little presence in the region for much of the war, claimed it as a conflict theatre because the fighting began in Juba, and Ugandan troops remained in the capital. Government and Ugandan forces secured Juba within weeks, however, after which the conflict moved to Greater Upper Nile.

At a political level, Equatorians were in the mediation with the government, SPLM/A-IO, SPLM-FD, civil society, faith leaders and women’s bloc, but there was no specific “Equatorian” group. The three Equatorian governors came in January 2015 to present the region’s political aspirations – specifically federalism – but did not seek to participate in the talks themselves. The government always maintained that they were part of the government.

Many Equatorians, particularly those without a strong affinity for either warring party, do not consider they were a part of the negotiations over the country’s future. According to the ARCSS, 85 per cent of state-level positions in the Equatorias go to the government and 15 per cent to the SPLM/A-IO, leaving many locals to believe they must join one or the other to secure representation, though they support neither. Despite this, most Equatorians are committed to the agreement as the best opportunity for peace, federalism and reform.

B. Cantonment

The parties eventually agreed to allow cantonment in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal. Yet, since the former’s conflicts gained momentum after the ARCSS was signed, its provision that only “forces previously in combat” are eligible for canton-

97 Crisis Group Report, South Sudan: Keeping Faith, op. cit., p. 13. Many of Juba’s most effective negotiators were Equatorians. “Government delegation off to Addis for peace talks consultation”, Gurtong, 8 June 2015.
98 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit., Section 1.15.3.
ment is a critical point of contention.\textsuperscript{99} The government negotiators contend that since Equatorian (and Bahr el Ghazal) forces only began fighting after signature, the SPLM/A-IO should not be rewarded for widespread ceasefire violations by allowing newly recruited and active forces to go into cantonment.\textsuperscript{100}

Kiir has said Equatorians are not eligible for cantonment, generating disquiet among Equatorian SPLM/A-IO leaders, who fear Machar may not represent their interests if they are not the same as his own.\textsuperscript{101} These leaders met in Nairobi in March to tell him they cannot continue the rebellion and participation in the SPLM/A-IO if their forces are not eligible for cantonment. Machar said these issues would be resolved upon his return to Juba, leaving many dissatisfied; now that he has returned, internal pressure has increased to address the question. Yet, there may be room for compromise; on 5 May, Kiir said in a public address that it was the transitional government’s duty to “cease fighting all over the country”, including in “Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal”.\textsuperscript{102}

Though Equatorians within the SPLA-IO are strong advocates of the cantonment process, it is not known whether all fighting forces will participate. Cantonment requires forces to decide whether they want to end their localised fights, participate in unification or demobilisation and be represented by the SPLM/A-IO. Given the many groups and multitude of communal and individual interests, understanding how combatants are approaching cantonment will be a difficult task for both international and national monitors.

Several cantonment issues continue to drive conflict and mistrust: whether the SPLM/A-IO will be allowed sites in the Equatorias; delay in beginning the process and resultant continuation of conflicts; and expectations about outcomes, some of which are unlikely to be met. Further complicating matters, ceasefire monitors and the broader international community have not determined which forces are SPLA-IO (and when they joined) and thus eligible for cantonment and accountable for ceasefire violations.\textsuperscript{103} Forces not deemed eligible may take up arms in disappointment. Internationals should better monitor the Equatorian conflicts to enable a more nuanced approach to resolving cantonment questions. Equally important, JMEC and donors should prioritise funding and deployment of the national architecture, which will enable the warring parties to jointly verify cantonment and begin to build trust in the conflict-affected areas beyond Juba.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid, Section 2.2.2.
\textsuperscript{100} During cantonment, government forces must remain in barracks or cantonment unless “deployed for national defence and security purposes”. Such deployments require Shared Unified Command ratification and transitional government approval. Government forces can continue fighting rebellions not associated with the SPLA-IO, provide border security and participate with the Ugandans against the LRA. Deployments for reasons other than fighting the SPLA-IO are not violations but require ratification by the transitional government. Ibid, Section 2.2.5; for more on the regional counter-LRA force see Appendix D below.
\textsuperscript{101} In an unscripted statement at the Extraordinary SPLM Convention, Kiir noted the contradiction between the SPLM/A-IO’s commitments in the ARCSS and its expansion in the Equatorias and threatened to “crush” the rebellions. Speech, Juba, 7 January 2016.
\textsuperscript{103} Crisis Group interview, JMEC member, Juba, April 2016.
1. SPLA-IO cantonment sites

Cantonment is widely seen as the first step in a process that will result in eventual integration into the organised forces or a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) package; these are among the limited incentives the SPLM/A-IO can offer recruits.\(^{104}\) Opposition groups in South Sudan have a long history of inflating their troop numbers, complicating integration and DDR. The present economic crisis has increased the number of civilians joining the opposition to benefit from these opportunities, and the SPLA-IO is deliberately inflating its troop count. It declared thirteen brigades in the Equatorias in September, which in conventional terms would mean nearly 40,000 soldiers. It requested fourteen cantonment sites, later reduced to eleven, in the region, whereas in Greater Upper Nile, the main war theatre, it has only eighteen sites.\(^{105}\)

Each site should host 1,500-2,000 combatants. The IO has three in Western Equatoria, indicating a maximum of 6,000 combatants in its most active Equatorian theatre. Nearly half the sites are in Eastern Equatoria, where it claims 10,000 combatants, the same figure as in both Unity and Jonglei states and that appears based on a possible merger with the few forces associated with the South Sudan Armed Forces – Equatorias (SSAF-E) (see Appendix C below), which have their own inflated count.\(^{106}\) These figures and the SPLA-IO’s continuing promotions of personnel anger many in the SPLA, who fear they may lose their seniority in favour of those who received unwarranted advancement or joined armed groups but did not fight the war.\(^{107}\)

2. Risks of cantonment delays and unmet expectations

The cantonment process confuses many SPLA-IO rank and file, who believe sites have been established; some have even gone to them already.\(^{108}\) At least once, government forces attacked groups moving to not yet agreed sites.\(^{109}\) The disconnect between high-level negotiations over cantonment and combatants has led to unnecessary conflict and loss of life. The talks should be completed quickly to ensure forces do not become disillusioned and to end continuing conflicts. Delays could also allow the SPLA-IO to continue recruitment, violating the ARCSS; once cantonment begins, its forces can be verified based on eligibility criteria.

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\(^{104}\) “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit., Sections 2.2, 2.7.


\(^{106}\) Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO members, Juba, January 2016; Nairobi, January 2016.

\(^{107}\) Many in the SPLA-IO recognise ranks and troop numbers have been inflated. Some are embarrassed. A newly-appointed SPLA-IO general said, “I found myself on the list as a brigadier general, but I have not fought in this war. I am only a politician. I also saw names of those who have been dead for long. Sometimes I wonder what we are doing”. Crisis Group interview, Juba, January 2016. The SPLA-IO has also advanced officers to encourage them to join. In March 2016, it promoted Johannes Okiech, head of the Shilluk “Tiger Faction New Forces”, to entice him to end his separate rebellion and join. He declined. Crisis Group interview, Shilluk intellectual, Juba, March 2016.

\(^{108}\) “South Sudan army accused of raiding SPLA-IO cantonment area in Mundri”, Sudan Tribune, 25 November 2015.

\(^{109}\) Futiyo’s Arrow Boys say they went to cantonment sites (their old bases in Ri-Rungu and Saura) but government forces attacked and destroyed them. Neither was SPLA-IO designated. They then moved further north toward Ezo and Tombura to avoid conflict with the SPLA.
Most Equatorian SPLA-IO anticipate unification into the organised forces following cantonment, though many do not know what that would entail. Eligibility criteria, however, remain under discussion, and, unlike past processes, prior membership in the organised forces will probably be required. This would make only defectors eligible, while anyone who rebelled as a civilian could only receive benefits following demobilisation. This would be a significant challenge for SPLA-IO local forces, the members of whose most active group, the Arrow Boys, were never in a security service. Even the demobilisation package for which they are only likely to be eligible is not guaranteed to those in cantonment. Unless there is effective planning, armed elements may reject the process and turn against neighbours – as is already happening in parts of Greater Upper Nile. With so much focus in recent months on Machar’s return, such contentious issues were put on the back burner, but they can no longer be ignored.

3. International and national monitoring

The international CTSAMM was slow to begin monitoring operations in the Equatorias and is hampered by poor relations with government security forces there. It struggles to understand Equatorian conflict dynamics and identify which forces are SPLA-IO and so part of the ceasefire. It should rectify this by undertaking timely investigations, documenting the status of the forces there; when groups joined the SPLA-IO; instances of military resupply; and if recruitment is ongoing. This would better enable JMEC and international actors to take informed decisions in the Equatorias.

The national architecture was designed to enable the warring parties to lead in implementing the permanent ceasefire, operationalising and monitoring cantonment and building trust in locations where they had recently been fighting. Despite their willingness, the national architecture has not deployed outside of Juba, due to the lack of funds and logistics. The JMEC should prioritise mobilising donor support to enable the national architecture to begin. While the CTSAMM monitors and reports on violations after they happen, the national architecture is designed to help avoid violations, including via joint deployments. Furthermore, it has a critical role in overseeing the entire cantonment process, so should be supported to begin work immediately.

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110 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit., Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2.7.
111 Crisis Group interviews, SPLM-IO members, Juba, March, May 2016.
112 For documentation of a denial of access to CTSAMM to investigate alleged permanent ceasefire breaches in the Equatorias, see “Violations of the PCTSA in Western Equatoria State: Protection of Civilians”, CTSAMM Violation Report no. 057, 19 February 2016.
113 The CTSAMM has prioritised the Greater Upper Nile’s much larger pre-ARCSS conflict. Its first investigation into Equatorian conflicts was released in October 2015. “Investigations into Violations of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements in Unity State and Central Equatoria State”, CTSAMM Violation Report V051, 21 October 2015.
114 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit., Section 2.3.
116 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit., Section 2.3.
C. **Church-led Peace Processes**

Reflecting the imperfect fit between the ARCSS and the Equatorian conflicts, churches have renewed their historical peacemaking role.\(^{117}\) Unlike the IGAD process, church leaders, with their awareness of local dynamics, have taken approaches specific to different conflicts and are currently leading local peace processes in Wonduruba, Mundri and Yambio.

The Wonduruba process is instructive of what church leaders can and cannot do in localised conflicts. The SPLA-IO operated almost exclusively in the small area surrounding Kitigiri town, and SPLA Commandos deployed in response.\(^{118}\) Combat was limited, but civilians were killed and displaced and humanitarian assistance is needed. The churches recognised that SPLA-civilian tensions, rather than SPLA-rebel conflict, was the major cause of the violence and held talks that led to a peace agreement between community leaders, the Commandos and Major General Johnson Juma Okot, then-SPLA 6th Division commander;\(^{119}\) the SPLA-IO forces refused to engage with the church leaders, since they considered themselves already a party to the ARCSS and did not want a local agreement.\(^{120}\) In Western Equatoria, where Alfred Futiyo’s Arrow Boys refused to negotiate directly with the government, church leaders provided an important conduit for communications.\(^{121}\)

Unlike the ARCSS, church-led mediations and local agreements have no outside enforcement or accountability mechanisms and rely on the parties’ will for implementation. When the Commandos violated the Wonduruba agreement, leading to civilian deaths in December 2015 and January 2016, the churches struggled to hold the SPLA to its terms.\(^{122}\) Yet, these efforts are South Sudanese-led, broadly participatory and avoid the complex regional politics that dominated the IGAD talks. Internationals have a chequered history with South Sudanese church processes, often overburdening them with administrative requirements, meddling unhelpfully or overwhelming them. External actors should not directly intervene. Their support is helpful, but often only modest sums are required.

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118 SPLM-IO forces in Wonduruba were led by Kenyi Loruba, a Pojulu who defected from the police over marginalisation and lack of promotion grievances. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO officials, Wonduruba community members, Juba, January 2016.
119 “Agreement Between Wonduruba Community and SPLA Commando Unit on the Resolution of Wonduruba Conflict”, 2 December 2015.
120 In November 2015, the church mediated an agreement between community leaders and the SPLA in Mundri that faced similar challenges as the Wonduruba agreement. Crisis Group interview, church leader, Juba, February 2016.
121 Crisis Group interview, church leader, Juba, December 2015.
122 Crisis Group interviews, Wonduruba community members, Juba, January 2016; church leaders, Juba, February 2016.
VII. Conclusion: Meeting Equatorian Aspirations

The conflicts in the Equatorias defy simple characterisation, and, in fact, large areas remain peaceful. Yet, fighting in the western areas that escalated in September 2015 requires a multi-layered approach to reach sustainable peace. First, the ARCSS should be implemented in full. There is support for a federal system of governance, electoral democracy and security sector reform across the region; in theory the ARCSS provides for these within a new constitution to be completed within eighteen months of the transitional government’s formation and based on a “federal and democratic system”.123

The SDSR is to create a new security policy framework and defence policy, as well as determine the size, composition and nature of future security forces.124 Beyond ensuring greater representation in those security forces, Equatorians are likely to encourage reforms that improve relations with local communities: protecting civilians, while exercising restraint during counter-insurgency operations. But there is concern these provisions will not be implemented, or will be re-negotiated or diluted given the many deadlines that have already slipped.125

Throughout the civil war, the IGAD-led peace process was accused of ignoring the interests of Equatorians, because they did not have their own warring group; and of rewarding only “those who take up arms”. Equatorians still feel ignored, even after many took up arms.126 Mediators and diplomats must triage their efforts toward ending the most deadly and destabilising conflicts. However, a strategic balance that ensures the diversity of Equatorian perspectives will be considered when creating the foundational elements of South Sudan’s new governance system would contribute to greater long-term stability.

Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 25 May 2016

123 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict”, op. cit. Sections 1.13.1, 2.6, 6.1.2.
124 Ibid, Section 2.6.
126 Crisis Group interview, Equatorian official in government, Addis Ababa, August 2015.
Appendix A: Map of South Sudan’s Historic Three Regions

At the time of South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011, the border between Sudan and South Sudan was not fully demarcated. The location of the border is a matter of ongoing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. For more information, see Crisis Group’s previous reports.

Based on UN map 4450, October 2011.
Appendix B: SPLA in the Equatorias

The SPLA

The history and relationships with local communities of the wide array of SPLA forces in the Equatorias differ dramatically. The primary formations are the General Headquarters (Juba); 2nd Division; 6th Division; Commandos; Presidential Guard; and forces within Juba (many were re-deployed 25km outside town per the ARCSS).\(^\text{127}\)

The 2nd Division is the largest, with brigades across the region, though some units moved to Greater Upper Nile during the war. 6th Division comprises former Joint Integrated Units (created by the 2005 CPA) spread throughout the country, but with headquarters in Maridi town.\(^\text{128}\) It was commanded in the war by Major General Johnson Juma Okot, an ex-Eastern Equatoria governor. Elements of the Commandos recently moved to Jebel Ladu and operate in Central Equatoria and the eastern parts of Western Equatoria. Many Presidential Guards are in Juba and at Luri (Kiir’s farm) in Jubek.

When civil war broke out in Juba in 2013, Equatorian governors actively recruited for the SPLA. Over 10,000 joined, the largest number from Central Equatoria, fewer from Eastern Equatoria and the lowest from Western Equatoria, where the governor struggled to fill the quota.\(^\text{129}\) That thousands joined shows that the region was not necessarily “neutral”, as is widely stated; that Equatorians continue to be part of the SPLA; and that addressing Equatorian aspirations for the security forces is certainly possible.

Nevertheless, tensions remain between the army and civilians in many areas of South Sudan.\(^\text{130}\) Most operations against suspected insurgents or bandits in the former Central and Western Equatoria are led by multi-ethnic Commando units accused of atrocities, including extrajudicial killing, rape, burning and looting of property and forcibly displacing civilians. In other areas they are seen as better than the predominantly Dinka regular forces, because they are multi-ethnic.\(^\text{131}\) In many cases, affected communities have turned against the army that they identify as “Dinka” – irrespective of the actual composition, though Nuer defections after the outbreak of the civil war resulted in a new preponderance of Dinka.\(^\text{132}\)

In Wonduruba, unlike some other parts of the country, this has not automatically translated into support for rebellion; most areas still support local and state

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\(^{127}\) The SPLA General Headquarters, operations and intelligence organisations at the Giada barracks, guard forces for all barracks and bases and elements of the presidential guard are permitted to remain in Juba. There are also a number of training centres, logistic bases and combat support units in the region.

\(^{128}\) For more on the Joint Integrated Units, see Crisis Group Report, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts*, op. cit., p. 15.


\(^{130}\) Crisis Group interviews, civilians, Juba, September, November, December 2015, January 2016.


\(^{132}\) Crisis Group interviews, Equatorian officials, Juba, November, December 2015; Skype interview, security expert, January 2016; Rigterink, Kenyi and Schomerus, “Report of the Justice and Security Research Programme Survey in Western Equatoria State, South Sudan (First Round May 2013)”.

government. Civilians in Wonduruba said they did not generally support the small IO forces in the area but demanded the Commandos be replaced by Equatorian SPLA troops, a common refrain from civilians throughout Equatorian conflict-affected areas. Yet, the multi-ethnic Commando unit from Nzara was seen to have mitigated some of the worst behaviour of the SPLA garrison in Yambio town.


134 For example, the never signed January 2016 draft peace agreement between Victor Wanga’s South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) and the government would have integrated the SSNLM into the SPLA but deployed them only in the Equatorias (see Appendix C below). Crisis Group interviews, civilians from Wonduruba, Equatorian officials, Juba, November-December 2015, January-February 2016.
Appendix C: Armed Groups in the Equatorias

The Equatorias are home to a host of armed groups. A number identify themselves as rebel groups, with names, ranks and manifestos; some are more community-oriented and less interested in joining the government (or rebelling against it), while others fall somewhere between. The SPLA-IO is by far the largest and best organised; since September 2015, it has absorbed other local armed groups and community forces. Pre-existing community forces that did not directly participate were still impacted by the war; for example, Mundari and Toposa were armed and supported by Juba in return for their loyalty. This appendix discusses the most significant groups, with a focus on their structure, objectives and relationships with other conflict actors.135

SPLA-IO Aligned

The SPLM/A-IO in the Equatorias is comprised of several elements. The first includes senior political figures, such as Lieutenant General Alfred Ladu Gore, Dr Richard K. Mulla, Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, Aggrey Ezbon Idri, Henry Odwar, Otim David, Abdel Sendri and Ramadan Hassan Lukor.136 Ladu Gore is now interior minister, and Mulla is federal affairs minister in the transitional government.137 The second is comprised of former EDF- or SSDF-allied officers and security service defectors. This is the core of SPLA-IO forces in the Equatorias, and they are loyal to Lieutenant General Martin Kenyi (promoted from brigadier by the SPLA-IO), though as a deputy chief of general staff, he is not their immediate commander.138 The third includes small but originally-independent entities, such as REMNASA or much larger collections of Arrow Boys, whose relationship with the SPLM/A-IO is looser and more tactical.

Core SPLA-IO Political Leaders

The SPLM-IO Equatorian political leaders are important national figures but rivalries among themselves and with Equatorians of other political stripes, such as those between Clement Wani Konga and Ladu Gore or Dr Richard K. Mulla and Kosti Manibe, undermine efforts to present a unified Equatorian front.139 These tensions came to the fore in May-June 2015, when a number of them, including Ladu Gore, Ramadan Hussein and Abdel Sendri, met with the Equatorian governors and then secretly with Ugandan President Museveni.140 The governors hoped to convince the Equatorian SPLM/A-IO leaders to return to Juba and join an Equatorian political

135 This section does not include many other well-armed actors who have at various points been involved in conflict in the Equatorias, including the Ambororo, Rizeigat and Turkana.
136 “A Fractious Rebellion”, op. cit., p. 22.
138 Kenyi is the SPLA-IO’s overall deputy chief of general staff for training.
139 Wani Konga beat Ladu Gore in the 2010 Central Equatoria gubernatorial elections; Ladu Gore claimed fraud. Wani Konga and Ladu Gore or Dr Richard K. Mulla and Kosti Manibe, undermine efforts to present a unified Equatorian front.139 These tensions came to the fore in May-June 2015, when a number of them, including Ladu Gore, Ramadan Hussein and Abdel Sendri, met with the Equatorian governors and then secretly with Ugandan President Museveni.140 The governors hoped to convince the Equatorian SPLM/A-IO leaders to return to Juba and join an Equatorian political
140 Crisis Group interviews, SPLM/A-IO members, Nairobi, June 2015; Central Equatoria officials, Juba, September 2015; Ugandan officials, Kampala, September 2015.
platform – indeed their meeting in Nairobi resulted in a statement on shared objectives, principally federalism. 141

Following this, however, SPLM/A-IO officials organised by Wani Konga and others met Museveni in Kampala without informing the opposition’s leaders. The details of what transpired are hotly contested and resulted in an unsuccessful attempt to oust the participants in the Uganda visit from the SPLM/A-IO at a June meeting with Machar in Nairobi. 142 The group is now fully back in the SPLM/A-IO fold, and by design or default, Wani Konga scored political points at Ladu Gore’s expense.

These leaders controlled relatively few fighters at the outset, though they contend they were never given the logistics to support the forces they recruited. 143 While Machar wants the SPLM/A-IO to be multi-ethnic, both for credibility and to be strong enough to defeat the government militarily, this creates internal tensions; many Nuer resent these officials for seeking political positions when they and their communities did not fight. 144 Many of these Equatorians also oppose rejoining the SPLM, which puts them in the mainstream of the SPLM/A-IO membership but at odds with the leadership. 145

Core SPLA-IO Military Forces

Militarily, a few former EDF or SSDF-aligned forces are the heart of the IO forces in the Equatorias, but they have done little more than maintain a low-level guerrilla struggle. Many of the most active forces are new to the anti-SPLA cause, though many local soldiers were with previous anti-SPLA armed groups that were integrated into the army, police, prisons or wildlife forces after the last war. 146 Generally unhappy with the marginalisation they experienced (a challenge that goes well-beyond the Equatorias), they saw an opportunity to improve their standing in the current conflict and continue to believe the SPLA is used “against” Equatorians to the benefit of Dinka. 147 A smaller number report joining the rebels because of harassment and threats by security operatives, who believed they were going to join the IO or were clandestine supporters. 148

141 Crisis Group interviews, SPLM/A-IO members, Nairobi, June 2015; Addis Ababa, August 2015; Central Equatoria officials, Juba, September 2015.
142 Crisis Group interviews, SPLM/A-IO members, Nairobi, June 2015; Central Equatoria officials, Juba, September 2015; Ugandan officials, Kampala, September 2015.
143 For example, when Ladu Gore fled Juba, he was physically carried (because he could not walk the long distance) to IO areas by Lou Nuer rather than members of his own community who had not joined the war. An SPLM-IO official said, “we ask Dr Riek [Machar] why we need this man in such a position. He seems to have no people. When the Dinka were killing everybody he could not even find his own family to carry him. So we carried him, but we are not happy to see him in this chair. It should go to those fighting, not those talking. But Dr Riek says we must accept”. Crisis Group interview, Addis Ababa, August 2015.
144 Many hardliners in Juba held the same opinion of Equatorians in the wartime government.
146 Most former EDF did not defect and remain in the organised forces.
147 Crisis Group interview, senior SPLA-IO members, Nairobi, March, June 2015; Addis Ababa, June, August 2015; REMNASA official, August 2015; SSAF official, by telephone, February 2016.
148 They were often subjected to threats, harassment and illegal detention by the security forces. The SPLM/A-IO has been repeatedly accused of announcing or publishing the names of Equatorians who it says are members but who deny membership. Statement by Mohammed El-Hag Bab-Allah, former mayor of Juba, 12 January 2016 (hard copy on file with Crisis Group); “South Sudan: Arbitrary Detention, Torture”, press release, Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2015.
The South Sudan Armed Forces—Equatorias (SSAF-E) were formed in November 2015 from forces previously affiliated with the SPLA-IO but frustrated by limited support from it.149 Led by Anthony Ongwaja, a former police colonel, its few members are largely Lotuko. The SSAF-E attacked and briefly overran a police post in Idolu and a military base in Longiro near Torit in early December, using SPLA-IO-provided weapons.150 Following this, the army deployed in greater force, and the group did not launch another major attack. While maintaining military operations against it, senior officials from the area, including National Security chief Obote Mamur, tried to encourage it to lay down its weapons and rejoin the government.151 It is presently negotiating to join the SPLA-IO.

Finally, many with no prior history of anti-SPLA activity rebelled due to growing perceptions of mistreatment by the “Dinka” government and SPLA. Most active and effective are the “Mid-West Equatoria” forces under Wesley Welebi.152 They operate around Mundri East and West and coordinate with Arrow Boys.153 Welebi received many Nuer defectors, including some who had been in the UNMISS Protection of Civilians site in Juba.154

The most active SPLA-IO elements in the Equatorias tend to look to General Martin Kenyi as their leader. The core group is likely to participate in the cantonment exercise and seek unification with the SPLA.

REMNASA

The Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASA) was the best organised independent Equatorian group. Launched by Major Losuba Ludoru Won’go in January 2015, it claimed to be active in Maridi county – though neither Losuba nor his forces hailed from there. At times it announced attacks that never took place. REMNASA was started as a pan-Equatorian movement that argued neither the government nor the SPLM/A-IO adequately represented the region, so an independent armed movement was required.155 However, Losuba rebelled, in part, because he felt passed over for promotion and isolated within the defence ministry.156 REMNASA also drew on increasing local resentment over Dinka cattle keepers’ incursions that was leading to tit-for-tat violence with the Arrow Boys. Some Arrow Boys joined in

149 The SSAF in Eastern Equatoria is different from though related to the SSAF formed by Generals Gatdet, Gatkouth and Tanying in Greater Upper Nile. In early 2016, the Greater Upper Nile SSAF split, with Gatkouth returning to Juba in March, while Gatdet and Tanying remained in Khartoum. “A Fractious Rebellion”, op. cit., pp. 59-65. This report refers to the SSAF led by Anthony Ongwaja as SSAF-E. Logistics and resupply challenges were one factor driving the original defections of Gatdet, Gatkouth and Tanying in July 2015 to form the SSAF.
150 Crisis Group interview, SSAF-E official, February 2016.
151 Crisis Group interviews, senior security official and Equatorian political leader, Juba, January 2016.
152 Welebi was a member of parliament in the Western Equatoria state assembly but lost his seat in the 2010 elections.
154 Following an October SPLA helicopter attack on an airstrip used by Welebi’s forces to receive military resupply, Equatorian forces blamed the Nuer among them for security leaks, creating additional tensions between Equatorians and Nuer within the SPLA-IO. The attack killed a senior Nuer general, Tito Biel Chol, as well as civilians who had gathered around the airstrip.
155 Crisis Group interview, REMNASA official, August 2015.
156 Crisis Group interview, defence ministry official, Juba, May 2015.
mid-2015. REMNASA’s major contribution was putting into practice the idea of an Equatorian rebellion, rather than its success or presence on the ground.\(^{157}\)

The movement struggled with resupply and came under frequent SPLA attack.\(^{158}\) It was one of many groups that unsuccessfully sought weapons from Uganda, while also discovering that Khartoum was not interested in supporting multiple armed rebellions in the South.\(^{159}\) Perhaps more critically, locals began complaining that Losuba was from Central Equatoria, and an outsider should not lead their community and create problems with the government. Losuba moved with some of his fighters to Yei, in Central Equatoria, but faced even greater government resistance, and most of the Arrow Boys with him returned home.\(^{160}\)

With few choices, and after months of negotiation, REMNASA joined the SPLM/A-IO in November 2015. Unlike the Shilluk “Agalek” forces who retain their own identity under the SPLM/A-IO umbrella, the far smaller REMNASA has been largely subsumed.\(^{161}\) It never became a major national security threat, only a localised disturbance. Its remnants within SPLA-IO are anticipated to participate in the cantonment process. The SPLM-IO appointed Losuba as a member of parliament and the SDSR Board.

**Arrow Boys**

Arrow Boys are loosely coordinated groups of primarily young men organised to protect their communities.\(^{162}\) Most Western Equatoria ethnic groups have their own Arrow Boys; the most numerous are the Azande, who call them Aparanga Aguanza.\(^{163}\) While it is widely said they were formed in 2007 or 2008, they can be traced to 2005-2006; they were involved in the 2005 Dinka-Zande violence and drew from pre-existing Zande social structures.\(^{164}\) The impetus for their growth, organisation and activity were LRA depredations following Operation Lightening Thunder (Section III. B above); they soon provided a parallel security-governance system.\(^{165}\) Being an Arrow Boy is not traditionally a full-time job, so members could maintain family life and farming. In 2013, half of Western Equatorians reported a family member had

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157 This was facilitated through Martin Cleto. Crisis Group interview, SPLA-IO official, Juba, February 2016.
158 REMNASA largely fought with the arms it defected with or was able to capture from the SPLA or other security forces. For a time, it maintained a safe haven across the border in the Central African Republic’s large, ungoverned forests.
159 This has also plagued the SPLA-IO generals who defected to form the South Sudan Armed Forces. Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan officials, Kampala, September 2015; South Sudan Armed Forces (Greater Upper Nile) officer, Nairobi, November 2015.
161 The Shilluk “Agalek” forces only joined the SPLM/A-IO in May 2015. They consistently state that they are fighting to preserve Shilluk territory in the former Upper Nile state, particularly Malakal town, rather than wider SPLM/A-IO objectives. They maintain substantial independence from the SPLM/A-IO leadership and have stated that they will leave the movement if the 28-state decree is not revoked. Crisis Group interviews, Shilluk leaders, Addis Ababa, June 2015; Juba, February 2016.
162 “After Operation Lightning Thunder”, op. cit., p. 11.
163 Aparanga Aguanza means Arrow Boys; they are also sometimes known as the home guard.
165 See also Mareike Schomerus and Anouk Rijtcrink, “State Versus Non-State Security Provision or Military Versus Civilian Modes of Governance? The Case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys”, in Mark Sedra (ed.), *State Versus Non-State Security Provision* (Guelph, 2016).
been one. Arrow Boys are activated when a threat is near to organise patrols, communicate between groups with phones or drums and occasionally fight and share information on LRA movements with various official anti-LRA forces, including U.S. Special Forces.

The Arrow Boys have historically had strong relationships with local and state political figures and often received limited, in-kind support from the SPLA, UPDF, local government officials and local businessmen. Many credit Patrick Zamoi with formalising the Arrow Boys during his first governorship (2005-2006), and until August 2015, first he, then Governor Bakosoro and the Azande paramount chief were all considered strong patrons. The Arrow Boys were deeply critical, however, of former Western Equatoria Governor Jema Nuna Kumba and her failure to support them or secure government protection during the height of LRA attacks. Many actively campaigned against her and in favour of Bakosoro in the 2010 gubernatorial elections, which he won to become the only independent governor in the country. This is part of the reason many call the Arrow Boys “Bakosoro’s Army”, but they are too diffuse, ethnically diverse and community-oriented to be anyone’s army.

Following South Sudan’s independence, the LRA threat declined significantly, as the group moved into the Central African Republic and Kafia Kingi on the contested Sudan-South Sudan border. Nevertheless, the Arrow Boys remained active, seeking to expel the nomadic Ambororo and often involved in local justice matters. More than 8 per cent of Western Equatorians reported taking a dispute to the Arrow Boys for resolution in a single twelve-month period from May 2012 to May 2013.

At the height of fighting in Zandeland (Yambio, Ibbo, Ezo, Nzara and Tombura counties) in late 2015, the Zande Arrow Boys were divided into two large groups, one led by Victor Wanga, a former SPLA officer (until he was killed in January 2016), the other by Alfred Futiyo. The two main groups have been active in parts of Maridi, Yambio, Ibbo, Ezo and Tombura and in close proximity in Yambio, where they and the SPLA operated in different parts of the town and its environs as fighting increased in intensity. The level of command and control is not strong and is based more on the shared community protection objective than military hierarchy.

The conflict that began in 2015 has brought changes to the traditional structure such that some contend the current groups should not be recognised as “Arrow Boys”.

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171 In the same survey, respondents also reported that Arrow Boys were helpful in the resolution of such disputes, and nearly 85 per cent expressed trust in them – more than in chiefs, elders, the church, local administrators or the SPLA. “Report JSRP Survey in Western Equatoria”, op. cit., pp. 34-38. “Western Equatoria governor tells Ambororo pastoralists to leave Zande land”, Sudan Tribune, 8 October 2010.
172 Futiyo is a Pazande-speaking Balanda, not uncommon in the area; most Arrow Boys with him are Zande. Many other smaller groups remain independent and uninvolved in the conflict.
First, there are more urban youths, particularly from around Yambio, who were part of the “cash economy” and have suffered from the economic crisis.174 Secondly, many who call themselves Arrow Boys are acting as criminals, generating resentment and confusion among in communities that expected protection, not theft, harassment, abduction and rape. Thirdly, members of the two larger groupings operate as full-time Arrow Boys and have abandoned family life. Finally, engagement with the SPLA and SPLA-IO has put them in the middle of national political disputes in which their interests are not well-reflected.

South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM)
Unlike most Arrow Boys leaders, Victor Wanga was in the SPLA and understood how to fight a conventional army. Through much of 2015, his group was the most active, with its focus around Yambio.175 He refused to ally with the SPLM/A-IO, because he believed Machar brought the LRA to Western Equatoria, a view shared by many.176 His group named itself when it began negotiations with the government, led by Patrick Zamoi and coordinated by Victor Danda. In November, it signed a preliminary agreement, after which it largely laid down arms and assembled, awaiting unification into the organised forces, in Gangura.177 The final agreement was due to be signed December, but terms could not be agreed. In late January 2016, the SPLA twice attacked its assembly area, killing Wanga and creating conflict, killings and displacement in Yambio town.178 Thereafter, some joined the SPLA-IO affiliated Arrow Boys around Ezo; a smaller group remains independent; and yet a third group signed a peace agreement with the government on 1 April; and many have gone home.

SPLA-IO Aligned Arrow Boys
Alfred Futiyo’s Arrow Boys group is the largest, in both membership and operational areas, with two brigades active throughout the central and western parts of the former Western Equatoria.179 It formally joined the SPLM/A-IO in December 2015, and he became a major general commanding the SPLA-IO’s Gbudwe division.180 Separately, the Arrow Boys in Mundri have fought with cattle keepers and SPLA and coordinate with the SPLA-IO. However, they are poorly armed compared to the SPLA and cattle keepers. Joining the SPLM/A-IO offers the prospect of new and better weapons and ammunition, connection with some of its political leaders, such as Dr Richard K. Mulla, and possibly some benefit from the peace agreement – integration, political positions or greater political voice.

The former information minister for Western Equatoria state, Charles Kisanga, established the South Sudan People’s Patriotic Front (SSPPF), suggesting that the Arrow Boys had rushed to join the SPLM/A-IO without adequate negotiation. Kisan-
ga believes they should have demanded guarantees of political and military positions prior to joining and tried to negotiate a better deal.\textsuperscript{181} However, Futiyo is now a SPLA-IO major general with a recognised command and has received official military resupply, his forces are formal SPLA-IO members, and he anticipates participation in the cantonment and unification process.

**Independents**

Some Arrow Boys in more remote areas have not joined in the national conflict, while others, particularly in the east, are more focused on their struggle with cattle keepers than the government. In a heavily forested area with widely dispersed villages, many communities prefer to avoid the government, do not operate within the cash economy and have not been touched by the war.\textsuperscript{182} Arrow Boys there retain a more traditional, less political role.

**Other Community-based Armed Actors**

**Toposa**

The pastoral Toposa, based in the south east, have a fearsome reputation. Namarunyang Governor and Brigadier General Louis Lobong Lojore is the senior Toposa in government, and their loyalty to Juba was widely seen as pivoting on his position.\textsuperscript{183} He was the most pro-government of the three wartime Equatorian governors. Despite the governors’ political agitation, Juba does not question the loyalty of Lobong and the Toposa in the same way it does that of Wani Konga and Bakosoro and the Mundari and Azande.\textsuperscript{184}

An example of how Lobong demonstrated loyalty was his handling of Nuer soldiers in “Camp 15” in his state who wished to defect after the killings of Nuer in Juba at the war’s outset. Rather than allowing safe passage, as happened in Western Equatoria, he made it clear that all Nuer who remained with the government would be under his personal protection and those who defected would have to face hostile local ethnic groups as they crossed the desert and SPLA-held territory to join SPLA-IO forces in the north.\textsuperscript{185} The Nuer are still at Camp 15, and Lobong is the only one of the three governors still in power.

**Mundari**

The Mundari are another well-armed pastoralist group based around Terekeka.\textsuperscript{186} Because they helped the SAF protect Juba from the SPLA during the last war, there was concern they would join the opposition and put the capital under great pressure. Mundari civilians allowed opposition politicians and military officers to pass through their areas at the war’s outset, though this was not Central Equatoria state policy.

\textsuperscript{181} Crisis Group interview, Kisanga, Nairobi, January 2016.
\textsuperscript{182} Crisis Group interview, Equatorian youth, Juba, January 2016; Equatorian expert, Nairobi, January 2016.
\textsuperscript{183} Toposa are regarded as marksmen and strong warriors. Immo Eulenberger, “Aspects of South Sudan’s Kenyan Frontier”, in *The Borderlands of South Sudan*, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{184} Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Juba, May, December 2015.
\textsuperscript{185} Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO official, Nairobi, February 2014; Addis Ababa, June 2015; Equatorian officials, Juba, January 2016.
\textsuperscript{186} In addition to Dinka, the Mundari often bring their cattle into Western Equatoria, creating internal tensions. The Mundari also often clash with the Bari, who are centred around Juba.
Assurances, recruitment of thousands of Central Equatorians into the SPLA and cash and weapons for Wani Konga and the Mundari kept them firmly on the government’s zand Bor was contested.  

Governor Wani Konga’s dismissal in September 2015 and the administrative separation of Terekeka from Juba in the new 28-state structure (limiting Mundari ability to benefit from tax collection in Juba) has strained the relationship. The government believes it is strong enough to no longer need to placate the Mundari and seeks more control over them and other groups that had greater independence while it focused on the war, but it recognises Wani Konga’s continued importance and made him a presidential adviser in May 2016.

Dinka Cattle Keepers

Dinka are not the only cattle keepers in the Equatorias, but they are the most frequently accused of causing conflict. They come primarily from the former Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap states to the region for a number of reasons: to move cattle away from Tsetse Fly infested areas; to escape conflict and cattle raiding in their home areas; and to seek water, pasture and additional grazing for growing herds. Most were armed before the civil war, but they obtained additional weapons with the intent to turn them on the SPLM/A-IO if need be, not on Equatorians.

The pressures that drive cattle keepers into the region are not always well understood by farming communities, who see them as dangerous and unwelcome. Many suggest the cattle brought to the Equatorias were acquired by raiding, which is why they cannot return home with them. More concerning is the widespread belief that the cattle belong to senior officials, which is why their keepers are armed and appear to operate with relative impunity. Without question, the Dinka cattle keepers are better armed and more militaristic than most agriculturalist communities and are seen to, and sometimes do, have security force backing. In April 2015, President Kiir issued a decree that they should leave; their failure to do so without consequence further confirmed their apparent impunity. As Arrow Boys and others have rebelled, arming Dinka cattle keepers is a low-cost way of strengthening the government against populations seen to be disloyal and is facilitated by the preponderance of Dinka in the SPLA in the area.
Appendix D: African Union Counter-LRA Regional Task Force

The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council authorised the counter-LRA Regional Task Force (RTF) in November 2011, and the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) inaugurated it on 24 March 2012. The joint force has an authorised maximum size of 5,000, and Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan have contributed 3,085. The member states receive substantial logistical and technical support from the UK and U.S., including the latter’s military personnel. The force has operated from Dungu in north-eastern DRC, Obo in south-eastern CAR and Yambio and Nzara in South Sudan. Though the ARCSS called for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from South Sudan, which was completed in October 2015, it made an exception for UPDF serving with the multinational RTF.
Appendix E: Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCSS</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>Equatorian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Military Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMEC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MVM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>REMNASA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM-FD</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Former Detainees</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAF</td>
<td>South Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAF-E</td>
<td>South Sudan Armed Forces-Equatorias</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAF-GUN</td>
<td>South Sudan Armed Forces-Greater Upper Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDA-CF</td>
<td>South Sudan Democratic Army-Cobra Faction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSLM</td>
<td>Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SSNLM</td>
<td>South Sudan National Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSPPF</td>
<td>South Sudan People’s Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
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