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INDONESIAN JIHADISM: SMALL GROUPS, BIG PLANS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, small-scale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims. The suicide bombing inside a police station mosque on 15 April 2011 and a spate of letter bombs delivered in Jakarta in mid-March are emblematic of the shift. The government needs urgently to develop prevention strategies to reduce the likelihood that more such groups will emerge.

Unlike the small group proponents, advocates of “organisational” jihad believe that nothing can be accomplished without a large organisation and a strong leader, but if the ultimate goal is an Islamic state, then it is imperative to build public support. Rather than engage in violence, groups like JI and JAT are focused for the moment on building up a mass base, by finding issues that resonate with their target audience. Increasingly this means a greater focus on local rather than foreign “enemies”, with officials who are seen as oppressors, particularly the police; Christians; and members of the Ahmadiyah sect topping the list. It also means a greater willingness than in the past to join coalitions with non-jihadi groups.

The two strands of jihadism are complementary. The larger organisations can fund the religious outreach that attracts potential recruits for the small groups. They can also provide the translators and distributors for material downloaded from extremist websites in Arabic or English that buttress the small group approach. They can maintain plausible deniability for acts of violence while trying to rebuild their ranks, while at the same time providing the cover under which small groups emerge.

The report looks at detailed case studies of small violent groups that have emerged in Indonesia in 2009 and 2010 in Medan and Lampung, on Sumatra, and in Bandung and Klaten, on Java. All involved at least one former prisoner; three of the four had links to JAT but operated independently of JAT control. Three of the four also involved mosque-based study groups that evolved into hit squads, and all were committed to the idea of ighityalat, secret assassinations. In none of them was poverty a significant driver of radicalisation.

Information about these groups is only available because their members were caught. This raises the question of how many similar small groups operating under police radar exist across Indonesia that will only come to light when one of their murderous attempts succeeds.

Prevention strategies that go beyond law enforcement are critical, and the new National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has an important role to play in designing and testing them. All such strategies, however, must be based on well-grounded research and informed by serious study of what has and has not worked elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the National Anti-Terrorism Agency:

1. Start work immediately on designing prevention programs:
   a) Hire a small research team to comb through the trial dossiers of all extremists arrested to date, making a database of mosques, schools and other institutions that have repeatedly hosted lectures, meetings and study groups involving individuals subsequently arrested for terrorism. From these, identify five or six communities for pilot prevention projects.
   b) Hold a series of small brainstorming sessions, not with prominent religious leaders or politicians, but with Indonesian scholars working on radical movements and others who can generate ideas about possible programs. A series of focus group discussions in the target areas to assess awareness of the problem and how to address it would also be useful, as would talking to commercial marketing experts who have done market research in these communities to know what kinds of appeals work best.
c) Compile a summary of prevention programs that have been tried in other countries; those involved in the brainstorming sessions should read it and discuss what might be adapted to an Indonesian setting and how.

d) Compile examples of Indonesian communities that have rejected extremist preaching to understand how the protests developed and how decisions were made with a view toward encouraging similar stands in other areas.

2. Make videos of repentant teenagers (with identities disguised) who have been arrested for terrorism and who can talk on camera about the shame they have caused their families and where they went wrong. Interviews with family members, also with disguised identities, about problems caused by their children’s arrest would also be useful. These videos should be tested on teenage audiences before being screened more widely in the target areas.

3. Hold small, closed sessions with principals of state junior high and high schools in target areas to:
   a) understand what guidance is given to teachers who supervise religious extracurricular programs and how that guidance might be improved to ensure these programs do not encourage extremism or advocate violence;
   b) understand how these supervisors are chosen and how safeguards against extremism might be built into the selection process;
   c) ensure that principals who are concerned that some of these programs do encourage support for violent extremism have a range of options available, including changing the supervisor or shutting down the activity; and
   d) ensure that there are detailed records of any outside donors for extracurricular activities using school facilities.

4. Find ways to audit the funds collected by jihadi organisations for a variety of causes – disaster relief, alms for the poor, assistance to families of imprisoned mujahidin – and expose any irregularities or suspected abuse.

5. Ensure greater awareness of trends in jihadism and resulting changes in tactics and targets by:
   a) hiring an Arabic linguist with an interest in ideological developments;
   b) developing contacts with counterparts in the Middle East to understand new trends in jihadism that will likely find their way to Indonesia through translations; and
   c) identifying jihadi revisionist tracts that might be useful to disseminate in the Indonesian jihadi community.

6. Share the results of the research in Recommendation 1, above, with the large social organisations like Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and provide funding for well-designed proposals that their respective youth and student groups could undertake with their members, aimed at preventing advocacy of violence in areas that have a history of extremist activity.

**To the Ministry of Law and Human Rights:**

7. Consider drafting a new regulation on conditional release that would ban anyone convicted of terrorism from speaking, hosting or being a resource person for religious study sessions (pengajian or taklim) at least for the duration of his or her probation.

8. Strengthen programs currently underway to improve training of prison personnel; monitoring and supervision of high-risk detainees; and post-release programs.

9. Give high priority to programs to reduce the unacceptable level of prison corruption, including through better inspections, better training, better auditing and merit-based rather than money-based appointments to internal prison positions.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 April 2011
INDONESIAN JIHADISM: SMALL GROUPS, BIG PLANS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

Three developments mark the latest shift in Indonesia’s extremist landscape. Violent action is increasingly the work of small groups formed out of religious study sessions, sometimes with only tangential links to larger jihadi organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). The latter are increasingly focused on strengthening their base, which means more emphasis on local issues than on the oppression of Muslims abroad. And al-Qaeda, both in the Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan, continues to be an inspiration for Indonesian jihadis, with some communication and a clear desire for stronger links.

The emergence of small groups has been accompanied by a change in tactics and targets. The preferred method of operation (amaliyah) is no longer the bombing of iconic buildings but secret assassinations (ightiyalat) that are less likely to cause inadvertent Muslim deaths or prompt massive arrests. The targets are increasingly local. Police are top of the list, partly to avenge the deaths of suspected terrorists in law enforcement operations; the 15 April 2011 suicide bombing at a police station mosque in Cirebon is the most recent example. Other targets include Muslim officials who are deemed oppressors (thaghut), as well as prominent non-Muslims (kafir).

These changes are partly a response to events. Since the 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta and the break-up of a militant training camp in Aceh in February 2010, extremists have been pushed back and cells dismantled to the point that it is much safer to operate in small groups and hit squads than in more structured organisations. But the shifts are also a response to what some scholars call “jihadi revisionism” coming out of the Middle East and reaching Indonesia through translations of Arabic texts downloaded from the internet.

No one should conclude that targeting of foreigners is gone for good. One lesson from this report is that there is a constant process of adaptation, and developments in the Middle East and Pakistan, as well as within Indonesia, could produce new strategic directions. Nor should one dismiss the organisations like JI and JAT that for the moment may be focusing on outreach and education rather than violence as a way of strengthening their ranks. In many ways the religious discussions they sponsor have laid the groundwork for the emergence of small violent groups described below.

This report looks at some of the ideological transformations that have taken place in the Indonesian jihadi movement over the last few years. It also examines in detail four small groups that emerged in 2009-2010 — in Bandung, West Java; in Klaten, Central Java; in Medan, North Sumatra; and in Lampung, Sumatra, that ended up in alliance with the Medan group.

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2 JAT was founded in mid-2008 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after internal disputes in another organisation he led, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), caused him to be expelled. JAT had its inaugural ceremony in Bekasi, outside Jakarta, in September 2008. Many MMI members went over to JAT, and the influence of MMI as an organisation plummeted.

3 Mosques have been the target of attacks in the past, almost always by factions of Darul Islam (DI), on the principle that they were mesjid dhiror, mosques built on sinful premises or used to divide the faithful. Some examples were the bombing of the Nurul Imam mosque in Padang in 1976 and of the Kauman Mosque in Yogyakarta in 2000. In January 2011, the Klaten group described in Section IV placed crude bombs at the Ata’uwwan Pancasila Mosque in Dlianggu, Klaten and the Baitul Makmur Pancasila Mosque in Solo. Neither exploded.
The most sobering aspect is the ease of recruitment, something that was also apparent with members of a similar group discovered in Palembang, Sumatra, in 2008. Three of the four evolved from radical mosque-based religious discussion groups of a kind that take place across the country, making detection difficult; none of these groups was on the police radar screen before becoming involved in criminal activity. All involved some contact with recidivists, men who had been arrested and imprisoned for extremist activity and then released.

No single socioeconomic profile emerges from the four groups. The Klaten group was the youngest and poorest; the Bandung group consisted of mostly middle-class, university-educated men in their thirties. Poverty was not what drove them to radical action, but rather ideas, as propounded by persuasive jihadi clerics.

The case studies are based largely on interrogation depositions of those arrested but supplemented where possible with interviews. While the circumstances under which these depositions are produced are not always known, it is possible to cross-check multiple accounts of the same incident for at least a general picture of what took place, particularly when these accounts can be corroborated through other sources of information. The cases highlight the urgent need for prevention programs – which are virtually non-existent in Indonesia. The critical task is to identify vulnerable communities, starting with areas that have produced extremist groups in the recent past, and think through possible programs that might strengthen community resistance to extremist teaching.

II. IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Since the conflict in Ambon erupted in 1999, there have been two schools of thought within the Indonesian jihadi community. One, *jihad tanzim* (organised jihad), holds that war against a stronger enemy must be pursued through an organisation with an all-powerful imam or leader. The second, *jihad fardiyah* (individual jihad), says that if jihad is defensive in nature, such that war becomes an individual obligation for all Muslims, no leader or organisation is necessary: children can wage war without their parents’ permission, wives without their husbands’.

Force of circumstance, particularly the weakening of jihadi organisations through effective law enforcement, has propelled more Indonesian jihadis to look favourably on *jihad fardiyah* – of which the letter bombs that hit Jakarta in early March 2011 may have been one example. At the same time, proponents of organised jihad are telling their supporters that they have no hope of achieving political success unless they can mobilise public support. One way to do this is to identify local causes that resonate in the wider community – such as joining the anti-Ahmadiyah campaign. Both camps use the writings of Middle Eastern radicals to support their arguments.

A. IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN INDONESIA SINCE 2000

Indonesian jihadis have always looked to Arabs for religious guidance. One revealing list was produced by Mukhlas, the Bali bomber, before his execution, entitled “Looking for the Model Ulama”. Posted on the internet in 2005, it listed 33 men from the Middle East and North Africa, some of them better known for acts of terrorism than religious knowledge and almost all of them prisoners or former prisoners, whose writings Mukhlas believed should serve as inspiration for young Indonesians. Virtually all of the most rabid tracts available in Indonesia have been written by these men.

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5 Anti-Ahmadiyah rhetoric and violence has steadily increased in Indonesia since a 2005 fatwa by the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) declaring it deviant. In 2008, the government issued a decree restricting Ahmadiyah activities and banning any effort to disseminate its teachings beyond the existing community. In February 2011, three members of the sect were beaten to death by a mob in the village of Cikeusik, Banten. See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°78, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July 2008.
One of them, Abu Qatada al-Falastini, was particularly admired by JI notables Hambali, Mukhlas and Imam Samudra. He wrote in one tract, later translated by Mukhlas in prison, that even one person by himself could wage a jihad, citing one of the Prophet’s companions as an example.6 His writing became one of the ideological underpinnings for the decision taken in 2000 by the JI trio and others to undertake secret assassinations of pastors in retaliation for the deaths of Muslims in the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso.7 They formed the “Badr Battalion of the Islamic Army” (Tentara Islam Batalyon Badar) and undertook an operation called “Assassinate the Kafir Leaders” (Ightiyalat al-Immatul Kuffar), without the endorsement of the JI leadership.8 It started with a failed bombing operation in Medan in May 2000 and continued with the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings across eleven Indonesian cities that killed nineteen people.9

By 2004, the thinking on jihad had evolved, thanks in part to the appearance of two new tracts from the Arab world. One was the manifesto of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, This Is How We See Jihad and How We Want It by Hazin al-Madani, which had first appeared on an AQAP website in 2002.10 The second was a jihad manual that from the contents must have been written by a Syrian, but the Indonesian translation, Sel Tauid, named no author. Both focused on the need for the formation of small guerrilla units to fight the enemy, but still within the context of a larger organisation.11 Noordin Top and his colleague Dr Azhari Husin took the basic idea, calling their units thoifah muqitilah (death squads), but set it within the context of jihad fardiyah.12 They considered themselves JI, but given the exigencies of the situation after the 2002 Bali bombs, they no longer saw the need to coordinate with the JI leadership and went off on their own. They soon broke with JI completely.

Later in 2004, photocopies of a small book appeared called Death Squads and Assassinations (the transliterated Arabic title was Firoqul Maut wal Ightiyalat). Citing Abu Qatada, it stressed the legitimacy of jihad fardiyah involving only one, two or three people in attacks that would kill or injure the enemy.13 This book provided, among other things, the inspiration for a 2005 plot by the group Mujahidin KOMPAK, led by Abdullah Sunata, to murder Ulii Abdhur Abdallah, a leading progressive Muslim scholar. Ulii’s writings were thought so blasphemous by some conservative West Java ulama that they issued a fatwa that his blood was halal, ie, it was permissible to kill him. Surveys were conducted in mid-2005 of Ulii’s office in Jakarta for an operation that was later aborted. In March 2005, the leader of one of the cells, Noordin Top, was arrested. He was later convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 2006.

February 2001. It was signed by “Abu Mutafazirat” (Father of Explosions), a pseudonym for Imam Samudra.14

10 Excerpts were published in Indonesian with a shortened transliterated title, “Hakadza Narol Jihad”. See http://azzamalqitall.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/sebusa-pesan-dari-mujahidin-internasional-tentang-taktik-perang-dan-tahapannya-hazim-al-madani/.15 Madani underscored the importance of forming small guerrilla units (khutibah) that in turn would be composed of squads (thoifah) of eight to fourteen people. Each thoifah would have three cells, each of which would communicate with the leader but not with each other.

11 Noordin Top was a Malaysian JI member who together with fellow Malaysian Azhari Husin became the mastermind of a series of major bombings from 2003 onwards in Jakarta and Bali. Azhari, who was an engineer by training and a master bomb-maker, was killed in a police operation in November 2005 following the second Bali bombing. Noordin was killed in September 2009 following the July 2009 bombings of the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta.


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6 There is usually about a two-year lag between when a radical tract appears in Arabic and when it is translated and published in Indonesia. In this case, the tract was published online in Indonesian by the al-Qoidun group as Rambu-Rambu Tho’i‘ah Manshuroh. (The al-Qoidun group may have taken their name from the website of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, www.qa3edo.com.) Abu Qatada, a Jordanian national, became one of Britain’s more notorious preachers. A London resident since 1993, he was arrested in December 2001, freed on bail in 2005, returned to custody five months later while awaiting deportation to Jordan, released on bail in June 2008, re-arrested in November 2008 for violating his bail conditions, and awarded compensation by the European Court of Human Rights for unlawful detention from 2001-2005. He remains in custody. See “Timeline: Abu Qatada”, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/18/uksecurity.terrorism.


8 Abu Bakar Ba’syir, then JI amir, almost certainly knew of the plans but no meeting of the JI central command was ever called to endorse it.

9 Imam Samudra later issued a statement in January 2001 claiming responsibility: “We the TIBB (Tentara Islam Batalyon Badar) have repeatedly released statements after we have undertaken killings of kafir leaders, especially pastors whom we consider senior, who played a role recruiting cadres for the red army – Crusaders – to make war on Muslims, especially in Maluku (Ambon and surroundings) and Sulawesi (Poso and surroundings). We began this operation to murder kafir, thanks be to Allah, last year with a few bombings of ‘churches’ in Medan that had become centres of indoctrination for the ‘Christian Army’, in fact some served as weapons storehouses”. See “Bayan Ten-tang Peledakan Bom Natal”, Tentara Islam Batalyon Badar, 21
2011, a book bomb was sent to Uliil at the same office, although he no longer works there.\textsuperscript{14}

Noordin Top was also taken with the idea of ightiyalat, and a series of diagrams appeared on his website, www.anshar.net (now closed) in 2005 about how to assassinate targets from pedestrian flyovers or in Jakarta’s notorious traffic jams.

The big shake-up to jihadi thinking came with the publication in Indonesian of the prison reflections of the Jordanian-Palestinian scholar, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The book, a critique of the methods of Abu Musab Zarqawi, the insurgent leader operating in Iraq, appeared in the Middle East in 2004 and in Indonesian translation in 2006. Al-Maqdisi criticised proponents of jihad fardiyah, like Zarqawi but also, by analogy, Noordin Top for focusing only on qital nikayah – repeated strikes at the enemy – rather than qital tamkin, jihad from a secure base as a means to applying Islamic law and establishing an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{15}

The popularity of the book, translated by the salafi jihadi scholar Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman from his prison cell in Bandung, led to increased demand for earlier al-Maqdisi writings, all of which stressed the need for a longer-term vision and strategy.\textsuperscript{16} In al-Maqdisi’s view, this could only be accomplished by an organisation with popular support, thus swinging the pendulum back to organised jihad (jihad tanzim) – and also to local targets.

The objective of qital tamkin is to control territory where Islamic law can be applied. The enemy is whoever places obstacles in the way. In Indonesia, that means many government officials whom jihadis deem thaghut. From late 2005-early 2006 when the influence al-Maqdisi began to take off, the interest in foreign targets began to weaken.

This process was reinforced by the appearance in Indonesia in 2009 of a chapter from the encyclopaedic work of Abu Musab al-Suri, a Spanish national of Syrian origin. Published as The Progress of the Jihadi Movement, 1930-2002 (Perjalanan Gerakan Jihad 1930-2002), it was a catalogue of lessons learned from jihadi mistakes. Indonesian jihadis read al-Suri to say that Osama bin Laden made war on the United States not because he was committed to the principle of attacking the far enemy, but as a strategy to bring down the Saudi government. By analogy, they concluded that the strategy should be to bring down the Indonesian government and establish Islamic law. It thus made more sense to focus on the near enemy, thaghut officials, than on Americans and foreign tourists. When Noordin included a plot against President Yudhoyono with the plan to attack the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in July 2009, it showed that even the most diehard proponent of attacks against the West was coming to see the “near enemy” as an important target.

B. FAILURE OF THE ACEH EXPERIMENT

Seen in ideological terms, the Aceh training camp was an effort by Dulmatin, one of the original Bali bombers who returned from five years in the southern Philippines, and his friends to unite the jihad tanzim and the jihad fardiyah schools behind a new approach: a frontal jihad against government forces. This is the kind of jihad he and Umar Patek, a fellow Bali bomber, had been fighting in the Philippines, first with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, then with the Abu Sayyaf Group.\textsuperscript{17} Dulmatin saw the efforts in Somalia, Chechnya, and southern Thailand, and particularly in Mindanao where he had lived for the last eight years, not so much as ethno-nationalist movements but as efforts to liberate territory to create an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{18} No other form of jihad, he argued, had succeeded so well

\textsuperscript{14} Interrogation deposition of Iqbal Husainy alias Ramly alias Reza, 11 July 2005. Iqbal was one of Sunata’s followers. The plot was aborted when Iqbal by chance stopped at a mosque where a debate on the death fatwa against Uliil was underway, and one of the discussants argued that only the government had the right to impose the death penalty. Iqbal found the argument persuasive, told Sunata, and plans were stopped. Uliil is now an official of Partai Demokrat, President Yudhoyono’s party.

\textsuperscript{15} See Crisis Group Report, Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, op. cit., for a discussion of the debate on tactics among the participants. The Indonesian translation of the al-Maqdisi critique was titled Merekka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah.

\textsuperscript{16} Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman is a Muslim cleric and Arabic linguist who was first arrested in 2004 following the discovery of a bomb-making class that he had arranged in Cimanggis, outside Jakarta. His small group of followers was first known as Jama’ah Muwahidin, then as Jama’ah Tauhid wal Jihad. In February 2005 he was sentenced to seven years in prison minus time in detention. He served most of that time in Sukamiskin Prison, Bandung where he ran an extremist study group and translated works of al-Maqdisi. He became so famous in the jihadi community through his lectures smuggled out of prison (and sometimes delivered by cell phone to followers in other prisons) that his release in July 2008 was treated as a major event on radical websites. He briefly joined JAT but fell out with the family of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in early 2009, apparently because they considered him too takfiri (too quick to brand a Muslim an infidel for failing to uphold Islamic law). He contributed funds and recruits to the Aceh training camp for which he was arrested and in December 2010 sentenced to nine years in prison. The popularity of al-Maqdisi’s writings among Indonesian radicals may be due as much to Aman Abdurrahman’s personal prestige as to the contents of the texts.

\textsuperscript{17} Dulmatin and Umar Patek fled to Mindanao after the first Bali bombings. Dulmatin returned to Indonesia sometime after 2007 and was killed by police in an operation in Pamulang, outside Jakarta in March 2010. Umar Patek was arrested in Pakistan in early 2011.

\textsuperscript{18} Crisis Group discussion in Jakarta, March 2011.
in building a formidable army, establishing impregnable camps and controlling its own affairs from a secure base. They only had one step left, political independence.

Dulmatin argued to jihadis from the other camps that this is what they should be fighting for. From the jihad tanzim side, he brought in JAT, Aman Abdurrahman’s followers and elements of Darul Islam. From the jihad fardiyah side, he recruited a number of small groups and individuals, some of them former associates of Noordin.

With the break-up of the camp in late February 2010, it was clear the experiment had failed. The arrests and deaths in operations that followed were a huge blow to the jihadi movement. One group, Ring Banten, lost its top leadership to arrests and bullets. JAT was hit hard by the arrests of its founder, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and a number of other senior leaders, as well as the exposure of a wealth of information about its activities.

Suddenly, jihad fardiyah seemed a desirable – if not the only – option again. A number of small groups appeared, some of them aimed at wreaking vengeance on police. Groups that had been formed earlier but had not yet carried out attacks stepped up their training. A few fugitives from the Aceh camp, including a KOMPAK man named Sibgho, reportedly formed new cells.

At the same time, a new wave of criticism against jihadi organisations surfaced, prompted by a piece by al-Suri that appeared in the AQAP online English magazine Inspire. It argued that such organisations had been total failures because every time one person was picked up, other members were identified. The only way to ensure security was to operate in small cells, so if one person was arrested, only one or two others would follow, and those who managed to evade capture could always form a new cell.

Indonesian jihadis saw the truth of this. If, while the Aceh camp was being planned, Noordin Top’s group had been criticised for lacking long-term vision and having to start from scratch to form a new team for every operation, now, in retrospect, his ability to form new cells quickly despite the destruction of the previous ones seemed praiseworthy.

C. INDIVIDUAL JIHAD AND Ightiyalat: THE NEW WAVE

Books that lauded jihad fardiyah became the new rage. One of these was Faris Zahroni alias Abu Jandal al-Azdi, the successor to Yusuf al-Ayiri as AQAP head. His handbook, Encouraging the Heroic Mujahidin to Revive the Practice of Secret Assassinations, was translated into Indonesian, posted on the internet and found its way into jihadi hands across the country, including some now on trial for their role in the August 2010 Medan bank robbery. Secret assassinations were not only better for security and avoided Muslim deaths, they were also cheap.

The most recent book to circulate on radical websites was posted on 18 March 2011. Called Jihad Fardiyah, Between Obligation and Strategy for War (Jihad Fardiyah, Antara Kewajiban dan Strategi Perang), it makes the case for individual jihad and specifically uses the early March 2011 spate of letter bombs in Jakarta as an example. The author, identified only as “jaisy_554” writes:

When we hear the words “jihad operation”, we have in our minds a group of mujahidin exploding an IED or spectacular suicide bombing against the enemy, so that if we have the desire to undertake an operation, most of us are focused on an attack of this kind. This makes us think that we have to have extensive preparations: personnel, logistic support, a safehouse, a strategy and so on and so on, all of which takes time, especially if we’re thinking of doing it here [in Indonesia]. We forget that with a defensive jihad, it is permissible

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19. Darul Islam, also known as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), was the name given to several regional insurgencies that fought the Indonesian army in the 1950s and that regrouped as a single movement in the 1970s. It has since splintered into several factions. One of these is JI, which broke away in 1993. Another is Ring Banten, which was established in 1999. A few other small splinters are still actively engaged in jihad. See Crisis Group Report, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, op. cit.

20. Ba’asyir was arrested for the fourth time on 9 August 2010 and charged with terrorism (for helping raise funding for the Aceh camp); incitement to violence; and failure to report a wanted fugitive (Dulmatin) to authorities. His first arrest on subversion charges in 1979 was on appeal in 1985 when he fled to Malaysia where he lived until his return to Indonesia in 1999, a year after President Soeharto’s fall ushered in a new democratic era in Indonesia. Later that year he became amir of JI after the death of its founder, Abdullah Sungkar. Ba’asyir was arrested again after the 2002 Bali bombing but the prosecutors failed to make rebellion charges stick and he was only sentenced to immigration violations. On the day he was to be released, he was re-arrested on terrorism charges in April 2004 and again the prosecutors failed to make the more serious charges hold. He was released in June 2006.


23. The Indonesian title was Mengobarkan Semangat Para Mujahidin Perwira Untuk Menghidupkan Sunnah Ightiyalat.


25. One of the many sites where the tract can be found is http://azzamaqitall.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/jihad-fardiyah-antarasebuah-kewajiban-dan-strategi-perang/. Translation from Indonesian by Crisis Group.
for an individual to wage jihad, whether in the form of a personal assassination or a secret killing [qiyas] of an individual target. The question is, how to carry out an individual action so that it creates a sense of terror among the enemy?26

He goes on to use the letter bombs as an illustration, saying the lesson for mujahidin to take away was that using a new form of attack jarred the enemy because it was completely unexpected. He then writes:

Repeated individual attacks are what we should be launching now, because in the midst of the difficulties and resource scarcity that we are experiencing now, actions like these are the most appropriate (without demeaning or downplaying the role of bigger attacks). They are cheap and effective in sowing disruption in enemy ranks and cause them to lose their concentration. They are harder to detect by the *thaghat*, as we have seen with the recent book bombs. The risks of a jihad operation can be minimised because only one or two people are involved, without a commander … This is the strength of this kind of action.27

At the same time that the theory of *jihad fardiyah* is being promoted, practical do-it-yourself guidance on military training and bomb-making is circulating on Indonesian sites. The first issue of *Inspire* was translated immediately into Indonesian. It included an article headlined “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” (“Membuat Bom dalam Dapur Ibu Anda”) with instructions for producing easy-to-make bombs with readily available material.

D. MESSAGE FROM JIHAD TANZIM: KNOW THE LOCAL CONTEXT

Even as the campaign for individual jihad seemed to be finding new support, proponents of organisational jihad from JI and JAT published new tracts arguing that the focus had to be kept on political goals. In December 2010, Jazera, one of the JI-linked publishers, released *Political Vision of the Islamic Movement* (*Visi Politik Gerakan Islam*). It took the first two chapters of the 2002 al-Madani book, *This How We See Jihad and How We Want It*, added a chapter from Abu Musab al-Suri’s magnum opus, and put it together with an introduction that reiterated some of al-Maqdisi’s criticisms of unthinking jihadism. It accused many jihadis in Indonesia of thinking that jihad was constructed out of “ready-aim-fire” thinking without taking into consideration public opinion, costs and benefits, the importance of delegitimising the enemy and the need to have a work plan and strategy.28

Using the prestige of the two Arab authors to buttress arguments that had been articulated earlier by JI’s Abu Rusdan and the author of “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad”, the book argued that it was not enough to find Quranic verses supporting the use of force against the enemy.29 In assessing costs and benefits of a jihad operation, those involved needed to study the local sociopolitical context to understand the likely impact.30 If the impact was likely to be harmful, then an act for which there seemed to be Quranic support and therefore permissible (*halal*) could in fact be forbidden (*haram*). The relative strength of jihadi forces and the enemy also had to be taken into consideration. In short, no action should be taken without considering religious law, political context and the realities of the movement.31

One jihadi acknowledged the truth of the analysis, saying, “We’re great on the military side but we don’t do our political homework”.32 Proponents of organised jihad use events in the Middle East as evidence of the political poverty of jihadi thinking, because it was not mujahidin but democracy supporters who ended up bringing down *thaghat* rulers. In Indonesia, one radical intellectual argues, jihad in the interests of an Islamic state will not be successful unless there is public support – and that can be marshalled only by addressing issues of direct concern.

If we bring in America and Israel as the enemy, we’re not channelling or empowering the potential of the Islamic resistance very well, because America and Israel are too far from the reality of the *ummah* (Muslim community). Because of this, the *ummah* must be mobilised to crush Ahmadiyah, Shi’ism, vice, gambling, narcotics, idolatry and other things that are closer to their daily lives. By opposing these things, the *ummah* will experience clashes, and from the clashes, larger conflicts that will produce solidarity and brotherhood. Then we will

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 “Refleksi Jihad Aceh” was the most influential critique of the Aceh training camp venture to appear on a radical website. First published on http://elhakimi.wordpress.com on 22 March 2010, it was quickly picked up on other sites and debated on chat sites, web forums, and other kinds of discussion groups. It was written by a young alumnus of the Islamic school in Ngruki, Solo that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir helped found. For an analysis of why it was so effective, see Sidney Jones, “Countering Extremism on Indonesian Internet Sites: Substance, Style and Timing”, paper prepared for CTITF Conference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 24 January 2011.
30 Understanding the local context is referred to as *fiqih waqi*.
31 *Visi Politik Gerakan Jihad*, op. cit., p. 35.
become ever stronger until we become a clear social force.33

A similar argument was advanced by the author of “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad”, which said that jihadi organisations should work in alliance – and work out a division of labour – with local pro-Sharia organisations including anti-vice groups like the Islamic Defenders Front and those that campaign against Christianisation. All can then work from the same blueprint to establish an Islamic state.34 The merging of extremist agendas that has been apparent in some of the anti-Christian and anti-Ahmadiyah protests in the last third of 2010 and early 2011 is thus not just a local phenomenon of Jakarta and its immediate environs. It has a clear theoretical basis from the jihad tanzim perspective.

E. CONCLUSION

The two schools of jihad, jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah, may seem diametrically opposed, with the first urging caution on the use of violence and stressing the need for support while the second is urging small-scale, low-cost attacks that can still cause widespread terror. The writings of JI leader Abu Rusdan, with his barely hidden contempt for selfish martyrdom-seekers at the expense of the larger ummah, would seem evidence of their incompatibility.35

But the history of JAT, with some of its leading members having dual identities as above-ground preachers and underground terrorists, suggests not just compatibility of the two camps but almost symbiosis. The larger jihadi organisations have the networks and the funds to support religious outreach via radio stations, weekly religious study sessions (pengajian), larger religious meetings (taklim), magazines and bulletins through which well-known radical ideologues can disseminate the basic principles of salafi jihadism. They provide the broader community from which small groups committed to jihad fardiyah emerge. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Aman Abdurrahman and other leading lights of jihad tanzim may have no direct role in violence, but they have set the stage for those who do.

The clarity of the theoretical debates gets messier when we look at the actual trajectories of the small groups discussed here. In some cases, as with the Klaten group, there is a clear line between radical preaching on the value of ightiyalat, as filtered through the leader, and the actions of the group. At the same time, it is doubtful that the teenaged bombers did any serious thinking about jihad tanzim versus jihad fardiyah or were even made aware of the debate. The Medan group had close associations with JAT, and several of its members by experience were more inclined toward jihad tanzim, including one of its leaders, Toni Togar, a JI prisoner – who himself seems to have been focused on spectacular attacks à la Noordin Top. At the same time, many of its members had also read and discussed the translation of Abu Jandal’s tract on ightiyalat. The Bandung group started out with secret assassinations but seemed to be heading toward big-bang attacks at the time its members were arrested.

In all cases, the operations undertaken by the groups were the result of a mixture of indoctrination, planning, accident, personalities and response to events. The very existence of these groups is what matters, however, because these are the ones that were caught. With jihad fardiyah and ightiyalat being promoted so strongly in radical circles, there inevitably are more plots in the works.

33“Pergolakan Arab dalam Perspektif Muqowamah”, 9 March 2011. This article, by the same author as “Refleksi Jihad Aceh”, first appeared on http://elhakimi.wordpress.com and was picked up by the larger circulation site, www.arrahmah.com on 10 March 2011.
III. THE FAHRUL TANJUNG GROUP, BANDUNG

This group got its start when six men, a few loosely linked to JAT, came together at a radical mosque in Cileunyi, outside Bandung, West Java, in late 2009. Five were in their early thirties, one a little older. Most had a university education and had some history with radical organisations. The group’s leader, Fahrul Rozi Tanjung, was neither the oldest, the best-educated, nor the most experienced in jihadi activism, but it was he who brought the group together and became its decision-maker. All were influenced by the preaching of radical ideologue Aman Abdurrahman, with his focus on local thaghut as the main enemy. Their decision to work within a small group was a deliberate tactical choice, rather than something forced on them by circumstance. At the same time, their first violent act – the murder of a police officer – was triggered by police operations following the break-up of the Aceh training camp that led to the arrest of over 100 men and the deaths of some two dozen others. It was also triggered by their encounters with one individual, an ex-soldier and long-time extremist named Yuli Harsono.

When the group was eventually arrested in August 2010, it was portrayed as a secret JAT cell, but JAT did not provide a command structure or any supervision. Instead, by sponsoring lectures and disseminating material, it provided a community that encouraged the emergence of groups like Fahrul’s.

A. THE AS-SUNNAH CONNECTION

The decision to form a group took place in 2009 at the as-Sunnah Mosque in Cileunyi where three men – Kurnia Widodo, Fahrul Rozi Tanjung and Iqbal alias Kiki – attended weekly religious study sessions. The mosque had a history of supporting radical activism going back at least a decade, and jihadi preachers were always welcome. Of the three original members, Kurnia was the oldest at 36. Born in Medan, he finished high school in Lampung and graduated in 2000 from one of Indonesia’s most prestigious universities, the Bandung Institute of Technology, with a degree in chemical technology. In 1991, while still in high school, he joined Darul Islam and continued that association after he moved to Bandung in 1994. In 2005, he moved to the Indonesian branch of the transnational organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir although he was never inducted as a full-fledged member and apparently found no satisfaction there. In early 2008, he was invited by a friend to as-Sunnah Mosque. He began attending regularly and was particularly attracted to the monthly lectures there of Aman Abdurrahman.

Fahrul was also a Medan native who came to Bandung to study information technology at Universitas Kebangsaan from 2001 to 2006 and then became a lecturer there. After JAT was formed in 2008, he became secretary for the Cileunyi subdistrict chapter.

In January 2009 Iqbal alias Kiki began attending religious lectures at the as-Sunnah mosque where he met Fahrul and Kurnia; he joined JAT sometime thereafter. He was a native of the area, having attended state schools in Cileunyi and graduated from the Bandung Islamic University in 2002. He then taught English at a state elementary school, and from 2008, at a Muhammadiyah junior high school in Sumedang, West Java, as well. He had been a member of a salafi organisation called Adhwa’us Salaf before he became drawn to Aman Abdurrahman’s more militant approach. At Fahrul’s initiative, the three decided to form their own unit for jihad operations. Kurnia told the others that he had taught himself how to make bombs from the internet and offered to teach the others as a form of i’dad, or military preparation.

B. YULI HARSONO

Through the as-Sunnah meetings, the three friends came to know Yuli Harsono, a former soldier who occasionally gave lectures himself at the mosque and who came to

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36 The high number of deaths in police anti-terrorism operations is a source of concern, because even given the dangers posed by men who have generally been armed and interested in martyrdom, non-lethal options were clearly available in some cases. 37 Louise Richardson in her book What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York, 2006) argues that terrorism needs three elements to flourish: alienated individuals, a supportive community and an enabling ideology. The JAT network has proved important for the second, not just for the group in Bandung but elsewhere as well. 38 Fahrul’s name is spelled Pahrul Ruji Tanjung on his interrogation deposition but all media accounts use the first spelling.

39 The mosque is run by a retired military officer, Ajengan Lesmana Ibrahim. It was at this mosque in February 2010 that Aman Abdurrahman handed over money to Dulmatin for the Aceh training camp. It was also here in November 2001 that the bomber of the Petra Church, Ujang Haris, stayed before leaving for Jakarta for the operation.

40 This group was led by Abu Hamzah Yusuf, a graduate of a salafi school in Dammaj, Yemen.

41 Interrogation deposition of Kurnia Widodo, 12 August 2010.
play a pivotal role in their activities. In March 2006, Yuli had been sentenced to four years in prison for stealing ammunition and training a jihadi militia. He was initially held in military custody, but in early 2007, he was moved to the big civilian prison in Sukamiskin, Bandung. There he joined a religious study group, led by Aman Abdurrahman, the prison’s most extreme inmate, who was serving a seven-year sentence for running a bomb-making class outside Jakarta. Another person in the same prison discussion group was Helmy Priwardani, a Bandung thug in his twenties, serving a four-year sentence for killing someone in a brawl.

Prison authorities became worried about the group and transferred Aman, Yuli and one other man to a smaller prison. Aman was released in July 2008 and began speaking at the as-Sunnah mosque. Yuli appears to have been released sometime in early 2009 and began attending the same mosque.

It is not clear whether or how Yuli Harsono participated in the meetings of Fahrul’s group, but he was clearly in communication with them at least on a sporadic basis. Then came the news in February 2010 of the discovery of the Aceh camp and shortly thereafter that Kang Jaja, one of the camp leaders who had also been a regular at Aman Abdurrahman’s lectures at the as-Sunnah mosque, had been killed by police, trying to flee Aceh. The friends decided, almost certainly after some communication with Yuli, that the best form of resistance would be through actions of a small group, and they began planning an operation to avenge Jaja’s death.

At this point two others joined the group. One was Helmy, Yuli’s fellow inmate in Sukamiskin Prison, now a respectable salesmen of leather jackets. The other was Abdul Ghojur, a nurse from Lampung and JAT member. In October 2009, Ghojur began attending Aman Abdurrahman’s lectures at the as-Sunnah mosque. It was here that he met Yuli Harsono, Fahrul’s group, and another man, Bintang Juliardi alias Anggara, who happened to be involved in the plans for the Aceh training camp.

There was a complex web of relationships among the group members. Helmy, in addition to knowing Yuli Harsono from prison, also relied on him for business contacts; Yuli helped Helmy market his jackets. In March 2010, Helmy also asked Iqbal alias Kiki for help finding a house to rent that he could use as his business base. The house in Cibiru, Bandung, became known as the bengkel or garage and subsequently served as a meeting place for the group. In late 2009, Anggara was acting as an arms broker for the Aceh camp and offered to sell bullets to Fahrul’s group. Ghojur and Yuli Harsono reportedly bought hundreds in separate transactions, making most of their purchases before the Aceh camp was broken up.

C. THE POLICE ATTACKS

Yuli Harsono took the initiative for the first attack. In early March 2010, he called Fahrul and asked to meet at the as-Sunnah mosque, where he asked him to join an attack on a police post near his hometown, Kebumen. He said it would be to avenge the deaths of their brothers, the martyrs in Aceh, although this was joined to a more personal motive – to get back at the police for ill-treatment he allegedly had suffered while detained at Sukamiskin.

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42 Yuli was born in Kebumen, Central Java around 1977 and attended a state Islamic elementary and junior high school there. He then went on to a military academy in Gombong, Kebumen and joined the army upon graduation. In 2001, he was assigned to an army training centre in Cimahi, West Java, and sometime thereafter, he joined Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s MMI, an above-ground radical group committed to the establishment of Islamic law. The army strictly prohibits such associations, but Yuli went further than just membership. In 2004, he held military training sessions for an MMI security unit (Laskar Majelis Mujahidin) in Tawangmangu, outside Solo and Bandung. He also became commander of an MMI militia in Kebumen. When his role was discovered, Yuli was arrested and his barracks searched. Military police discovered that in his capacity as guard of an ammunition depot at the Cimahi centre, Yuli had stolen almost 200 bullets of various sizes. They also found a wealth of jihadi literature.

43 Helmy was one of several criminals who became jihadi as a result of Aman’s preaching. Another was Sugeng Said, arrested for murder. He was transferred to a smaller prison in 2007, at the same time as Aman, but it is not clear if he has been released.

44 Interrogation deposition of Kurnia Widodo, op. cit. The way Kurnia expresses this in the deposition suggests that a serious discussion had taken place on tactics and strategy, with the idea of small group action a deliberate choice. Kang Jaja (“Kang” is an honorific meaning “older brother”, sometimes written as “Mang”) was the leader of a Darul Islam splinter group called Ring Banten that worked with JI on the first Bali bombing and with Noordin Top on the Australian embassy bombing. According to the testimonies of some ex-JI members, Kang Jaja joined JI sometime in the mid-2000s but left in 2009.

45 Since 2002, Abdul Ghojur had been a member of the Lampung chapter of MMI. He moved to Subang, West Java, in 2005 to look for work and joined the local MMI chapter. Ghojur left MMI for JAT sometime in 2009.

46 Anggara worked in Depok Airsoft, the airsoft gun shop run by Sofyan Tsauri. Sofyan was sentenced to ten years in prison on 19 January 2011 for arranging the purchase of guns for the Aceh camp.

47 Interrogation deposition of Bintang Juliardi alias Anggara, 27 August 2010; and Abdul Ghojur bin Imam Bashori, 12 August 2010.

48 Interrogation deposition of Kurnia Widodo, op. cit. It is not clear when the police would have had the opportunity to inflict any ill-treatment on Yuli, since by the time he was transferred to Sukamiskin, he was no longer in police custody.
He told Fahrul it would be a hit-and-run attack. Yuli brought a revolver to the meeting; Fahrul brought some of the bullets that Ghofur had purchased.\(^49\)

The two men left shortly thereafter on Yuli’s motorcycle for the eight-hour drive from Bandung to Kebumen. They arrived at dawn, rested, then spent much of the day driving around Kebumen surveying police posts to choose which one to target. They decided on the police station in Prembun, on the outskirts of town. At 1:30am on 15 March, with Fahrul driving, they rode up to the station. Yuli walked in the main entrance with his gun cocked. Fahrul heard two shots in quick succession, then Yuli came running out and the two sped away. Yuli had killed a constable, Yona Anton Setiawan, 29, as he slept, with two shots to the head.

No one suspected jihadi activity; indeed, initial suspicion fell on internal disputes within the police themselves.\(^50\) Fahrul called the others shortly after he got back, showed them reports on the internet of the mysterious killing, and told them he and Yuli were responsible.

The successful attack provided the impetus for further operations. A few weeks later, Helmy was on a business trip to Central Java in a rental van when he got a call from Yuli, asking him to meet in Yogyakarta, the main city in the region. It turned out Yuli had already chosen a new target, a remote police post in Kentengrejo, Purworejo, a little over an hour outside Yogyakarta. Helmy agreed to take part in the attack. They drove up to the police post around 2:00am on 10 April. Yuli went in as before, fired a series of shots, then ran back out to Helmy’s van, and the two drove off. This time two policemen died, Sgt. Major Wagino, 35, and First Sgt. Eko Iwan Nugroho, 25. Their bodies were only found when one of their colleagues reported later for work.

D. BIGGER PLANS

With two apparently perfect crimes committed, the group was emboldened to do more. Kurnia began more systematic bomb instruction, with members meeting once a week for lessons in Helmy’s rented house in Cibiru. Fahrul bought basic supplies at a chemical supply store in Cica-das, Bandung, and stored them at the house. They also decided to have a couple of practice sessions in a forested area outside the city.

Sometime towards the end of May, Ghofur got a call from Anggara, his friend who had sold him the bullets. Anggara wanted him to put up Abdullah Sunata, a former prisoner who was on the police most-wanted list for his role in the Aceh camp. Ghofur agreed, and Sunata stayed for three days. He came back twice thereafter for short stays, each time with Anggara. On 18 June, Anggara called Ghofur and asked him to get ready for a trip to Solo, in central Java, with Sunata and bring ammunition with him. The next day, Sunata, his wife and two young children, Anggara and Ghofur drove to Solo, where Ghofur turned over 400 bullets to Yuli Harsono, who was waiting at the as-Salam pesantren to receive them.

It was the last time the others saw Yuli alive. On 23 June, in operations in and around Klaten, about a half hour’s drive from Solo, police shot and killed him, arrested two others at the same site, then arrested Abdullah Sunata on a bus from Klaten bound for Jakarta. They also arrested another former prisoner, Heri Sigu Samboja alias Soghir, with whom Sunata had just made contact and who served as bomb instructor for the Klaten group, below. Ghofur made it safely back to Subang, West Java.

Yuli Harsono’s death only strengthened the resolve of Fahrul’s group to attack the police. Fahrul reportedly suggested that they plan on an attack on the headquarters of the mobile police brigade (Brimob) in Kelapa Dua, Depok, a Jakarta suburb.\(^51\) They began amassing materials, and on 30 July Fahrul, Kurnia, Iqbal and Helmy successfully tested two small pipe bombs in the hills outside Sumedang.

On 7 August, before they could do anything more, all were arrested.

E. CONCLUSION

Fahrul’s group is a good example of individual jihad (ji-had fardiyah), and several things are worth noting about it.

- Most of its members had several years’ experience in radical organisations before they joined Fahrul’s group; above-ground tanzim like MMI and JAT, let alone clandestine ones like Darul Islam/NII or JI, can serve as important training ground for those who eventually choose to operate in small groups.
- The group drew on a web of existing relationships: the three friends from as-Sunnah; Yuli, Helmy and Aman from Sukamiskin Prison; Ghofur and Anggara from some earlier meeting. The overlapping associations probably strengthened the group’s cohesion as well as broadened its contacts.

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\(^{49}\) Interrogation deposition of Pahrul Ruji Tanjung alias Bayu, 12 August 2010.

\(^{50}\) See “Pelaku Penembakan Diduga Teman Sepiket”, Siara Merdeka, 16 March 2010.

\(^{51}\) Interrogation deposition of Muhamad Iqbal alias Kiki, 20 August 2010.
There appears to have been no real structure to the group; it was more or less a gathering of friends.

No one paid much attention to the murders. The downside of secret assassinations of local targets is that they get almost no national or international media coverage, meaning the terror value is lower. It would be interesting to know if those behind the book bombs drew any lessons from this.

Without Aman Abdurrahman’s preaching as a magnet, this group might not have come together. His lectures provided the occasion for meetings, the focus of the group’s targets (thaghut) and the inspiration for attacks.

The second example of a small group is Tim Ightiyalat from Klaten, Central Java. It was led by a shopping mall parking attendant who had once been a high school recruiter for one of Darul Islam’s many factions. He fell in with a more radical crowd through a JI-linked publishing house in Klaten and became committed to the idea of ightiyalat. He easily recruited a group of high school students, who themselves had become attracted to salafi jihadism through radical discussion groups in the area. He found a former prisoner and student of Dr Azhari Husin, the late bomb-maker, willing to provide instruction to the group, and then when he needed more manpower, merged his team with an anti-vice squad in Klaten. The result was a crude bombing campaign against police posts, churches and a few mosques. Most of the group was arrested on 25 January 2011, but two of the bomb-makers remain at large.

A. THE LEADER, ATOK

Roki Aprisdianto alias Atok, the founder of Tim Ightiyalat, was recruited into Darul Islam (DI) in 1997 at age fifteen, while at junior high school in Baturetno, Wonogiri, near Yogyakarta. His father had converted to Christianity when he was eleven, and invited him to do so as well, but Atok refused, instead taking an active role in local Muslim organisations. He became a recruiter himself in local high schools and two years later was expelled from his own school for DI activity. He graduated from a Muhammadiyah high school, then worked in a series of small factories run by DI owners in Wonogiri, Solo and southern Sumatra. In 2004 he moved back to Klaten, Central Java, where he worked as an itinerant noodle seller. He left DI in 2008, when he discovered that the monthly infaq or contribution he had been giving for years had been pocketed by the district leader.52

Atok began selling Islamic books to make a living and soon came into contact in Klaten with Yayasan Kafayeh, the organisation behind the JI-linked jihadi publisher, Kafayeh Cipta Media. Established in early 2007, it had quickly become one of the publishers favoured by al-Qaeda sympathisers.53 Yayasan Kafayeh sponsored a weekly study group at Krapyak mosque in Merbung village, Klaten, led by Ustad Mus’ab Abdul Ghaffar alias Darwo, a fiery orator and admirer of Osama bin Laden who preached about the obligation of all Muslims to wage jihad. After villagers in Merbung forced Darwo to leave because his teachings were too extreme, his place at Krapyak mosque was taken

52 Interrogation deposition of Roki Aprisdianto alias Atok, 27 January 2011.
by Abu Umar Abdillah, editor of the JI magazine ar-Risalah. It was at one of these sessions in October 2009 that Atok first encountered the students from the Klaten vocational school.

Around the same time, a few of the Yayasan Kafayeh people introduced Atok to a group that met in one of the most radical mosques in central Java, al-Muhajirin mosque in Purwosari, Solo. It was a who’s who ofJI and ex-JI notables: Umar Burhanuddin, imprisoned briefly for his role in the lead-up to the 2004 Australian embassy bombing; Abu Tholul, also a former prisoner, later arrested for involvement in the Aceh camp; Muzayyin alias Mustaqim, a Ngruki teacher and JAT official; Aris Mundandar, former head of KOMPAK-Solo; and a man known as Joko Ngruki teacher and JAT official; Aris Mundandar, former head of KOMPAK-Solo; and a man known as Joko Jihad, a former prisoner with ties to the late Noordin Top.54 Joko knew of Atok’s past life as a DI recruiter and allegedly urged him to build on his recruiting abilities and bring more people into the jihadi community.55

Encouraged, Atok called up Agung, one of the Klaten students, in early December 2009 and asked him to invite his friends to a meeting. It was less than two months from their first meeting to the formation of Tim Ightiyalat, and the students had only seen Atok four times. But they had already been radicalised for at least a year through dakwah (religious outreach) activities in high school and extracurricular study groups, so that by the time they encountered Atok, it did not take much to convince them to sign up.

B. THE RECRUITS

All of the recruits were students or recent graduates of a Klaten vocational high school, where they had been active in ROHIS, a club for Muslim students that is present in almost every state school in the country, and Corps Dakwah Sekolah (CDS), for aspiring student preachers. At CDS meetings, they were frequently shown videos of Palestine, Afghanistan and other conflicts. The youths ranged in age from seventeen to 21 and most were from relatively poor families. The parents of one were illiterate; the father of another was the caretaker of a local cemetery; the father of a third was a construction labourer. The friends made a point of attending religious lectures in and around Klaten and Solo, and were particularly taken by lectures with big-name radicals such as Abu Bakar Sirah Nabawi! by Sulaiman bin Shahil al-Khursysi with Ha-

C. TIM Ightiyalat

In December 2009, thirteen youths responded to their friend Agung’s invitation, sent by text message, to the meeting with Atok. It took place at the high school mosque and only lasted about a half hour. Atok told the participants that they had a chance to put Darwo’s teachings into practice. They knew this meant undertaking amaliyah or operations. He told them to think about it, and he would call another meeting in two weeks.

Sometime in January 2010, most of the same group met at a mosque near Atok’s home and agreed to form Tim Ightiyalat and undertake secret killings of kafir. Atok said 54 Joko Jihad’s other nickname was Joko Gondrong. His real name is Joko Tripriyanto from Laweyan, Solo. He was arrested after the second Bali bombing and given a short sentence for lending a laptop to the man who helped Noordin make the www.anshar.net website. He was released in mid-2007 and immediately went back to his old network.

55 Interrogation deposition of Roki Aprisdianto alias Atok, op. cit. 56 Interrogation testimonies of Agung Jati Santoso, 27 January 2011; and Yuda Anggoro alias Bilal, 28 January 2011. 57 One of the students remembered attending the launches in late 2009 for Astaghfirullah, Ulama Difitnah! by Sulaiman bin Shahil al-Khursysi, with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as the speaker; Salah Kaprah Salafi by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, with Ha-


the group would be the Klaten cell of a larger group, perhaps envisioning future expansion, and assigned people to different positions. He said they would practice target-shooting with air rifles on Sundays on the school grounds and also do martial arts training.

Group members were also required to attend Darwo’s weekly study group, which had resumed in February at a village mosque. Study materials included the twelve-volume Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education), a series of writings and lectures by Abdullah Azzam (and a staple of teacher training programs in JI schools); Aqidah Islam al-Qaidah, translated from the Arabic by Darwo for Kafayeh Cipta Media; and Iman wal Kufur by Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz aka Dr Fadl, the Egyptian radical. The meetings aroused the suspicion of locals, however, and they were eventually forced to move again.

In March, Atok assigned new names to the members, now down to nine with a few defections. The names (nama hijrah) were emblematic of their new lives in a purely Muslim environment and represented historical figures whom the youths were urged to emulate. As the group embarked on what was supposed to be a two-month physical fitness program, another youth pulled out on the grounds that he did not have his parents’ permission to take part. But the training seems to have been poorly organised, participation was sporadic, and it was eventually abandoned.

In May, Atok allegedly sent a member named Irfan to study bomb-making with Heri Sigu Samboja alias Soghir, a man he knew through Yayasan Kafayeh. Soghir had excellent jihadi credentials. His father had been one of the DI recruits to Afghanistan in the late 1980s, and he himself had gone to JI schools. At his father’s suggestion, he studied bomb-making in 2004 with the late Dr Azhari Husin and was partly responsible for assembling the bomb used in the Australian embassy attack. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to seven years in prison in 2005 and conditionally released after three. He probably moved to the Klaten area sometime in 2009 and occasionally led taklim at Krapyak mosque.

Soghir taught Irfan the basic skills he had learned from Azhari; Irfan seems to have trained Atok; and Atok trained several of the others but not to a skill level that most could really use.

On 23 June, radical circles in Klaten were shaken by the arrest of Soghir, in the course of police operations against a number of jihadi leaders. Irfan, according to Atok, became a target of police investigation and dropped out of sight. Darwo immediately ceased preaching and may also have gone into hiding. Atok’s group, however, seemed determined to go forward, cautiously. In July, five members carried out a bomb-making experiment on Mt Tumpang, near Klaten; a few months later they went back to the same place to practice making grenades.

**D. MERGER WITH TIM HISBAH**

In September, Tim Ightiyalat acquired a partner. Tim Hisbah, another small group, was run out of the al-Ansor Mosque in Semanggi, Solo, by a man named Sigit Qor-dowi. It had been more oriented toward enforcing Islamic morality than waging jihad, but now it wanted to work with Atok’s group to attack police, a change in focus that might have been prompted by the spate of killings of suspected terrorists by the police counter-terrorism unit Detachment 88 and/or the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir on 9 August 2010. Sigit heard that Atok had bomb-making capacity and wanted a few members of his group trained, not realising how unskilled the Klaten bombers actually were. He also offered to cover the costs of all components.

Atok agreed and for six nights, after his wife and children had gone to sleep, he gave a kind of “training of the trainers” course at his house to four members of Tim Hisbah. They also had a couple of practice sessions making detonators in a nearby rice paddy, with materials purchased from an ordinary electrical supply store in Solo. When Atok deemed the four proficient, he sent them back to teach other members of Tim Hisbah.

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58 Irfan was the cell leader; Tri Budi Santoso was the secretary; Sarjianto was the treasurer; Agung Jati Santoso was in charge of travel; and Muncar Wahyu of training. Those who were still in school were just ordinary members.


60 Tri Budi Santoso became Ali; Agung Jati Santoso became Musa; Nugroho Budi Santoso became Umar; Eko Suryanto became Kholid and so on.

61 Interrogation deposition of Roki Apsisdianto alias Atok, op. cit.

62 Interrogation deposition of Roki Apsisdianto alias Atok, op. cit.
In November, Atok told the members of Tim Ightiyalat to make five Molotov cocktails, then choose their targets. No one thought in terms of foreigners or international icons. One chose a police post; two others chose churches; a fourth chose a Catholic shrine; and the fifth another police post. Only one of five went off and it caused little damage to the target, the Manjung Church in Klaten.

In the first week of December, Atok tried to arrange a coordinated bombing operation with Tim Hisbah. A joint team prepared bombs in small biscuit tins and Atok handed out assignments. Two would be planted at the Pasar Kliron police station and two would be used to disrupt a traditional Javanese ceremony at the palace (kraton) in Solo on 1 Syuro, the Muslim new year. At the last minute, one of the bombs destined for the palace was instead used to target a Catholic church in Sukoharjo, Solo. Overall, the operation was a total failure, like everything else the group had attempted. Two of the bombs never went off; the other two caused no serious damage.

Atok’s next idea was to have a bomb made out of cow dung and two Molotov cocktails planted on New Year’s Eve at two mosques named after Pancasila, Indonesia’s state ideology. The idea was that if a mosque were attacked, Christians would be blamed and this would incite communal hatred in a way that could be exploited for a bigger jihad. But again, none of the bombs worked. One would have thought by this time that Atok’s young followers would have become disillusioned with his leadership or discouraged by the unbroken string of failures. But there was one more initiative, an effort to bomb the grave of a prominent Javanese mystic in Jatinom, Klaten, with a device that once again failed to go off. Shortly afterwards, most of the group’s members were arrested.

E. CONCLUSION

Tim Ightiyalat’s name by itself suggests the influence of the tracts on jihad fardiyah and Atok’s connection with the jihadi intellectuals around Kafayeh Cipta Media – which was translating al-Qaeda material into Indonesian – virtually guaranteed that he would have heard of the debates around the issue. Like every other group described here, this one had direct links to a former prisoner, in this case Soghir, who provided the bomb instruction. But either the training was not long enough or his pupils were not apt, because they clearly did not learn enough to make them effective terrorists.

One particularly worrisome aspect of the group was the fact that most of the students had been “softened up” for extremism by hardline high school organisations before they ever started attending radical lectures. It is as though the local chapters of ROHIS and CDS set them on the path toward terrorism – suggesting that these organisations should be particular targets of counter-radicalisation work in areas that are already vulnerable to extremism.

66 Interrogation deposition of Roki Aprisdianto alias Atok, op. cit. The two mosques are among many in Indonesia with “Pancasila” in their names, an indication that they were funded by a foundation linked to the late President Soeharto. For members of DI, the organisation that Atok had belonged to for several years, these mosques were dhihar, founded with the express intention of dividing the faithful. In Islamic history, the Prophet had forbade his followers from praying at such mosques and authorised their destruction.
V. THE MEDAN GROUP

The final case study, about the men who carried out the 18 August 2010 robbery of a Medan branch of the CIMB bank, is also the most complicated because there are two different versions of events which lead to different conclusions. The first is that of Fadly Sadama, a smart, twice-imprisoned jihadi who has a history of lying during interrogations.67 The second comes largely from the testimonies of two Lampung men involved in the Medan bank robbery. The first paints Indrawarman alias Toni Togar, a JI member imprisoned in 2003, as the mastermind, and says the group involved, called “Indonesian Mujahidin Group” (Kumpulan Mujahidin Indonesia, KMI) was formed in 2005 by inmates in Tanjung Gusta prison, Medan’s main penitentiary. The purpose of the bank robbery, according to Fadly, was to raise funds for a prison assault that would help Toni escape. The second suggests that the mastermind was a figure named Sabar alias Abdi, also known as “The Boss”, who could possibly be a top fugitive; it makes no mention of KMI’s existence. If Fadly’s version is correct, the Medan group fits with the pattern of small groups undertaking violent attacks. If the Lampung men are right, the line between organised and individual jihad becomes much more blurred.

A. FADLY’S VERSION

According to Fadly, he and about a dozen other Tanjung Gusta prisoners swore an oath of loyalty (bai’at) to Toni Togar as KMI amir in 2005. Toni, a 1990 graduate of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, Indonesia, was an experienced JI member. He had taken part in one of JI’s earliest bombing attempts in May 2000 in Medan and had been the field coordinator there for the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000. The left-over explosives from that attack were stored at his house, and his desire to get rid of them after the 2002 Bali bombings led directly to the August 2003 Marriott hotel bombing in Jakarta.68 The Lippo heist in May 2003, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence, was designed to raise funds for the Marriott operation.69

Toni remained loyal to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and when he set up KMI, he told the members that it was affiliated with JI, according to Fadly.70 By 2010, it had about 25 members, with the former inmates still constituting the core but with others recruited by friends on the outside. Fadly suggests a territorial structure, not unlike JI, with Toni Togar in command, first from Tanjung Gusta, then from Pematang Siantar prison, also in North Sumatra, where he was moved in early 2010. According to Fadly, there were KMI groups in North Sumatra, Aceh, Riau and Java, some of them run by former inmates.71 He mentions “The Boss” only as a member of the group in Binjai, a town just north of Medan. Other key figures were Taufik Hidayat, in charge of KMI in Belawan, Medan’s port area, and Khairul Ghazali, a writer and publisher of Islamic books who had spent years in Malaysia and ran the group in Tanjung Balai, some 200km south of Medan.72 According to Fadly, there were also KMI groups in Titi Kuning, Medan, led by two of the released Lippo bombers, and Hamparan Perak, about 15km outside the city, led by Marwan alias Wak Geng.73

From the beginning, Toni had stressed to his members that the three key elements for jihad were people, guns and money, and they were exhorted to produce all three.74 Fadly portrays himself and Taufik Hidayat, later killed by police, as Toni’s key subordinates. Taufik Hidayat, in his mid-twenties, was a budding businessman who owned a

over explosives. Noordin decided it would be better to think of a way to use them and from there began plans for an operation that became the first Marriott hotel bombing. 69 It has never been clear whether any of the proceeds from the robbery of the Lippo Bank were actually used in the bombing because Noordin obtained more than sufficient funds from al-Qaeda, through senior JI member Hambali.

70 Interrogation deposition of Fadly Sadama, 26 October 2010.
71 Fadly told his interrogators that the Aceh members included Ardiyan, Manyak, Zainal and Halim, and that KMI was represented in central Java by Purwadi, once head of JI’s subregional unit (wakalah) in Pekanbaru, Riau, who had taken part in the Lippo bank robbery in 2003. He was released after serving less than two thirds of a thirteen-year sentence.
72 Ties to Malaysia ran not only through Ghazali but also through Fadly Sadama and Toni Togar himself, who had worked with some of JI’s old Mantiqi I on the Christmas Eve bombings. It may not be a coincidence that the name he chose, Kumpulan Mujahidin Indonesia, makes it seem like a twin of the JI affiliate founded in Malaysia in 2000, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia. 73 The two were Bima Ari Suyanto, sentenced to four years in prison, and Muhammad Aryo, sentenced to thirteen years. He must have been released only shortly before the Aceh training camp began.
74 Interrogation deposition of Fadly Sadama, op. cit.

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67 Fadly first met Toni in Pekanbaru, Riau, in 2000 when both were already involved in JI, and later joined him in the Lippo robbery. He was tried and sentenced to seven years, but was released in August 2007 after serving slightly more than four. Shortly after he was released, he married the daughter of a DI leader Imbalo Hasibuan, also arrested for the Lippo robbery. Fadly was re-arrested in July 2009 for providing the gun used in a May 2009 robbery of a bank in Bireuen, Aceh. He got a short sentence and was released in July 2010. Information he gave the police about the May 2009 robbery proved to be false when he claimed he had no idea how the gun he gave the perpetrators was going to be used.
68 See Crisis Group Report, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Toni contacted Noordin Top in December 2002 and told him he was going to dispose of the left-
small pond for fish cultivation. It is not clear how he came to know Toni Togar, but whatever his background, it is clear he knew how to use guns because he later gave firearms training to KMI recruits. Fadly claims he met Taufik in 2006, on one of the latter’s regular visits to see Toni in prison, and that later, after Fadly had been released, Taufik financed a weapons-buying trip to the Thai-Malaysian border at Toni’s instructions.75

According to Fadly, Toni Togar organised the robbery of the CIMB bank in Medan from Pematang Siantar prison. In mid-July 2010, just ten days after he was released from a second brief stretch in prison, Fadly went to visit Toni in prison. Toni told him that he wanted to get out, and there were two ways to do this: either by kidnapping the head of the prison and negotiating an exchange, or assaulting the prison to make possible an escape.76 Either way, they needed money, hence the idea for a bank robbery. Taufik’s men would take care of the operation, but Toni asked Fadly, by this time an experienced robber, to make sure everything was in order.

Fadly accordingly called Taufik, and they met one evening at the fish pond. Also present was Ridwan alias Iwan Cina, a Chinese businessman and recent convert to Islam who reportedly provided financing for the group; he remains at large. Fadly listened to Taufik’s action plan for the robbery, gave a few tips, then left. He then gave a progress report to Toni by telephone.

Fadly and Taufik had about five more telephone conversations before they met again, two weeks before the robbery. By this time Taufik and his men had done a survey of the CIMB bank and produced a rough sketch. Fadly went through a checklist of everything one needs for a successful bank robbery, including division of labour, lookouts, an escape route and a post-operation safehouse. When the meeting was over he called Toni and updated him on developments.

Fadly did not take part in the robbery but saw it reported on television and immediately called Toni Togar to tell him the good news. Of the Rp.340 million (about $34,000) stolen, the robbers reserved 20 per cent or Rp.72,000,000 (about $7,200) for jihad operations, including the purchase of weapons and assistance to the families of jihadis detained or killed. Each robber received Rp.10 million ($1,000), with the supporting cast getting less. Fadly got Rp.5 million ($500); Toni Togar and Khairul Ghazali, head of KMI’s Tanjung Balai branch, each received Rp.2 million ($200). Three days after the robbery, Fadly, on Toni’s instructions, left for the Malaysian-Thai border with RM 16,000 (a little over $5,000) from the proceeds of the robbery to buy arms from a gun dealer there.77 He was arrested in Malaysia in mid-October.

A different version of events comes from the Lampung participants in the robbery. Fadly says the KMI had a branch in Lampung, and the participants were its members. The Lampung testimonies make no mention of KMI and suggest their main contacts in Medan were not Toni Togar and Fadly Sadama but “the Boss” and Alex alias Cecep.

B. THE LAMPU NG GROUP AND ITS JI CONNECTIONS

The Lampung group was led by a former JI member and Mindanao veteran, Qomaruddin alias Mustaqim, who rejected mainstream JI’s withdrawal from active jihad.78

By the time he became involved in the Aceh camp, Mustaqim had drawn a small group of jihadis around him. Some came to him through family ties. One man, Iqbal, had become a committed jihadi through attending religious study sessions, reading magazines and listening to radical radio programs. When he learned from friends that Mustaqim was one of the prominent extremists in the area, he sought him out. He had been a part of Mustaqim’s circle since sometime in 2008.79

Around November 2009, Mustaqim ran into another radical ustad, Beben Choirul Banen alias Rizal, at a JI-affiliated

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75 Interrogation of Fadly Sadama, op. cit. The robbers were caught and the group exposed before the attack could take place, but it is worth flagging Toni’s plans, because there is high importance attached in jihadi literature to rescuing detained comrades from the hands of thaghtut, and discussions periodically have taken place about trying to do so. The only convicted terrorist to escape from an Indonesian prison is Jasmin bin Kasau, sentenced to twenty years for his role in the 2004 bombing of a cafe in Paloppo, Sulawesi. In September 2007 he found a way out of Gunungsari prison in Makassar on his own, without any violence involved.

76 Ibid.

77 He contacted a dealer named Muchtar on the Thai side of a river dividing the Malaysian state of Kelantan and the Thai province of Narathiwat. This is the same area where the Acehnese rebel group GAM bought arms in 2001. See Crisis Group Briefing, Illicit Arms in Indonesia, op. cit.

78 He had gone to Mindanao as a JI cadet in 1998, studied for two years, became an instructor for another two and stayed on to fight with the MILF. He returned to Solo in 2004 and was almost immediately arrested. After four months in detention without charge, he was released. After a few years of preaching and teaching both in Solo and Lampung, he went to work in 2009 for a few months at Kafayeh Cipta Media, the hardline jihadi publisher in Klaten, and it was there that he came into frequent contact with Lutfi Hadaeroh alias Ubeid, a former Noordin associate and one of the main figures behind the Aceh camp.

79 Interrogation deposition of Anton Sujarwo alias Supriyadi alias Iqbal, 2 November 2010.
mosque in Karang Anyar, South Lampung. With similar backgrounds and views, they quickly became friends. Mustaqim asked Beben to help recruit participants for the Aceh camp, and it turned out that Beben had a religious study group of his own whose members he could tap. He produced seven young men for Aceh almost immediately, and Mustaqim gave him instructions on where to send them and who to contact on arrival. In January, before leaving for Aceh, four of them swore an oath of loyalty to Mustaqim.

The connection to the Medan group came as the Lampung recruits needed a transit stop en route to Aceh. It was provided in Stabat, north of Medan at the home of Alex alias Cecep Gunawan, a KMI member, according to Fadly. Like Beben, a transplanted Sundanese, Alex had been active in JI-West Java and had gone to Poso to fight during the communal conflict there. He apparently fled in 2006 as police operations there were stepping up and settled in Stabat. He was active in MMI, then joined JAT after the 2008 split. In July 2009, he hosted a JAT taklim (religious meeting) at his house, attended by Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir. He was also close to “Boss” Sabar, who among other things was his landlord.

After sending his students to Aceh, Beben himself arrived at Alex’s house in February 2010 and stayed there while awaiting instructions from Mustaqim. While he was there, Alex introduced him to several other members of the Medan group – although the term “KMI” apparently never came up. Alex introduced Wak Geng, the head of the group in Hamparan Perak, as a fellow MMI member, but when Wak Geng later took part in the bank robbery, he did so not as MMI, JAT, JI or KMI; all that mattered was that his commander was Taufik.

On 17 February, just before the Aceh camp was broken up, Iqbal, one of the Lampung recruits, came down from the camp to see Beben and told him that he had been instructed by the Aceh camp leaders to rent a house and set up a commercial lathe operation in Biinjai, along the Medan-Aceh road. This could be used both as gun manufacture and repair shop and as a transit and service centre for recruits going to and from Aceh. He had been given Rp.50 million ($5,000) to purchase a lathe and hire the requisite personnel, but the camp was discovered on 22 February, and a wave of arrests began.

Under the circumstances, and given the difficulty of finding the machinery at a reasonable price, Beben, Iqbal and another member from the Lampung contingent named Sawal decided to go home in early April, without spending the money. On 11 April, Mustaqim was arrested with a number of other camp leaders in Medan, trying to flee.

The arrests seemed, if anything, to reinforce the Lampung group’s commitment to jihad or perhaps it gave them a sense that since they were almost certainly being sought, there was nothing to lose. Over the next few months Beben and Iqbal acquired a few guns from dealers, using the funds they had been given for the lathe. Then in June 2010, three Medan men – Alex, “the Boss” and a man who worked for the “Boss” named Hotman – showed up in Lampung, inviting the group there to take part in another military training being organised in Medan. Since none of the members were particularly gainfully employed and nothing was holding them back, they agreed to go. They also agreed to secure a few more guns for the purpose. Thus, when Alex called again in late July and said the training would begin in a few days, three men from the Lampung group – Beben, Usman and Sawal – pulled together basic supplies and went back to Medan where they almost immediately left for weapons training in the Sibolangit hills, led by “Boss” Sabar. Fourteen men took part in the training, including all those later involved in the bank robbery.

At this point, the two versions of events begin to converge.

C. THE MEDAN BANK ROBBERY

Around the beginning of August 2010, the Medan and Lampung men were alerted to plans for a major fa‘i operation. The men were divided into two teams, one for external backup, one for getting the money inside, and with a few exceptions, they did not meet. Taufik Hidayat, who was the designated field coordinator, then gave the teams firearms training at his fishpond and in a local palm oil plantation; he even took one man who had never used a gun before out on a small fishing boat and allowed him to fire once, for practice.

Under “Boss” Sabar’s direction, the inside team did a practice run with a robbery of a small Internet café about a week before the bank robbery took place. The unimpressive haul was no money and one mobile phone, but it was a success in the sense that no one was caught. On 15 August,
the whole team came together to break the fast (Ramadan had begun four days earlier).84

On 18 August, the bank robbery went off successfully as far as the group was concerned, although Taufik killed a police officer acting as guard, which was not part of the plan.

Police arrested several members of the group on 19 September but killed three in the process; the group struck back on 22 September with an attack on a police station in Hamparan Perak in which three police officers were killed. On 2 October, police pursuing the killers tracked down and shot dead Taufik Hidayat and Alex alias Cecep.

D. CONCLUSION

In Fadly Sadama’s account, responsibility rests with Toni Togar, who is conveniently in prison, and Taufik Hidayat, who is conveniently dead. The Lampung group suggests that two other men played a role that was at least as large, “Boss” Sabar, who remains at large and Alex, who was also killed. If Fadly’s version is correct, then everyone should breathe easier: the mastermind is already behind bars, and whatever larger plans he may have had after escaping have now been scuttled.

But if the Lampung version is correct, not only is at least one mastermind still at large, but it also brings the whole crime much closer to JAT, especially given Alex’s role.85 Toni Togar could still have played a role from prison; his contacts with Taufik Hidayat should be possible to document through Tanjung Gusta prison’s record of visits. He still could have formed KMI in 2005, and there are enough released men to track down and ask. But if the robbery were a more organised JAT operation than Fadly suggests, it might throw a spanner in the theory of leaving violence to small groups, while letting the larger organisations pursue community support.

Or would it? Abu Bakar Ba’asyir has always wanted it both ways. From August 2000, when he agreed to become head of MMI while he was still JI’s amir, he has had no problem working openly and clandestinely simultaneously. Moreover, unlike Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder, who ran a tight ship, Ba’asyir seems to have presided over, if not explicitly endorsed, a large number of operations – most notably the first Bali bombing – in which the central leadership structure was not involved in the decision-making. The Medan robbery may have been an example of the symbiosis noted in Section II, where a larger organisation like JAT can provide the necessary framework for the violent actions of a smaller group while at the same time trying to ensure plausible deniability for itself.

The lines between jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah are less clear in Medan than in the other two cases. But one thing is clear: those involved in the robbery, whether operating under Toni Togar’s direction or “Boss” Sabar’s, were up on the latest ideological developments, because a copy of Abu Jandal’s book on ightiyalat was circulating among the members.86

84 The team included Taufik Hidayat, the leader, killed on 2 October; Wak Geng, arrested on 19 September; Udin; Dani alias Bekam, killed on 19 September; Rahmad alias Abang Pendek, killed on 3 October; Pohan; Suriadi; Jaja Miharja Fadillah alias Syafizal; Aldian Rojak alias Ajo, killed on 19 september; Agus Sunoto alias Gaplek; Alex alias Cecep Gunawan, killed on 2 October; Zulkarnaen Purba, killed on 2 October; Abdul Gani Siregar, arrested 3 October 2010; Robin Simanjuntak alias Pautan alias Robi, arrested 3 October 2010; and Muhammad Chair, alias Butong, turned himself in, 3 October 2010.

85 Fadly, Ghazali and Alex Gunawan were reportedly preparing to launch the JAT regional branch for North Sumatra, with Alex as head of military operations. Ghazali was going to be head of the Tanjung Balai and Fadly for Belawan.

86 The book was translated into Indonesian from Arabic on the website www.ashhabulkahfi.com. (The site name is an Arabic transliteration of “occupants of the cave”, a reference to al-Qaeda). Khairul Ghazali, the publisher and long-time Malaysia resident, was the one who passed on Abu Jandal’s book to others in Tanjung Balai.
VI. PREVENTION

The emergence of small groups makes prevention harder, but at the same time, more urgent. The most critical message to the BNPT is to ensure that all prevention programs are carefully targeted at the most vulnerable communities, both in terms of location and age group. The targeting needs to be based on hard data coming in part from combing through interrogation depositions of extremists who have been arrested since the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, now more than a decade ago. In many cases, the same neighbourhoods have been producing jihadis for more than a generation. It does not mean that extremism only appears in these areas, but it does mean that if authorities cannot figure out how to change behaviour patterns in places like Pandeglang, Cileunyi and Laweyan, they are going to fail to make much of a dent in the problem nationwide. The effort needs to start on Java.

The issue has to be handled with extreme sensitivity, and here terminology is important. Many mainstream Muslim leaders are unhappy with the terms “deradicalisation” or “counter-radicalisation”, for example, because they imply that radicalism is bad – whereas radicalism in defence of the faith, as long as it does not extend to violence, is seen as positive. Scepticism about counter-terrorism efforts remains widespread: why is the government so focused on one group of criminals, who act in the name of Islam, and not on corruptors, whom many Indonesians regard as worse? The suspicion that terrorists are rounded up whenever the government needs to divert attention from other issues continues to run deep, as does the belief that while some alleged terrorists may be purely home-grown and acting on ideology, others are plants of political interests, foreign and domestic.

The BNPT has to be aware of these doubts and address them head-on, as one element in a prevention program. A Muhammadiyah official noted how quickly then vice-president Kalla convinced sceptics after the second Bali bombing that this was a home-grown affair simply by showing them the video testimonials of the suicide bombers. Use of similar material from more recently arrested suspects could be helpful as the BNPT thinks through its strategies: if communities are going to be asked to help resist extremism, they have to be convinced first that it is a problem.

A prevention program also needs to start from the correct premises. One well-intentioned initiative in Poso, Central Sulawesi, is an example of what not to do. Assistance to a group of ex-prisoners there was premised on several wrong assumptions: that economic deprivation drove radicalisation; that the ex-prisoners were unemployed; and that employing them would make a major contribution to improved security. It turned out that most of the recipients already had jobs; there was no attempt to match training with existing skills or aspirations; selection of recipients was flawed; there was no guidance on use of lump sum grants; and in-kind assistance was often low quality. Security in Poso did improve but not because of this program; it ended up being a huge waste of money.

Any prevention program will inevitably be trial-and-error, and some ideas will prove to be duds. But it is long past time for some serious brainstorming with some of the young, smart Indonesian scholars studying radical movements – and not just Islamic ones. The following suggestions could feed into that process. They are divided into several general areas: community outreach; charting ideological developments and countering extremist messages; and improved prison and post-release monitoring.

A. COMMUNITY OUTREACH

Despite the suspicion and scepticism noted above, communities that have direct experience with extremists do not like them. They do not like Islam associated with violence, they do not like people who keep to themselves and reject traditional practices, they do not want dead terrorists buried in local cemeteries, and they do not approve of firebrands preaching jihad in their local mosques. The repeated expulsion of Ustad Darwo by Klaten villagers is evidence of this antipathy, and it means these communities can be important allies – as long as prevention programs are sensitive to their concerns.

1. Identification of vulnerable areas

One of the first steps is to map out where radical discussion groups have held meetings in the past. There are several ways of approaching this – by building, by individual and by organisation. Some mosques come up repeatedly in trial documents and testimonies. For example:

- The Muhajirin Mosque in Purwosari, Solo, has long hosted a weekly taklim attended by radical notables, including many subsequently accused of terrorism such as Abu Tholut, Umar Burhanuddin and Joko Tripriyanto aka Joko Jihad.

87 Crisis Group interview, Muhammadiyah official, 6 April 2011.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
The Muhajirin Mosque in Grogol, West Java, frequently hosted Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and was known as a JAT mosque.

The Jamik Mosque in Krapyak, Klaten remains associated with the Kafayeh radical publishers and some of Noordin Top’s former associates lectured there.

The as-Sunnah Mosque in Cileunyi, Bandung, has a history of hosting radical preachers going back more than ten years.

A research team could go through the hundreds of testimonies of terrorism suspects collected over the last five years and list all the institutions that came up from more than one source as a host of regularly scheduled taklim – that is, not the occasional lecture by a radical ustad but routine weekly or monthly programs in which groups of extremists participated. It would be an incomplete list but it would be at least a starting point to choose five or ten places for pilot projects.

Working with community leaders, the government could look at a range of entry points – mosque development committees, mosque youth (remaja mesjid) programs, dakwah activities – to see how more constructive teachings could be promoted. It would also be useful to get concrete examples of unpopular preachers being evicted from local mosques to see how this was done – on whose initiative and with what rationale.

2. Kampung awareness programs

In a number of cases of arrested terrorists, neighbours reported that they kept to themselves, rarely took part in community activities or showed other unusual behaviour. Vulnerable communities need to know what to look for and who to go to with information, and women should be involved in all aspects. Women doing awareness training for other women would be far less threatening than, for example, anyone identified with the security forces. Women are also likely to have good knowledge of neighbourhood dynamics and to be concerned if there is a danger that their children are being drawn into radical networks. They also may be aware of odd activities in their own homes – some training sessions and plot discussions have taken place in homes after wives and children were supposedly asleep.

Programs aimed at adolescents would also be useful. Several repentant extremists have expressed sorrow for the shame brought on their parents because of their imprisonment. A video with some of these youth talking on camera about the impact on their families – with the necessary steps taken to protect their identity – might be worth making and showing in schools and mosque-based youth meetings.

Other countries have developed effective community outreach programs, although those in the West are mostly dealing with immigrant communities that pose a different set of problems than those faced by Indonesia. It would be worthwhile for the BNPT to examine programs in both Muslim-majority and Western countries, take elements that might be modified and adapted to an Indonesian context, and test them for acceptability in a target area.

3. Implementation of effective zakat and disaster relief programs

Many radical groups try to make their concern for the poor, oppressed and displaced a selling point. Very few of them are effective.\(^91\) Any organisation that wanted to challenge the appeal of extremist groups could start by mounting effective and incorruptible zakat (alms for the poor) programs in the target communities; the Muslim private sector might be able to play an effective role here. The keys to success would be transparent administration and visible benefits.

None of the Indonesian extremist groups have managed to put in place a system of medical clinics analogous to Hizbollah or Hamas in Lebanon and Palestine respectively, but several have dabbled in “Islamic medicine” (thibbun nabawi), based on herbal remedies, cupping (bekam) and exorcism of evil spirits (djinn). The list of terrorists who have worked as Islamic healers or dealers in herbal medicines is lengthy; it includes Syaifuddin Zuhri Jaelani, one of the masterminds of the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings. Providing effective, low-cost health care, in accordance with Islamic principles, in vulnerable communities might be one way to dent extremist appeal.

Likewise, some radical organisations try to exploit disasters like earthquakes or volcanic eruptions by raising funds or providing other forms of assistance to victims before the government can. In some cases it is little more than a public relations effort; in others, it is real. But effective disaster relief by non-radical Muslim groups would be a way of immunising some areas against jihadi inroads.

Conversely, one effective way to discredit radical groups is by demonstrating misuse of funds collected for routine activities (infaq, a monthly contribution by members); zakat; assistance to families of detainees; mosque construction; or disaster relief. Extremist leaders and their wives are no more immune than others from the temptation to rob the till for personal enrichment, and exposure of such actions can be a powerful tool against them.

\(^91\) The Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C) is an exception. It has real doctors who can deploy quickly and provide genuine assistance. It is close to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and recently joined with JAT in raising funds for a hospital in Gaza.
4. Better supervision of ROHIS programs

In several areas, student Islamic organisations have been captured by hardliners. At least a year before they were arrested, the Klaten teenagers had been radicalised by directed discussions of videos and other materials in two high-school level organisations, ROHIS and CDS.

ROHIS is an extracurricular group for Muslim students under the auspices of a national network called the Inter-scholastic Students Organisations (Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah, OSIS); there are equivalents for students of other religions. During the Soeharto years, OSIS and its affiliates were used as an instrument of state control to ensure that high school students learned the state ideology, Pancasila, and toed the national political line. Today OSIS is simply the student governing body, like a high school senate, and the religious groups operated under the authority of individual schools, usually with a teacher who is assigned or volunteers to supervise them. Almost every state school and many private schools have ROHIS clubs. School administrators in some of these vulnerable areas need to be alert to who the supervisors are and what materials are being used in discussions to ensure that they are not leading students toward support for salafi jihadism.

B. Countering Extremist Ideology

Ideological developments in the Middle East can have a profound impact in Indonesia. The critique by Abu Al-Maqdisi of Abu Musab Zarqawi, as discussed, was quickly applied and transformed by Aman Abdurrahman, the main translator of al-Maqdisi into Indonesian, into a critique of Noordin Top. The lines of transmittal are not always clear, but one thing is certain: there are enough extremists with capacity in Arabic to be able to read, absorb and translate those tracts that they believe have particular relevance to Indonesia, and there is no such capacity in the counterrorism effort.92

The BNPT needs an analyst who can monitor new publications, including new postings of e-books, by these authors and understand the significance of the arguments made, in terms of debates within the jihadi intellectual community on tactics and strategy. Ideally the new agency could have a fluent Arabic speaker who could monitor some of the major al-Qaeda websites and, in cooperation with Middle Eastern counterparts, alert Indonesian colleagues to changes in salafi jihadi thinking that might affect, for example, who or what is defined as the “enemy”.

The new agency needs to understand the importance of radical book launches as a method of recruitment. Publishing “counter-narratives” or different interpretations of jihad and distributing them to Islamic boarding schools or selling them in general bookstores does not do the trick. The danger does not lie in the books themselves; it is rather in the way the ideas in books are discussed and disseminated. Book launches are public events. They are announced in advertisements in radical media, in flyers distributed at Friday prayers, and on Facebook and other social networking sites. It is at these forums that extremist ideas need to be challenged, but since they tend to preach to the converted, anyone with radically different ideas would be instantly noticed.

Radical premises have been effectively countered on websites but not by promoting “moderate” viewpoints. The most effective recent example of an argument against violence from within the radical community was “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad” that acknowledged the legitimacy of jihad but argued that the loss of support as a result of attacks meant that Indonesian mujahidin were losing the more important battle to establish an Islamic state.93 Getting clerics with in-depth knowledge of Islamic texts to engage in extremist chat forums is a technique the Saudi government has used to good effect; it might be worth undertaking more systematically here.

C. Prison and Post-release Programs

The Indonesian government recognises the problems that extremist prisoners can cause, from the recruitment of ordinary criminals, such as went on in Sukamiskin and Tanjung Gusta prisons, to the problem of recidivism by men who, once released, immediately return to former networks. Many donors are working on different aspects of the problem in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice’s Department of Corrections: computerising basic data on prisoners so that information can be easily shared across institutions and geographic areas; improving monitoring of high-risk detainees; improving prison-based intelligence gathering; improving post-release monitoring of prisoners involved in terrorism; improving training of prison administrators and raising their status in the law enforcement system more generally. All of this is useful, all of it needs to be expanded, and all of it will be at risk unless prison corruption is addressed. A few high-profile cases of warrens involved in prison-based narcotics rings have come to light, but the problem is so entrenched that it needs more systematic attention to root out corrupt officials and ensure that cleaner and more qualified people take their place.

92 For a list of translations from the Arabic available as free e-books online, see list of free ebooks on jihad at www.usudullah.co.cc/2010/08/download-ebook-jihad.html.

93 See “Refleksi Jihad Aceh”, op. cit.; also Jones, “Countering Extremism on Indonesian Internet Sites”, op. cit.
Indonesia has never had a systematic religious counselling system for extremist prisoners; its much-praised “deradicalisation” was more an effort at economic cooptation of prisoners and their families that was ad hoc, off-budget, and highly dependent on a few individuals. It was never a well thought through program. Some scholars question whether “deradicalisation”, in the sense of changing ideological commitments, ever really works. A more practical objective is “disengagement”, changing behaviour rather than mindsets, and convincing violent extremists not to return to their old ways, whatever they may still think about the validity of jihad as armed struggle. The Indonesian police have been successful with some prisoners in this respect, and the recidivism rate remains low relative to the overall number of releases. Nevertheless, an evaluation of efforts to date is probably in order before the BNPT embarks on any new program of prison or post-release economic incentives.94

Among the post-release measures that should be considered is a temporary ban on any dakwah activities by released prisoners, at least during their probationary period. Too many of those convicted of terrorism have led religious discussion programs inside prisons and immediately returned to preaching jihad upon their release. The prisoners associated with the Muhajirin Mosque in Solo are particularly notable in this regard. Enforcement of such a ban needs careful consideration, but the opportunities for these men to indoctrinate a new set of followers should be tightly restricted.

D. INTEGRATION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

Even if all of the above could be implemented, the fact remains that the lines between violent extremists, non-violent extremists and the Muslim mainstream remain very blurred, and anti-terrorism or counter-radicalisation programs cannot be designed in isolation from other programs designed to improve education, alleviate poverty, respond to natural disasters, tighten border security or improve law enforcement and the corrections system. Detachment 88 and the BNPT need to take part in discussions with other government agencies; they also need to share their knowledge of terrorist networks to challenge the widespread assumption that the terrorist problem has been solved.

Finally, the government needs to recognise that laws are not a panacea. This is not a problem that can be fixed by a new intelligence law or a strengthened anti-terrorism law. The effort has to start in communities, by reducing the receptivity to extremist messages, finding alternative activities and role models for young men in their twenties in certain targeted areas, and showing that other approaches produce concrete benefits.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 April 2011

94 As noted elsewhere, a prisoner’s decision not to re-engage in violence after release can be due to many factors other than his encounters with police in prison. See Crisis Group Report, “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, op. cit.