

DARFUR'S NEW SECURITY REALITY

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DARFUR'S NEW SECURITY REALITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Darfur conflict has changed radically in the past year and not for the better. While there are many fewer deaths than during the high period of fighting in 2003-2004, it has mutated, the parties have splintered, and the confrontations have multiplied. Violence is again increasing, access for humanitarian agencies is decreasing, international peacekeeping is not yet effective and a political settlement remains far off. The strategy the African Union (AU)/UN mediation has been following cannot cope with this new reality and needs to be revised. After a highly publicised opening ceremony in Sirte, Libya, on 27 October 2007, the new peace talks have been put on hold. The mediation should use this opportunity to reformulate the process, broadening participation and addressing all the conflict's root causes.

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a failure, too limited in scope and signatories. Those who signed – the government and a few rebel factions – have hurt the peace process. The ruling party in Khartoum, the National Congress Party (NCP), is pursuing destructive policies in Darfur, while at the same time resisting key provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the North-South war, thus triggering a crisis in that process. They are meant to ensure its survival in 2009 elections, not end the conflict, and they are jeopardising Sudan's peacemaking architecture. The NCP wants Darfur in chaos to limit the room for an opposition to emerge, while resettling key allies on cleared land and defying Security Council resolutions by integrating its Janjaweed irregulars into official security structures instead of disarming them.

Rebel DPA signatories, particularly the Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), have been responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarians, the AU mission (AMIS) and some of the violence in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Their leaders have been given government jobs and land and, as ardent supporters of the status quo and without a clearly defined role in the new negotiations, are potential spoilers. Rebel movements that did not sign have further splintered and only just begun tentative steps toward reunifying their ranks. Many have boycotted the talks and increased military action. As they divide along tribal lines, their messages become more

fragmented and less representative of constituencies they claim to speak for.

The IDP camps are increasingly violent, with residents manipulated by all sides while Khartoum also tries to force them to return to unsafe areas. Inter-Arab dissension has added new volatility to the situation on the ground. Some tribes are trying to solidify land claims before the UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) arrives. This has led to fighting with other Arab tribes, which have realised the NCP is not a reliable guarantor of their long-term interests and have started to take protection into their own hands. There is now a high risk of an Arab insurgency, as well as potential for alliances with the predominantly non-Arab rebel groups. A spillover of the conflict into Kordofan has also started.

The new realities emphasise the necessity of broadening participation in the peace talks to include the full range of actors and constituencies involved in the conflict, including its primary victims, such as women, but also Arab tribes. Incorporating broader and more representative voices can help remedy the uneven weight the process now gives the NCP and rebel factions. Core issues that drive the conflict, among them land tenure and use, including grazing rights, and the role and reform of local government and administrative structures, were not addressed in the DPA but left to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process that was supposed to follow the negotiations. They need to be on the agenda of the new negotiations if an eventual agreement is to gain the wide support the DPA has lacked.

UNAMID is unlikely to be fully operational until well into 2008, so it is important to complete the delivery of promised aid packages to AMIS quickly so that it can resume more active peacekeeping. When it is on the ground, UNAMID must build upon lessons learned from its predecessor, including to be more pro-active in protecting civilians and responding to ceasefire violations. Its leadership should also engage actively in the peace talks so as to ensure coherence between what is agreed and its capabilities. The international community must give it more support than it did AMIS, including strong responses, with sanctions as necessary, to further non-compliance by any party, as well

as to actions that obstruct the peace process or violate international humanitarian law.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the Political Negotiations

To the AU/UN Joint Mediation Support Team:

1. Return to Darfur for further consultations that bring in all constituencies on core issues such as land tenure, grazing rights, the Native Administration and cessation of hostilities, and seek to identify individuals to represent the interests of those constituencies at the peace talks, with specific attention to the representation of women.
2. Give the rebels participating in the SPLM-hosted Juba conference time to unify and create a common platform and joint negotiation strategy and to identify representatives before resuming peace talks, and encourage absent factions to take part in the Juba conference.
3. Prioritise a new ceasefire agreement when negotiations resume, including a commission inclusive of all its signatories, DPA signatories and adherents and AMIS/UNAMID, and supported as necessary by international guarantors of the peace process, which operates at two levels:
 - (a) decision-making, to oversee implementation and support actions against violators; and
 - (b) working, to monitor violations and investigate and report conclusions to the decision-making level for action.
4. Ensure that UNAMID military and political leadership participate in the negotiations so as to ensure coherence between what is agreed upon and UNAMID's mandate, capabilities, planning and concept of operations.
5. Prevent DPA signatories and adherents from becoming spoilers by including them in the negotiations and ensuring that they are appropriately represented in any future power-sharing arrangements.
6. Mobilise regional and other international partners to press the negotiating parties to make goodwill gestures to prove commitment to the talks and improve the environment for agreement, namely:
 - (a) in the case of the NCP: cease all attacks by the army and other security entities on civilians and IDP camps and arms distribution to tribal militias; appoint more neutral figures as governors of the three Darfur states; halt and reverse occupation of cleared land and post-

DPA creation of new administrative localities; support the AU/UN mediation team's efforts to conduct further consultations by allowing unhindered access in Darfur and not interfering in supervision and organisation of meetings; and cease immediately all violations and recommit to the full implementation of the "Joint Communiqué" signed with the UN on the facilitation of humanitarian activities; and

- (b) in the case of the DPA non-signatories: declare and respect an immediate cessation of hostilities and cease arms distributions to IDPs; give full cooperation and protection to humanitarian operations in their respective areas; and cooperate fully with SPLM efforts to create a common platform among the movements.

To the Governments of Chad, Libya, Egypt and Eritrea:

7. Support the AU/UN mediation team by pressing the government of Sudan and the DPA non-signatories to implement the above goodwill gestures and consult with the SPLM on how to complement, and not compete with, its efforts to produce unity among the DPA non-signatories.

On the Peacekeeping Operation

To the Government of Sudan:

8. Agree immediately to the UNAMID force make-up, including non-African troops as necessary, make appropriate land available, allow access and improvements to airstrips and grant UNAMID unrestricted access to Sudanese airspace.
9. Create a coordination structure between state security committees and UNAMID to prevent the escalation of local conflicts and promote their speedy resolution.

To AMIS/UNAMID:

10. Resume patrolling and prioritise protection of IDP camps, humanitarian assistance and key transportation routes, including by working with all parties to set up demilitarised zones around camps and humanitarian supply routes, as called for in the DPA.

To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):

11. Ensure that AMIS is reinforced as quickly as possible via the light and heavy support packages and prioritise the rapid deployment of UNAMID.
12. Recommend to all Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID) and Central African Republic/Chad (MINURCAT, EUFOR) peacekeeping missions a joint coordination and information exchange mechanism to maximise their protection of civilians and improve their capacities to deal with cross-border threats.

To the Members of the UN Security Council:

13. Apply punitive measures, including authorised sanctions, to any party obstructing the negotiations, UNAMID deployment or the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC), or violating the arms embargo or international humanitarian law.
14. Provide, together with states party to the Rome Statute of the ICC and others, full and effective support to the Court to continue its investigations and prosecutions in Darfur and increase pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the Court and turn over the two individuals for whom arrest warrants have been issued thus far.

Nairobi/Brussels, 26 November 2007

DARFUR'S NEW SECURITY REALITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed by the government of Sudan and a single rebel faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), failed to resolve the conflict, and aspects of its implementation have contributed to deteriorating security. With the majority of rebels not parties to the agreement, Minni unable to control the forces still loyal to him and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum committed to a military solution, fighting has continued. The African Union (AU) mission (AMIS) was put into the untenable position of enforcing an agreement with little support, thus weakening its already shaky presence. The NCP, bent on buying off or destroying rebel factions, contributed greatly to the growing anarchy, violence and displacement. With fighting and insecurity continuing, lasting tribal reconciliation processes through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation have not been possible.

Neither the NCP nor the rebel movements want the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process to begin as prescribed in the DPA, because both view it as a threat. The NCP fears a comprehensive process might generate unity among Darfurians and endanger its survival strategy. The rebels see the process as potentially weakening their legitimacy as movements representing the interests of Darfur.

The absence of a viable peace agreement has allowed new dimensions of conflict to emerge. First, rebel divisions and in-fighting have increased. Secondly, internal fighting over land and power has resulted in fragmentation within Arab tribes, with some groups distancing themselves from the NCP. Thirdly, there has been a convergence of interests between some Arab and rebel groups. Fourthly, there has been increased violence and insecurity in IDP camps, accompanied by an NCP strategy to empty the camps. Fifthly, the NCP has accelerated expropriation of land from its traditional owners to the benefit of both pro-NCP Arabs and non-Arabs, namely the Zaghawa associated with SLA/MM.

The regime wants to create a buffer of friendly Arab tribes along the border to isolate non-Arabs in Darfur from relatives in Chad. Darfur's deadly ethnic dynamics have spread and become intertwined with those across the

border, adding another dimension to the volatile situation, as Khartoum and N'Djamena fuel war in each other's backyard. The conflict has also spilled into the Central African Republic (CAR), and there is growing risk it will merge with the crises in Southern and Northern Kordofan.

In the midst of this, the human suffering in Darfur is unabated. Since the beginning of 2007, over 240,000 people have been newly displaced or re-displaced.¹ Kidnapping and sexual assault of women by government forces and associated militias as well as rebel groups have continued.² Humanitarian agencies, which have helped ensure the survival of over four million war-affected Darfurians, find themselves the direct target of violence. With attacks against them having risen by 150 per cent over the previous year,³ they have been forced to pull out of many areas and reduced to providing assistance via "in and out" operations in some areas, often by helicopter. Violence against them comes from all sides: government militias, non-signatory rebels, SLA/MM forces and IDPs themselves. With the proliferation of rebel movements, it is difficult for humanitarian agencies to coordinate aid delivery; because of the insecurity, nearly half a million people are inaccessible to them.⁴

In an attempt to move the various parties in Darfur toward a peaceful solution, the AU/UN presented a three-phase peace "roadmap" in June 2007, and peace talks were launched in Libya on 27 October. But the new realities make Darfur and the region at large a different and more chaotic place than when the DPA was signed. The crisis between the NCP and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) over implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) they signed in

¹ "Sudan Humanitarian Overview", UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), August 2007.

² "Eighth Periodic Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sudan", 20 August 2007. It alleges that Sudanese forces and militiamen subjected about 50 women to multiple rapes and other violence in Deribat in late December 2006. The women were raped in front of each other, beaten with sticks and forced to cook and serve food to their attackers. It also accused the Sudanese government of failing to investigate. The government has denied such atrocities were committed by its forces.

³ "UN Mission reports more attacks on aid workers in South Darfur", UN News Centre, 27 September 2007.

⁴ "Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 28", OCHA, July 2007.

2005 to end the primarily North-South war has further complicated attempts to negotiate a settlement. As Darfur's challenges change, international responses must adapt to the new situation on the ground.

The surge in violence, the proliferation of armed groups and the difficulties emerging around the talks pose enormous challenges to the peace process. This report analyses the new dynamics and recommends measures the AU/UN facilitation and national, regional and wider international actors should take to address the root causes of the conflict and find durable solutions to end the violence.

II. EVOLVING CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Previously, the main conflict axis was between the government (and its related militia) and the non-Arab tribes of Darfur but new disputes over land and power have resulted in Arab-on-Arab clashes and the seeds for potential Arab insurgencies. Arab tribes have started to create new ties with non-Arabs; some have even joined or created Arab-led rebel groups. The IDP camps, housing over two million Darfurians, are becoming increasingly violent, and IDPs are being manipulated by all parties.

A. THE RISE IN ARAB-ARAB CONFLICT

Many Arab tribes in Darfur, particularly the camel herders, feel they have been used in recent years by the NCP and, now that the prospect of a stronger peacekeeping force is real, Khartoum intends to abandon them or sell them out. In the absence of a solution that deals with their grievances, they believe they have only two choices: either continue fighting a proxy war, subjecting themselves to confrontation with the international community, or distance themselves from the NCP and engage with the international community. No matter their choice, all tribes are concerned about cementing their gains from the last years of war before the peacekeepers arrive.

These gains include wealth in the form of expropriated land, military hardware and ammunition, vehicles, and political influence. They want their claims to occupied land legitimised, either through the establishment of new localities, or by being given an independent Native Administration recognised by local laws.⁵ They also demand payment: according to a senior Janjaweed militia commander in Nyala, the Arab tribes deserve to be rewarded for all they have done in fighting the rebellion. They believe that if there is a peace deal, development and reconstruction money will be directed only toward

⁵ This could include gaining *Nizara* (chiefdom) status for themselves and *Umudiya* (sub-chiefdom) status for their Arab kin who have arrived in the last two years from West Africa (Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad). A Darfur member of the National Council said in the media that the NCP has resettled some 7,000 West African families in Darfur with immediate citizenship. These groups have strong kinship with the Northern Rizeigat of Darfur, particularly Musa Hilal's clan. Crisis Group interview, July 2007. Also relevant is the influx of 30,000-40,000 presumably Chadian Arabs in 2007. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), these are mostly Arab nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes fleeing general insecurity and armed violence directed at them. Some have said local Sudanese leaders have told them to take land formerly settled by IDPs. UNHCR has recommended Sudan recognise them as refugees on a prima facie basis and clarify land ownership issues. UNHCR briefing, 7 August 2007.

the non-Arabs in Darfur, and the nomads, particularly the camel herders, will be sidelined.

1. The Targam and the Abbala Rizeigat

The current fighting between Arab tribes is not neatly divided between those who supported the NCP's policies and those who did not. It occurs among all groups in a grab for land and power and is fuelled and worsened by Khartoum. An example is the fighting between the Targam and the *Abbala*⁶ Rizeigat, two groups that have actively supported the NCP. The small Targam tribe had been living on Fur land for 60 years and hoped to legitimise its claims through its peaceful relations with the Fur Native Administration⁷ but with the advent of the NCP counter-insurgency in 2003, it instead seized the opportunity to force the Fur out and cement its *Nizara* (chiefdom).

To this end, it joined forces with certain *Abbala* – mainly the Um Jalul, Mahriya (both sub-clans of the Northern Rizeigat) and other small Arab groups such as the Taalba and Hotiya – who were also eager for this land. Together they attacked the Fur, committing atrocities around Kas, Nyala, and east Jebel Marra and producing massive displacement. With the prospect of the arrival of a more capable international force, the Targam and *Abbala* Rizeigat started fighting each other over land in the beginning of 2007. The *Abbala* Rizeigat, already more heavily armed by the NCP, were able to inflict serious damage on the Targam, forcing many into IDP camps. By April and May 2007, the Targam were accusing the NCP of backing the *Abbala* Rizeigat actions and of failing to provide any security or legal response when the fighting started. In early 2007, some Targam were even expressing a wish to join the insurgency in Darfur.⁸

2. The Salamat and the Habaniya

Salamat militias have recently clashed with the Habaniya;⁹ more than twenty Salamat were killed during ten days of

fighting. Over the past decade, the Salamat have asked the government to give them a *Nizara* in Darfur but they have not met the criteria.¹⁰ Now they are fighting the Habaniya, possibly to acquire an administrative unit in Dar Habaniya. The Habaniya want the Salamat off the land altogether and, with the Beni Halba tribal militias (*fursan*), have destroyed their villages and wells to ensure that they cannot return. Similar fighting occurred in September and October 2006 in the areas of Muhajeria, Yasin and Labado, which are all claimed by Minni Minnawi's group as "liberated". Now the *Abbala* in general and the Salamat in particular are not welcome to stay in Dar Beni Halba and Habaniya.¹¹

3. The Beni Halba

With the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), the NCP attempted to mobilise tribes against a possible international intervention in Darfur.¹² One they singled out was the Beni Halba, one of the largest *Baggara* tribes and viewed as influential among the Arabs of South Darfur, despite a limited relationship with the *Abbala* marked by suspicion. With the post-DPA atrocities carried out by Khartoum and its allies being condemned internationally, the Beni Halba leaders opted to remain distant from the government's strategy. In June 2007, the NCP sent senior leaders to persuade the tribe to join with it.

First, they promised that oil exploration would soon start in the area and fixed flags south of the town, marking the area as containing petroleum fields. Secondly, they used scare tactics, telling crowds the internationals would consider all Arab tribes, including the Beni Halba, guilty of crimes against the non-Arabs, who would use international support to rule Darfur again. They tried to recruit for the Popular Defence Forces but met resistance from most communities. After this, they went to Um Labbasa and ordered the construction of a hospital, a further attempt to co-opt the tribes, but none of these ploys were effective.¹³

4. The impact on the Arab tribes

Given the internal fighting, it has been difficult for tribal leaders to pursue a pro-Arab agenda for Darfur, particularly

⁶ The *Abbala* is a general term that refers to Arab camel herding tribes. *Baggara* refers to Arab cattle herders. The *Abbala*, of whom the Northern Rizeigat are the largest and most significant, are most common in North Darfur; *Baggara* are more numerous in South and West Darfur. The other main distinction is that while many *Baggara* Arabs have traditional land rights, many *Abbala* do not, making them susceptible to the NCP's call to arms in 2003/2004.

⁷ The Targam live in areas along the *wadi* of Bulbul (Dalal Ankara, Timbisko and Ab-Jasou). These are part of the Fur *Hakoura*, the traditional system of land tenure and ownership in Darfur administered by the Fur *Magdumia* (the tribal administration of the Fur) of Nyala.

⁸ Crisis Group interviews, January and July 2007.

⁹ "South Darfur Authority interferes to contain conflict between Habaniya and Salamat", *Al Sahafa*, 23 August 2007.

¹⁰ The Salamat have a *Nizara* in Chad, at Am Timan, but in Sudan only an *Umudiya*. Over the past decade, they have asked the government to give them a *Nizara* in Darfur but they have not met the criteria of having at least seven *Umudiat* (plural for *Umudiya*).

¹¹ Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

¹² Military intelligence had put out a plan to counter an international force, including a division of responsibilities among tribal militias, positioning of Janjaweed camps in strategic areas and arms distribution, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

¹³ Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

one created and controlled from Khartoum.¹⁴ Trust among Arab groups has deteriorated to the point where Arab tribal reconciliation has little standing; many of the tribal reconciliation agreements – after being praised by the government and the media – have collapsed.¹⁵ The Arab Gathering,¹⁶ the secretive steering body for Arab interests in Darfur, has been unable to regulate these growing crises; tribal militias view it as less and less relevant.¹⁷ Many Arab tribal leaders would like to have political control independent of the NCP, which they believe has paid too much attention to the *Abbala*, but are discouraged by the so-called centre-leaders (*Kiyadat al Markaz*),¹⁸ so remain paralysed. However, competent Arab native leadership and paramount chiefs still exist, who, given opportunity, could productively engage in finding a sustainable solution for the conflict in Darfur.

5. The inclusion of Arab tribes in the peace process

The AU/UN mediation team has recognised the need for more inclusiveness in peace talks but must ensure the new voices can have a meaningful role. Crisis Group has long argued that inclusion of Arab tribal views, separate from the NCP, is critical but difficult, as there is no obvious representative that can ensure their buy-in. Contrary to the insistence of the rebels, the NCP does not adequately represent all Arab groups in Darfur and cannot be depended upon to find a long-term solution for co-habitation between Arab and non-Arab tribes. Similarly, the Arabs among the rebels have not mustered a large following. While it is clear that Darfur's main victims have been the non-Arab targets of NCP-sponsored violence, many Arab tribes are also suffering. Nevertheless, Arab militias and commanders responsible for atrocities must still answer for their actions, so that the victims can feel secure and justice is done.

¹⁴ Some Arab leaders remain closely affiliated with Nafie Ali Nafie's group and continue to promote the NCP's divide-and-rule agenda for personal gains, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

¹⁵ The Targam and *Abbala* have signed two failed agreements in 2007.

¹⁶ For more on the Arab Gathering, established in 1985, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°76, *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*, 25 March 2004; and N°25, *Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process*, 30 April 2007.

¹⁷ During the last three major Arab tribal fights in South Darfur – Salamat vs. Beni Halba, Tarjam vs. Rizeigat (*Abbala*) and Falata vs. Habaniya – the Arab Gathering was unable to stop the killing. Senior leaders such as General Adam Hamid, Abdallah Masar, General Safi Nur (NCP deputy chief negotiator at Abuja), Ali Mahmoud (new governor of South Darfur) and Abdel Hameed Musa Kasha have less grassroots power and influence than they once did.

¹⁸ The *Kiyadat al Markaz*, the Arab representatives in Khartoum, include presidential advisers, ministers and ex-generals.

A sustainable peace needs not only to hold the Janjaweed accountable but also to find a long-term settlement for land and power issues, including how to handle *hawakeer*¹⁹ and to reform the Native Administration to mutual satisfaction. It also needs to figure out how to disarm the Arab militias effectively, to compensate for Arab losses that are a direct result of Khartoum's manipulation and to find long-term solutions for the landless Arab tribes which have fuelled the Janjaweed. Finally, the current dynamics of violence have implications for any future ceasefire negotiations. While a ceasefire between the NCP and the Darfur rebels is a key requirement for the first round of negotiations and would bring a measure of stability, it would only deal with a part of the violence that now exists on the ground.

B. ARAB AND NON-ARAB RELATIONS

New links are growing between the Arab and non-Arab tribes, particularly between the Arabs and the Fur and Massaleit; much distrust and animosity is still directed by the Arab tribes towards the Zaghawa. The NCP has strongly resisted the attempts at alliances, and aside from the Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces (RDFF) and the splinter United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF), only limited joint action or strategy has developed between the rebel movements and the Arab groups. Since the beginning of the rebellion, countless envoys, emissaries and local initiatives have failed to create a significant alliance between Arabs and rebels. For the most part, the insurgents hope the Arab tribes will realise they have been undermined and betrayed by the NCP and at least remain neutral.

1. The Arabs and the Fur/Massaleit

Given the shift in their relationship with the NCP, particularly after passage of Resolution 1706, many Arab tribes have started to realise that their role as part of the Janjaweed and related militia has damaged the future of their communities. The Arab tribes recognise that, over the long term, their livelihoods are linked socially and economically with sedentary groups such as the Fur, who, despite the counter-insurgency, are not going to go away. Some have initiated agreements with their neighbours,

¹⁹ *Hawakeer* has been an historical land ownership system in Darfur since it was a sultanate. The Native Administration was the sole manager of the land tenure system. The parties agreed in the DPA to restore the historical land ownership rights. While the Darfur Land Commission (DLC), set up by the DPA, has started to develop a framework to handle land issues, it has been severely weakened by the SLA/MM commanders' intention to fill all its posts with people from their tribe, which has compromised its independence. If this continues, the institution will fall well short of addressing one of the most sensitive and critical parts of the conflict.

such as the deals between the Saada, Hotiya and Gimer Arabs of the Al Gardud and the Fur of Jebel Marra.²⁰ One successful agreement opened a main trade route from Jebel Marra to Nyala market.²¹

The NCP seeks to dilute these efforts. Though it has established tribal reconciliation committees in all three Darfur states, it ensures that peace deals do not jeopardise their overarching goals in the region.²² For instance, in June 2007 several Arab communities made up of both *Baggara* and *Abbala* in West Darfur²³ decided to organise a peace initiative with the Fur and Massaleit. They approached the Sultan of the Massaleit, Saad Bahar El Dien, and the acting Sultan of the Gimer, Hashem Ibrahim Hashem, as well as Fur tribal leaders in West Darfur. When, as a protocol matter, they approached Ahmed Haroun²⁴ in Khartoum seeking support for their reconciliation conference in Kereinek locality in West Darfur, Haroun – on the advice of the *Kiydat al Markaz* – spurned them as potentially pro-rebellion. Because of this, as well as continued attempts by the NCP to settle newcomers and *Abbala* in Dar Gimer, Hashem Ibrahim Hashem left Darfur and launched a new Gimer-based rebellion in Chad.²⁵

²⁰ Civil society organisations played a direct role in some cases; in others this was done by local native leaders, without the consent of the local government.

²¹ The route, which passes by Al Gardud and Kherwei, was reopened for commercial traffic in early 2006. It is guarded by the Central Contingency Force, young men from Arab tribes based in Al Gardud. The Arab communities involved (Saada, Taalba, Gimer, Hotiya and Salamat) asked the government to put in a force of their own men, to ensure it would abide by the agreement with the Fur. The government agreed but then gave command to an officer from Northern Sudan, in keeping with its policy that all security forces in Darfur (except tribal militias) are commanded by outside officers. Crisis Group interview, January 2007.

²² Crisis Group interviews, September 2006 and July 2007.

²³ Specifically, they were from the Awlad Zaid, Shekerat, Um Jaloul, Awlad Rashed and Mahariya groups, grassroots members of the Native Administration who had started to resent their top leaders as closely associated with the Janjaweed and the NCP, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

²⁴ Ahmed Haroun, state minister in the humanitarian affairs ministry and indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and violations of human rights, is believed to be one of the senior NCP leaders in charge of the Darfur file. See Section IV.B below.

²⁵ Hashem Ibrahim left for Chad in early August 2007 after having argued with Nafie Ali Nafie over matters related to his Sultanate, taking with him more than 1,000 young men to undergo military training. Although their primary aim is to liberate the Kulbus area (the location of the Sultanate of the Gimer) from unlawful Arab settlements, they also seek to resist the central government in Khartoum. Crisis Group interview, Gimer leader, Khartoum, September 2007.

The unhappiness of most *Baggara*,²⁶ and even some *Abbala* (excluding those closely affiliated to Musa Hilal and other senior Janjaweed commanders) has led to greater communication between them and the Fur rebel groups. There are also signs of political coordination between the Fur and Arabs in Seref Umra; when the local government nominated a Tama²⁷ for a post in the legislative council of the locality, the Fur and *Abbala* members coordinated their response and jointly boycotted.

2. The Arabs and the Zaghawa

While the Arab and Fur/Massaleit tribes have created a small space locally for reconciliation, the relationship between Arabs and Zaghawa is much more contentious. There is great resentment in Darfur against the Zaghawa, whom some consider driven to gain land and power. Many believe the *Abbala* and other Arabs who do not have land will continue fighting the Zaghawa over it for years. These sentiments are the product of a highly concerted government propaganda initiative to instil fear of the Zaghawa and their so-called plan for a “greater Zaghawa state”.

By playing on these fears, the NCP has isolated the Zaghawa – some of whom have acted in ways which have fed the suspicions – from both Arab and other non-Arab tribes and kept Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa elements of the rebellion distrustful of each other. This has been an effective counter-insurgency technique, as the Zaghawa elements of the rebellion have been the best funded and supported, including from President Deby of Chad, a fellow Zaghawa. The Zaghawa communities are mostly in North Darfur, which has been hit hardest by drought and desertification, so have come into conflict with other tribes as they have moved south seeking usable land.

Similarly, the expropriation of land over the past three decades by the Zaghawa in the areas of Kalamando, Muhajeriya, Yasin and Labado has made people suspicious. The fact that Minni Minawi, a Zaghawa, signed the DPA, led many Fur to believe that the Zaghawa had betrayed their cause.²⁸ In the past several years, Zaghawa communities which have settled in the areas of Sag Alnaam, Shangil Tobayi, Muhajirya, Yasin and Labado

²⁶ *Baggara* here refers not only to Arab tribes that have homelands (*Dars*), such Beni Halba, Taaisha and the Southern Rizeigat, but also smaller tribes which are also cattle breeders but have no *Dar* and reside in communities in West and South Darfur such as the Gimer of Katela and the Saada, Hotiya and Salamat around Jebel Marra.

²⁷ The Tama are a non-Arab tribe in Chad and Darfur which fought on the side of the government early in the conflict. Their kingdom/sultanate is historically situated in Guereda, eastern Chad.

²⁸ Nevertheless, some of the main non-signatory rebellion movements are also Zaghawa-led.

have demanded the right to a full Native Administration – and therefore ownership – regardless of the rights of the historical land owners, such as Birgid, Dajo, Fur and Mahalia. Now that Minni is part of the government, the NCP has created localities for him and affiliated senior politicians in the same way it has elsewhere created localities for Arab tribes which have occupied land historically owned by the Fur and others. Minni's forces have removed most of the indigenous Native Administration of these areas by force.²⁹

3. Possible outcomes

Without a settlement, there will be increasing opportunities for disillusioned Arabs to join with rebel groups. For the moment, there is no over-arching Arab/non-Arab alliance: the cases are isolated, centred more on avenging perceived local injustices than on a common Darfur-wide vision. The NCP will attempt to break these initiatives, either militarily or by buying them off, but without a viable long-term alternative to respond to Arab dissatisfaction, it will not be able to prevent coalitions from forming.

It is apparent on the ground that there are real possibilities for eventually reconciling Arab groups with the Fur and Massaleit tribes, though it is more complicated with the Zaghawa, particularly those of Minni, who have made political and land gains they will not want to relinquish. They remain heavily armed and are likely to continue to resist disarmament and integration. They know other tribes will fight them to regain land rights the moment they are weakened.³⁰ A comprehensive settlement must deal with land issues as well as disarmament.

C. RISING VIOLENCE IN THE IDP CAMPS

1. Situation in the camps

Since the DPA signature, more than half a million people have been displaced, bringing total IDPs to nearly 2.2 million. For the first time since 2004, the humanitarian community reports a rise in malnutrition rates, with those in North Darfur and elsewhere higher than emergency levels.³¹ The report card on “bureaucratic impediments” is mixed, following the communiqué Khartoum and the UN signed in March 2007.³² Fighting between rebel groups,

the government and government-related forces continues to cause displacement.³³ Camps are overcrowded, and agencies overstretched and under attack.³⁴

The camps reflect the insecurity at large and are home to a disempowered, disenfranchised, overcrowded community with little hope. In past peace efforts, the mediation considered that IDPs were represented by the rebels and the Arabs by the government but the rebel groups, the NCP and DPA signatories are all now making the camps a new conflict theatre, awash with weapons and banditry.³⁵ Though he denied the camps were becoming rebel bases, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes said, “[t]he politicisation and militarisation on the ground is a fact of life you can't ignore”.³⁶ On 17 November, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson admitted that fresh arms are pouring into the IDP camps in Darfur and that the IDP leaders are becoming more organised to exert pressure and raise political demands, and expressed concern that they might take extreme positions.³⁷

In camps around El Fasher, local authorities are selecting, arming and training groups. Allegedly, they are working with Minni's forces in the area, as many in the El Fasher camps are his sympathisers.³⁸ In the camps around Zalingei, for example, there has been severe insecurity. Over the

/UN-GOScommuniqué-28Mar.pdf. While the communiqué was widely welcomed as an important step forward in relations between the government and the humanitarian community, it merely reiterated the July 2004 Joint Communiqué with the UN (www.unmis.org/English/documents/JC.pdf), which created the Joint Implementation Mechanism and was systematically violated by the government.

³³ For example, the June government offensive against SLA/Abdel Wahid in West Darfur caused daily displacement around the Zalingei camps. Attacks on civilians by the JEM Peace Wing and other militias pushed thousands of IDPs toward Al Salam and Um Dhukum camps in South Darfur. Confidential reports, July 2007.

³⁴ By the end of June 2007, nearly all IDP camps near Darfur's three state capitals were full, “Humanitarian Profile”, op. cit.

³⁵ A rebel faction representative reported that IDPs in a camp near Zalingei have been killed for not accepting Abdel Wahid's leadership, and that in Kalma camp those who did not support him were accused of being government agents. It was unclear whether these actions were taken by supporters under Abdel Wahid's orders or by others attempting to create a climate of fear. Crisis Group interview, August 2007.

³⁶ “UN official warns of militarised Darfur camps”, Reuters, 30 August 2007.

³⁷ “Eliasson: No return from the peace agreement, failure would be a disaster”, *Al Hayat*, 18 November 2007. Eliasson argued that in the absence of a political settlement and with militarisation of IDPs, the conflict could escalate to include the displaced, with fighting inside their camps. AMIS peacekeepers must re-prioritise the protection of IDPs and give attention to arms control in the camps.

³⁸ Crisis Group interview, September 2007.

²⁹ Some Zaghawa closely affiliated to Minni Minnawi refer to these localities as “Greater Kornoi”, which angers many indigenous tribes of the area and their neighbours, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

³⁰ Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

³¹ “Humanitarian Profile”, op. cit.

³² “Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur”, March 2007, at www.unmis.org/English/2007Docs

past six months, twenty assassinations or attempted assassinations (pitting suspected rebel sympathisers against suspected government sympathisers) were reported; an IDP suspected of working for the national security agency was shot; guards have been fired at; the deputy sheikh was killed; and camp operations were suspended because of demonstrations and rumours of kidnappings of international aid workers.³⁹

Kalma camp, in South Darfur, is considered one of the most volatile and politicised, with high levels of murders, assassinations and vigilante justice.⁴⁰ In mid-August, armed men seized weapons from a police post near Al Salam camp, killing a policeman, and took them to Kalma. The government mobilised Border Guards and Central Contingency units to raid the camp, searching for the weapons and rebels. They found the weapons and arrested twenty people, whom they called common criminals, not rebels.⁴¹ In the run-up to the talks in Libya, violence around the camps increased, with three government soldiers reportedly killed at Hamadiya camp near Zalingei and an alleged government attack on Kalma camp.⁴²

2. NCP attempts to clear out the camps

The government is aware that the IDPs' plight galvanises world opinion, keeping Darfur in the spotlight; part of its strategy has been to push IDPs to leave the camps.⁴³ In the past several months it has also severely ratcheted up pressure on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the UN to empty the camps, accusing them of not doing enough to encourage returns and insinuating they are prolonging the crisis for ulterior motives.⁴⁴

The government has proposed locations for 25 "model villages" as areas of return, some where there had been no habitation. When President Bashir visited Darfur in July 2007, a key message was to push for emptying the camps.⁴⁵ He promised his state governors development money and instructed them to start an IDP return program, in light of

the "peaceful" conditions in the areas of return. Upon his departure, Sudanese media reported returns of thousands of IDPs, in blatant contradiction of the facts on the ground.

Government efforts have failed, due to the complete mistrust of the IDPs, many of whom have said they will not go home until those they do trust say it is time. This can mean internationals, but also leaders such as Abdel Wahid, who still commands great popularity among Fur IDPs, despite a less than stellar political record. Though he has been out of Darfur, he has come to symbolise popular demands; many IDPs trust only him to represent them, a fact he has capitalised upon with the international community in regard to the negotiations. In addition, most areas of return are unsafe, and many are currently held by fighting Arab tribes or are under siege from various armed elements. Despite government promises, there is also little to return to. Nevertheless government troops have allegedly been forcing IDPs out of a camp near Nyala.⁴⁶

The emergence of intra-Arab fighting highlights two things. First, all the conflict's root causes – including such systemic ones as land, grazing rights and local governance – must be dealt with for peace to hold.⁴⁷ Secondly, all involved in these conflicts, including Arab tribes, must be represented at some level in the peace talks. With Arab tribal fragmentation and politicisation of IDP communities, an agreement only between rebels and the NCP is unlikely to resolve the conflict. In addition, given their increasingly precarious situation, the UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping force (UNAMID) will need to deploy to the areas around IDP camps. It should aim to limit and eventually reverse the militarisation of those camps and protect humanitarian access routes.

³⁹ Crisis Group interviews, August 2007.

⁴⁰ NGO meeting report made available to Crisis Group, South Darfur, August 2007.

⁴¹ At the same time there has not been a single raid on weapons in the heavily-armed Falluja neighbourhood of Nyala.

⁴² "Sudan to 'halt fire' on talks day", Al Jazeera, 22 October 2007.

⁴³ In 2005, for example, the government attempted to get residents of Kalma and other camps to return home, including by paying the tribal leaders, offering food and transport, and force. "Situation Report", UNMIS, 26 April 2005; "Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, March 2005-March 2006", Sudanese Organisation Against Torture (SOAT).

⁴⁴ Crisis Group interviews, August-September 2007. The desire for financial gain is one allegation.

⁴⁵ "Who wins in the political game?", *Al Ayyam*, 20 August 2007.

⁴⁶ "Sudan defends expulsion of UN official", Associated Press, 9 November 2007.

⁴⁷ The root causes of the Darfur conflict can be divided into two categories. The first are the political and economic disputes which triggered the current rebellion. These include the economic and political marginalisation of Darfur from the centre, similar to other peripheral areas of the country, as well as more recent political manipulation of the region by the NCP for partisan purposes. The Abuja process attempted unsuccessfully to resolve this set of issues. The second, more specifically local, are principally related to land ownership, grazing rights and water, as well as the traditional structures of governance which monitored these systems. As desertification and access to small arms increased in Darfur, disputes over these escalated, with fault lines often emerging between land-owning tribes and those without land and between pastoralist and farming communities. In response to the 2003 rebellion, the NCP manipulated these fault lines, mobilising predominantly Arab tribes without traditional land rights to join its war against the civilian populations of non-Arab tribes thought to be supporting the rebellion.

III. THE CALCULATIONS OF THE PARTIES

For the NCP, as well as for all the aspirants to power, Darfur has become a critical staging ground for the 2009 national elections.⁴⁸ After years of trying to produce Arab control in Darfur, the NCP's current strategy is to keep it divided, stimulating the conflict in an attempt either to delay elections it fears it cannot win or to make it impossible for anyone else to win. It has not abandoned its military strategy but rather has regrouped the Janjaweed into its security structures and recently ordered reopening of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) military training camps throughout the country.⁴⁹ At the same time, it is using the chaos in Darfur as cover for creating new localities whose political representation it can manipulate.

Minni Minawi and the others who signed the DPA and joined the government are hoping to hold their gains. The rebel non-signatories have found it difficult to unite and are plagued by divisions, some instigated by the NCP, some the result of tribal rivalry and mistrust. In the lead-up to the peace talks, which many boycotted, they increased their military activity and hardened their positions.

A. THE NCP STRATEGY

1. Electoral calculations

Since coming to power, the NCP has consistently sought to re-structure Darfur in favour of Arab tribes. In 1994, it split Darfur from one state into three, dividing the Fur, its largest tribe, between them, and annexing the northern part to Northern State. It thus created a border between Libya and Northern State, diverting all land trade between Sudan and Libya to Dongola (in Nile State) instead of the old customs centre of Millet (in North Darfur) and depriving Darfur of annual revenue worth millions of dollars. Days before the DPA was signed in May 2006, Bashir ordered a return to the 1956 Darfur borders, responding to one of the rebel demands incorporated in

the text.⁵⁰ Since the mid-1980s, Khartoum policies have fuelled local conflict between Arab tribes and the Fur (1986-1989), the Massaleit (1996-1998) and the Zaghawa (1999-2001). The self-defence militias that sprung up formed the initial backbone of the SLA.⁵¹

The NCP's current calculation is that the longer Darfur remains unstable, the greater the chance the elections and the subsequent southern referendum on independence will be postponed, and it can stay in power. At the same time, it is hedging its bets, seeking to prevent emergence of a unified opposition in Darfur so that it can anticipate minimal losses there if national elections are held by 2009.⁵² While the NCP has not been able to defeat the rebel groups militarily, it has disempowered and weakened non-Arabs, particularly the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa, and divided communities, thus making reunification among Darfurians too difficult to achieve before elections. Resolution 1706 and the possible arrival of a stronger international force in Darfur, have forced it to accelerate this strategy in 2007.

The NCP pursues these objectives through various means. First, it uses local security apparatuses to contain rebel groups and affiliated tribes. To facilitate this, it ensures that the three Darfur states' state security committees are directed by non-Darfur officers directly linked to Khartoum. Secondly, it uses co-option and corruption to manipulate the states through the governors and other state power centres and the Native Administration, so as to gain electoral support, including by legalising new administrative boundaries to create and accommodate favourable demographic shifts. Thirdly, it contributes to the fragmentation of Darfur's social fabric, including that of the Arab tribes, by instigating then not responding to inter-tribal conflicts and by promising money and government positions to members of rebel groups.

⁴⁸ The elections were originally due in 2008. The SPLM cited dissatisfaction with NCP preparations (not releasing funds, eliminating religion and ethnicity questions) for the twice postponed national census, now scheduled for February 2008, as a reason why it suspended its participation in the Government of National Unity. For more on NCP, SPLM and national opposition party positioning in Darfur in regard to the elections, see Crisis Group Report, *Revitalising the Peace Process*, op. cit.

⁴⁹ In his speech at Wad Medani celebrating the eighteenth anniversary of the PDF, President Bashir ordered its command to reopen military training facilities and start recruitment and training.

⁵⁰ Darfur Peace Agreement, May 2006, Art. 6, para. 61, but Darfur continues to be divided into three states.

⁵¹ For more background, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°32, *Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace*, 6 October 2005.

⁵² In June 2007, a senior NCP delegation visited South Darfur to assess party support. It reported that it would not be enough – even with Arab allies – to win the election. Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, May 2007. While there is some NCP support in North and West Darfur, this appears due mostly to profits made by tribal leaders. Overall responsibility for party support lies with Mohamed Yousif Kiber, North Darfur governor, head of the *Shura* council of the Islamic Movement and of the NCP in his state. He is from the Berti tribe, the largest in North Darfur, which had historically supported the Umma party of Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, during General Ibrahim Suleiman's governorship, (2001-2003), many Berti shifted to the regime; this trend increased under Kiber. Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

Fourthly, it continues to hinder deployment of a more powerful international force.

By rejecting Resolution 1706 and dragging out negotiations over UNAMID, the NCP has gained a critical year in which to implement its strategy. Finally, it has continued to exert influence in Chad, via support to rebel groups, in an attempt to mitigate potentially hostile Chadian government policies.

2. Use of the local security apparatus

The NCP relies heavily on the military might of the *Abbala* militias (including the Janjaweed), their foreign tribal relations and ex-convicts (the *Taaebeen*, “penitents”).⁵³ These partnerships have endured because of mutual interest; the *Abbala* used the crisis in Darfur to gain land and regional power. Many recruits were tempted by money and weapons and were glad to have their grievances over access to usable land acknowledged. The Arab tribe most associated with the Janjaweed counter-insurgency is the *Abbala* Northern Rizeigat, particularly the Mahamid branch of Musa Hilal.

Smaller Arab tribes such as the Taalba, Hotiya, Al Rawas, Bahadi, Saada and part of the Salamat from around Jebel Marra, as well as the Misserya of Neteiga and the Fallata, also have been involved in the Janjaweed incursions.⁵⁴ The actions and atrocities of these groups have been both steered and covered up by the NCP, which has supported the militias despite national and international criticism. It can afford to lose the support of virtually all Darfur tribes except these *Abbala*, who are vital to its military strategy.

Though several UN Security Council resolutions have demanded Janjaweed disarmament, and the NCP has committed to it on multiple occasions, it has made no attempt to alter its use of the proxy militias.⁵⁵ To prevent disarmament while avoiding accountability, it maintains that the Janjaweed are little more than thugs and thieves, whom it is not capable of disarming. In response to international pressure, it has instead integrated much of the Janjaweed into various official organs, giving them more advanced training and better weapons, including

vehicle-mounted heavy machine-guns and mortars.⁵⁶ In North Darfur they are now predominantly the Border Guards;⁵⁷ in West Darfur they are also the Popular Defence Forces;⁵⁸ in South Darfur they are the Nomadic Transhumance Routes Police (*Al Shurta al Zaeina*) of the Fallata and other *Baggara* tribes.⁵⁹ Other tribal militias have been incorporated into the Central Contingency Forces, created from the *Abbala* and some *Baggara* tribes.⁶⁰

Janjaweed who have not been integrated (and have not turned against the NCP) still closely coordinate with the official security structures. For example, the Border Guards are commanded by Brigadier General Al-Hadi Adam Hamid, who also directs the well-known Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, as well as, until his death, Mohamed Hadai Omer (“Dekersho”).⁶¹ Both Musa Hilal and Dekersho’s groups are organised, highly trained, well-supplied with weapons, cars and money and operate under the command of top NCP policy-makers in Khartoum.⁶² The groups are divided within operational sectors in Darfur.⁶³ The

⁵⁶ Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁵⁷ The Border Guards are a part of the army (SAF) and previously known as the Border Guard Intelligence Unit.

⁵⁸ The Popular Defence Forces (PDF) is an official part of the defence ministry and is present throughout Sudan.

⁵⁹ The Nomadic Transhumance Routes Police are under the national police and funded through the interior ministry’s police budget, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁶⁰ The Central Contingency Forces operate as gendarmes, under interior ministry control, and, unlike the locally recruited Nomadic Transhumance Routes Police, who operate solely along nomadic routes, they can be deployed throughout Darfur.

⁶¹ Over the past year, tensions rose between Musa Hilal and Dekersho, until Dekersho was assassinated and splits emerged within the groups. Dekersho had concluded ethnic cleansing should stop and submitted a document to the NCP stating that Darfurians should unify and the Arabs cooperate in any process that could lead to peaceful coexistence. When the NCP rejected this, he considered joining the rebel National Redemption Front (NRF). Suspicion for his death in April 2007 fell on Musa Hilal. A police investigation in El Fasher cleared Hilal, adding that as tension between the groups had been defused, it no longer threatened “the situation” in Darfur. Dekersho’s manifesto, while possibly motivated by political self-interest, is something the AU/UN mediation should explore.

⁶² Experts suggest that presidential adviser Nafie Ali Nafie, who was officially put in charge of the Darfur file in September 2007, is the top NCP policy-maker regarding Darfur proxy forces such as the Janjaweed/Border Guards. This view is reinforced by incidents such as that of December 2006, when the then-Border Guard Intelligence Unit stormed El Fasher. Governor Kiber and North Darfur security command were unable to stop them until Nafie arrived in El Fasher. He is also deputy NCP chairman, head of party organisational affairs and the party’s internal intelligence apparatus and former head of national security and intelligence.

⁶³ Musa Hilal commands the *Jamous* (“buffalo bull”) brigade, mainly from the Um-Jallul (*Mahameed*) clan of Northern

⁵³ *Taaebeen* is the name given to those who, starting in late 2003, agreed to support the NCP in Darfur, including by participating in the Janjaweed, in exchange for release from prison. All had been convicted of serious crimes such as murder and armed assault and are primarily Arabs, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁵⁴ Several large *Baggara* tribes such as Beni Halba, Taaisha and Southern Rizeigat have largely remained neutral. The Habaniya tried to remain neutral but experienced two major rebel attacks early in the crisis; two leaders were killed in 2003-2004.

⁵⁵ The NCP has committed to disarm and neutralise Janjaweed militias in six agreements including the DPA.

senior commanders take orders from Khartoum, through security interlocutors within the three states, enjoy considerable autonomy from the official security apparatus and are not accountable to local or regional authority, such as the police, governor, or state security committee.

The NCP deploys all these forces to assist and aid the army (the SAF). For example, during clashes in July and August 2007 between the SLA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Mahalia, in and around Adila and parts of Southern Kordofan, the heavily-armed Border Guards were ordered to move from South and West Darfur to fight with the Mahalia against the rebels. Some units have also been sent to assist the army in protecting routes to the petroleum areas of Sharief and the oil pipeline in Southern Kordofan.

3. Arms dealing

As part of its military strategy, the NCP has become the primary arms dealer in Darfur. The breakdown of trust between tribes means that tribal leaders seek weapons from wherever they can to protect their people, villages and belongings. The NCP has been stimulating these demands, using the pretext of “popular defence” and local security to create militias and allies. Its allies have access to arms; those who remain unaffiliated or show support to the rebels are left vulnerable to attacks. According to a Mahameed tribal leader whose people received government arms in May 2007, “through their actions, they want to ensure that our people remain their party supporters and do not disperse in other directions”.⁶⁴

While the NCP may distribute weapons according to a plan, the small arms market is extremely fluid, and it has difficulties controlling them once they are given out. In the absence of rule of law and economic activity, and with high unemployment, displacement and poverty, banditry is an easy option for improving livelihoods and social status. Weapons proliferation is generating near anarchic conditions outside the main cities and towns, as exemplified by a new proverb repeated by young Darfurians: “*Klash fi alyad wala alfe wazefa*” (“a Kalashnikov gun in the

Rizeigat, and centred in Mastariha, Kabkabiya and surrounding areas. Dekersho commanded a brigade from the Mahariyah clan of the Northern Rizeigat, centred around Um-Bildesso. Within Dekersho's brigade are also a few *Baggara* militia from the Hotiya, Targam, Taalba and Salamat who live in and around the Jebel Marra plateau.

⁶⁴ In May 2007, rich *Abbala* from the Mahameed (a Northern Rizeigat sub-clan) in the Awlad Junub area, on the border between North and West Darfur, complained in Khartoum to Ahmed Haroun that they have not received any government arms. They were given 100 “tokens”, which could be redeemed for 100 guns on their return to Darfur and money, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

hand is better than 1,000 paid jobs”).⁶⁵ Humanitarians are often targeted. In July 2007, for example, a group of Targem and Saada in camouflage attacked several NGO convoys around Bulbul, severely beating the drivers and warning the NGOs to stop delivering aid to the SLA-controlled Eastern Jebel Marra area, but instead to assist their communities.⁶⁶

4. Containment of non-Arab tribes

Another critical part of NCP strategy has been to contain the tribes affiliated to the rebels, such as the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa. Like the related divide-and-rule tactics the NCP follows with the rebel groups themselves, this has been pursued particularly aggressively since the DPA signature and the prospect of the arrival of a larger peacekeeping force. The NCP has been helping settle friendly tribes (mostly nomadic groups from the *Abbala*) in border areas, mainly north of Kulbus to south of Geneina, in order to isolate the non-Arab groups from their kin in Chad, who have been a strategic resource for the rebels.⁶⁷

The NCP is also settling Arabs in areas – mainly Fur and Massaleit zones – where a demographic change is essential for it to manipulate elections.⁶⁸ The Arabs who settle there are not necessarily part of the Janjaweed but arrive after the original villages are either destroyed by Janjaweed militias or given to them by the authorities.⁶⁹ Once in place,

⁶⁵ According to “The militarisation of Sudan”, published by the Smalls Arm Survey in April 2007, “an estimated 1.9-3.2 million small arms are in circulation in Sudan. Two thirds are held by civilians, 20 per cent by the Government of Sudan, and the remainder divided between the Government of South Sudan and current and former armed groups”.

⁶⁶ Internal NGO situation report, July 2007.

⁶⁷ For example, the NCP, on the pretext of establishing nomad schools, has settled and armed Arabs in those areas. In Dar Gimer, the Gimer resisted schools in the western area of Kulbus, near the Chad border, knowing this was part of NCP strategy. Dar Gimer was chosen for its strategic location, rich vegetation for camels and small population.

⁶⁸ For example, the NCP allowed land occupation by Arab nomadic groups, particularly the *Abbala* and other non-land owners, in Fur areas, such as Gari and Korelleh. Gari is the home of Ahmed Derieg, ex-governor of greater Darfur and a leading figure in the rebel movement. Korelleh was an economically stable administrative unit with over 2,000 brick-houses destroyed by Arab tribes, who built small villages in its place. Other places where this has been happening include Garsela, Wadi Saleh and Kabkabiya. Crisis Group interviews, July 2007.

⁶⁹ The indigenous people of these areas can differentiate between those who intend to settle and those who are passing through. Settlers immediately build permanent houses, not those in the camp style of *dumur* (summer camping area), typical of Arab nomads. According to eyewitnesses, some building materials were off-loaded from army trucks or trucks with no number plates, which in Sudan are usually affiliated

they too are often heavily armed by the government on the pretext of maintaining security,⁷⁰ and the NCP provides reinforcement by arming Janjaweed and other militia.

5. The creation of new localities

Primarily through Governor Kiber of North Darfur, the NCP uses these demographic shifts and its ability to manipulate the law to create new geographical/political divisions known as localities. These reconfigure the electoral map to the party's advantage.⁷¹ After the DPA was signed, the North Darfur local government formed a committee to identify new localities. Based on established criteria, it determined that only two could be added to the existing seven.⁷² However, in early 2007, after the visit of presidential adviser Nafie Ali Nafie to El Fasher and Kabkabiya (Musa Hilal's base), Kiber was instructed to add five more localities, all encompassing Arab groups.⁷³ In a May ceremony in the Seref to celebrate the new localities, Nafie said to a crowd of more than 30,000, "with the presence of people like you, it is possible for us to resist the U.S. and UN".⁷⁴

By selectively giving land to only some of the Arab tribes which supported its agenda, the NCP has created deep divisions among them. These have worsened since June 2007, when a large number of *Abbala* Rizeigat militias – the bulk of the PDF around El Dein – mutinied against the NCP and their commanders and joined the *Baggara* Rizeigat and Misseriya of Southern Kordofan. The groups are said to be Arab tribal militias, including some who fought against the SPLA during the North-South war as well as against the Darfur insurgency. They have since demanded money and the governorship of South Darfur.⁷⁵

with security units. Along the border, twenty settlements have been renamed or permanently occupied by new settlers. Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁷⁰ These groups are not paid by the government and have limited means of sustaining their livelihoods, so they resort to banditry, cattle-raiding and robbing passing cars and trucks. The government keeps them for contingencies and uses them as needed. Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁷¹ The Berti of North Darfur and the *Abbala* tend to have benefited the most but the Zaghawa of SLA/MM have also been given new localities and augmented their Native Administration. An example is the new locality of Kalamando, where there is tension between the traditional owners and the new Native Administration of the recently settled Zaghawa.

⁷² According to regulations, an area must have at least 150,000 inhabitants to be considered a separate locality but the rule was amended to allow the governor to form a locality not meeting this criterion, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁷³ The new localities include al-Kuma Karadaiya (only 9,000 inhabitants) and Seref Beni Hussein (only 29,000).

⁷⁴ Crisis Group interviews, those present at the rally, May 2007.

⁷⁵ Musa Hilal visited these groups in July 2007, fuelling rumours he supported the mutineers' demands and was positioning

NCP policies in Darfur continue to be destructive; a fundamental shift in the way the party calculates its survival is necessary if there is to be a change. All efforts to resolve the conflict, including the peace talks and the AU/UN peacekeeping force, will be problematic if the NCP maintains its strategy. There can be no cessation of hostilities between the NCP and the rebels without trust but that is the last thing the people of Darfur have for the ruling party. The only developments that might start to change the NCP calculus are the erosion of support within its traditional Arab security base (the *Abbala*), potential for the conflict to spread beyond Darfur and international pressure.

B. THE DPA SIGNATORIES

1. Minni Minawi and the SLA/MM

Though Minni Minawi signed the DPA, his group has carried out many of the attacks, killings, carjacking and thefts in Darfur over the last eighteen months.⁷⁶ Immediately after the signing, his SLA/MM in North Darfur committed so many atrocities that it became known locally as the "Janjaweed II". There has not been much improvement in 2007. Disenchanted with Minni, many have defected to the non-signatory rebel movements, declaring their intention to withdraw from the DPA,⁷⁷ or created new militias. Minni has said he does not control many of those committing atrocities. He has also railed against what he considers international community complicity in leaving his forces under-resourced and weak, thereby "forcing" some into

himself within an emerging Arab opposition in Darfur. These demands were timed to coincide with NCP discussions over who should replace the then governor of South Darfur, Atta Al-Mannan. A large Northern Rizeigat group supported Musa Kasha, while the rest of the Arab tribes, particularly the *Baggara* (the majority in South Darfur) and including Southern Rizeigat, were opposed. After a nine-month stalemate, in July 2007, the NCP appointed Ali Mahmud. He is not fully accepted by any South Darfur tribe, as he is the secretary general of the *Shura* Council of the Arab Gathering under General Adam Hamid and considered a key NCP agent in Darfur. His appointment – directed by Khartoum – comes at a critical time in South Darfur, when there is significant resentment of the NCP and frustration and increased fighting among Arabs.

⁷⁶ During June–September 2007, SLA/MM elements either held for ransom or hijacked more than 68 commercial trucks around Adila and Muhajirya. They collected \$120,000 from one company for four trucks and confiscated their loads, including World Food Program supplies. The carjacking rate sharply increased after the government stopped giving the DPA signatories supplies. Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, August 2007.

⁷⁷ In mid-October 2007, it was announced that Minni Minawi was suspending participation in the DPA. It was later found that this was not his decision, but that of some commanders. "Minni Minawi faction allegedly terminates Darfur Peace Agreement", *The New Sudan Vision*, 14 October 2007.

banditry, after it pressured him to sign the DPA and promised aid.

On several occasions Minni has appealed to the AU and others for assistance, as stipulated in the DPA.⁷⁸ However, his forces have discouraged disarmament and integration, which is a prerequisite for assistance, because they believe they need to remain militarily strong.⁷⁹ While some aid was given, the AU mission (AMIS) has been the target of sometimes deadly attacks by fighters alleged to be SLA/MM. The SLA/MM has also fought with the army, its supposed allies. Minni accused Khartoum of rearming the Janjaweed, with whom his forces have clashed, most recently in the October attack on Muhajirya, and SLA/MM party headquarters in Omdurman was besieged by government forces in March.

Following the Omdurman incident, community leaders and others supportive of Minni pressured him not to pull out of the DPA, arguing that their gains would be jeopardised, and they would become vulnerable to other rebel groups, government forces and the Janjaweed. Minni accepted their advice but the NCP took advantage of his weakness, co-opting him almost completely with the reward of the new locality of Kalamando and surroundings. There has since been a noticeable drop in Minni's verbal attacks against the NCP. Aware of his vulnerability and limited military capability, he has focused on internal reconciliation among his troops and supporting communities in Darfur, completely neglecting his role as Senior Assistant to the President and chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA).

2. Other DPA signatories

The NCP, with early, misguided help from internationals including the AU and EU, has persuaded other rebel groups to join the DPA with Minni, either through the subsequent Declaration of Commitment (DoC), a memorandum of understanding, or a special protocol; these measures have allowed the late signatories to gain some power and other privileges.⁸⁰ Most of these groups are relatively small but

some of the larger ones have also been responsible for recent violence and displacement.⁸¹ While the leaders have received important political positions and became members of the TDRA, their forces survive off government "packages" and banditry.⁸²

There is little coordination among the signatory groups on the ground and almost none politically. The TDRA has met once since its inception in April 2007; the heads of its commissions do not cooperate. For instance, Ibrahim Madibo, who leads the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission (DRRC), has disassociated himself and decided not to cooperate with the other TDRA officials.⁸³ Similarly, there is no coordination between these groups and the NCP, which has sidelined Minni and others.

While they may have ineffectual leaders, these groups are important potential spoilers of the peace process because of the gains they have made under the DPA and the rejection they face by the remaining rebels. They are probably some of the most ardent defenders of the status quo but if their needs are not considered, they have the capacity to disrupt the situation on the ground and the peace talks. At the same time, because they are unpopular with the rebel groups, and their control over their forces is tenuous, it is unlikely they could seriously return to combat for any real length of time. Minni Minawi did not attend the opening ceremony in Sirte due to an unresolved conflict over his role; he does not want to be a member of the government delegation and requested a special facilitator role for his movement. The government has reportedly threatened to walk out of the talks if Minni is given any role besides that of a government delegate.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Article 28 of the DPA stipulates that when the movements have been redeployed and registered with AMIS, they may request non-military logistical and communications support. This support is also contingent upon them observing and adhering to the DPA Ceasefire.

⁷⁹ In June 2007, Minni signed an action plan with UNICEF to demobilise child soldiers. UNICEF estimates there are 1,800.

⁸⁰ Several leaders who joined the NCP, such as Ibrahim Yahia (JEM), Adam Abu Risha (JEM Wing for Peace), Abul Gasim Imam (SLA/AW breakaway), Abdel Rahman Musa (SLA Free Will) and Ibrahim Madibo (SLA Peace Wing), received gifts of money or cars and in some cases were promised good land and business contracts. Abul Gasim Imam is now West Darfur governor; Abdel Rahman Musa is state minister in the

council of ministers; Ibrahim Madibo is head of the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission (DRRC). Crisis Group interview, February 2007.

⁸¹ A recent report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the atrocities by forces allied with Abul Gasim Imam in 2007, which caused massive displacement. The troops were reportedly backed by the Sudanese air force. "Eighth Periodic Report", op. cit.

⁸² These salary "packages" are organised outside the DPA's official disarmament and integration program. There has been no movement under the AU in disarmament of any signatory force or integration into the army structure as the DPA calls for. The packages have halted over the past six months, particularly after the 27 June 2007 death of Majzoub Khalifa, the presidential adviser who handled the Darfur dossier, Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, July 2007.

⁸³ Madibo claims his attitude is based on disapproval of Minni's Zaghawa tribal dominance of the TDRA, Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group interviews, November 2007.

C. REBEL STRATEGIES AND FRAGMENTATION

The post-DPA period has been most notable for the increasing fragmentation among the non-signatory rebels.⁸⁵ Though there have been cracks within the SLA and JEM since the conflict began,⁸⁶ they have been widened by the Abuja peace talks' failure, NCP tactics, poor leadership, desire of regional powers to gain influence, tribal animosities, internal power struggles and the lack of a unifying leader.

In spite of renewed efforts in Juba, unification remains lacking, though the chairs have been slightly reshuffled. Despite ample rhetoric, previous international efforts to support a unification process failed because they were never prioritised and tended to be part-time or sub-contracted to third parties, with regional and donor country efforts often competing and contradictory. While some internationals tried to create SLA unity, others sought at the same time to promote umbrella organisations bringing together SLA, JEM and other groups. Khartoum sabotaged many of the attempts, several times even bombing Um Rei, the location of some of the meetings.

The AU/UN and their international partners finally deemed "unity" to be a mission impossible and ended all initiatives after their July 2007 meeting in Tripoli. An attempt to bring all factions together to reach positional if not organisational unity in Arusha in August had mixed results. Not all factions attended but some progress was made, and an agreement was reached to continue discussions. A follow-up meeting the AU/UN mediation convened in Chad in mid-September was postponed, because few leaders attended. A further attempt, under SPLM auspices in Juba, is ongoing.⁸⁷ Participating rebel groups have reported progress, although some key rebel leaders are still missing, and many have said they will not attend renewed peace talks until this unity work is completed. When those talks finally did open in Libya on 27 October, all major factions boycotted.

1. SLA factions

There are now several SLA factions with political leadership, as well as a few more amorphous military

factions without a declared political leader. Abdel Wahid Mohamed el Nur, despite his Paris exile, still commands one faction of Fur in Western Jebel Marra. He remains popular among IDPs as a symbol of the rejection of the DPA but his stubborn obstructionism and refusal to attend any talks or meetings has frustrated the international community. Another SLA faction is led by Ahmed Abdelshaafie, a Fur and long-time Abdel Wahid associate, who broke away in July 2006. Both his and Abdel Wahid's forces are restricted to the higher areas of the Jebel Marra plateau by the Janjaweed and government troops.

Khamees Abdallah, a Massaleit, is the nominal leader of another group, although its strength is allegedly limited. Formerly Abdel Wahid's deputy, he and eighteen other commanders broke away in the final round of the Abuja talks to form the G19, which was joined by Minni defectors and others and became the backbone of the National Redemption Front coalition formed in Asmara in June 2006. Over time, the commanders split into factions, and Khamees's influence waned. His main support now is in eastern Chad and West Darfur.

SLA/Unity emerged from some of the G19 splits but is now itself broken up into splinter groups led by Abdullah Yahya and Sharif Harir, formerly of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). Despite ongoing attempts to unite the factions in Darfur instead of in Juba, Abdallah Yahya and Sharif Harir are increasingly at odds.⁸⁸ Suleiman Jamous,⁸⁹ the former humanitarian coordinator under Minni Minawi, is also associated with SLA/Unity. The SFDA is still represented as a movement by Ahmed Diraiqe. In addition to these groupings, there are several led by un-allied commanders, although those connected to Jar el Nebi, for example, have recently moved into coalition with Abdelshaafie in Juba.

2. JEM splits

JEM, which had suffered disunity in the past,⁹⁰ seemed to be less prone to the problems plaguing the SLA. Recently, however, there have been increased divisions among top cadres and commanders. "We are becoming

⁸⁵ For background on factional splits and international attempts to heal them, see Crisis Group Report, *Revitalising the Peace Process*, op. cit.; and Crisis Group Africa Report N°130, *A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan*, 26 July 2007.

⁸⁶ For more on the Abdel Wahid/Minni Minawi split, see Crisis Group Briefing, *Unifying Darfur's Rebels*, op. cit.

⁸⁷ The convening of rebels in Juba coincided with the SPLM's decision to suspend its participation in the Government of National Unity, prompting suspicions among some international actors that the two events were linked.

⁸⁸ Crisis Group interviews, August and October 2007.

⁸⁹ Suliman Jamous has been controversial; he spent over a year "imprisoned" in a UN hospital in Kadugli, after being captured by Minni's forces in Darfur when he defected away from SLA/MM. The government allowed him to leave Kadugli on 14 September 2007. Many internationals took up his cause, believing him to be key to a Darfur settlement.

⁹⁰ Examples are formation of the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) in 2004 and Mohamed Saleh Harba's 2005 defection. Harba's JEM-Field Revolutionary Command faction joined with Abdelshaafie's group and others in Juba under a single collective leadership. Crisis Group interviews, October-November 2007.

just like the SLA”, a leader said.⁹¹ In November 2006, Idris Azraq defected amid suspicion the NCP had bought him. There were also allegations that Khalil Ibrahim was distributing Chad's aid unfairly.⁹² Azraq re-emerged in August 2007 as leader of the Darfur Independence Front, a group seeking self-determination and independence for Darfur. It is unclear how many fighters he has but this was the first time a rebel movement has so clearly demanded independence.⁹³ Shortly afterwards, Khalil Ibrahim made a similar statement in Haskanita; the London leadership denied this was the official view, reasserting JEM's position as a “nationwide” movement.

In mid-July 2007, Ibrahim Yahya, a Massaleit ex-governor of West Darfur and president of the JEM assembly, signed a deal with the NCP in Cairo.⁹⁴ At the end of that month, another group of commanders defected from Khalil Ibrahim, forming the JEM-Eastern Command. One of the main contentious issues was Khalil's dismissals of JEM's commander-in-chief, Abdallah Banda, in July⁹⁵ and of its vice-president, Bahar Abugarda, in September.

Contradictory information about whether Banda was operating alone, waiting for reintegration into JEM or working with SLA/Unity circulated for several months, culminating in JEM's most substantial split.⁹⁶ On 4 October 2007, Banda and Abugarda declared a new faction, JEM-Collective Leadership (JEM-CL).⁹⁷ It has spoken against Khalil's re-acceptance of Ibrahim Yahya and the reported increased cooperation between JEM and the *Shahama*, a Misseriyah movement, in Southern Kordofan.⁹⁸ Khalil Ibrahim has boycotted the Libya talks and refused to come to Juba for unification discussions, while JEM-CL has been

in Juba and was one of the few movements that attended the Sirte opening ceremony.

3. Additional groups

Several other groups now on the scene were not part of the Abuja process which produced the DPA. The first is the National Movement for Reform and Development of Gibril “Tek” Abdelkarim.⁹⁹ The second is the “Arab” group of Abu Surrah, a *Baggara* Rizeigat, the Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces (RDFF), though it has splintered; Abu Surrah's deputy commander Yassin Yousuf, from the Eregat sub-clan of the *Aballa* Northern Rizeigat, and Mohamed Brima recently announced the United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF).¹⁰⁰ Its leader is now Ibrahim Ahmed Abdallah al Zebati, a Rizeigat.

An RDFF spokesperson claims the URFF is still close, while other reports suggest it has a cooperation framework with NMRD.¹⁰¹ It is unclear how much support on the ground either group has and thus to what extent it is qualified to be the main representatives of Darfur “Arab” concerns. Three others announced their existence in July, two of which split from Minni: the Group for Development and Grievances and The Mother of all SLAs; the third, the Sudan National Liberation Movement, has set itself up in Chad.

When the National Redemption Front (NRF) slowly disintegrated, Eritrea helped give birth to a new umbrella organisation, the United Front for Liberation and Democracy (UFLD), bringing together SLA/Khamees, SLA/Unity, RDFF, NMRD, and the SFDA.¹⁰² It assisted these movements to create an impressive structure but there has been no joint action, and little remains of the coalition. This is almost the opposite of the NRF experience: it had military success but could not come together politically.

⁹¹ Crisis Group interview, July 2007.

⁹² Crisis Group interviews, December 2006-January 2007.

⁹³ They argue that all attempts at finding a Darfur solution under the current government have failed, so a new concept is needed, “The Demand for the Separation of Darfur: the Coming Fire Ball”, *Al Sahafa*, 20 August 2007.

⁹⁴ News of the defection broke on 7 June, when it was announced Yahya and Massaleit forces from JEM and Khamees's group, had signed a deal in El Geneina. Yahya claimed to have had nothing to do with the agreement; Khalil Ibrahim reportedly accepted him back into JEM, only to have him sign a deal in Cairo, Crisis Group interviews, July 2007.

⁹⁵ Some say Khalil decided to fire Banda because Banda went to N'Djamena at Deby's request, without consulting him, hinting at deteriorating relations between Deby and Khalil. Khalil reportedly maintains that he fired Banda because he was secretly negotiating a deal with Sudan, Crisis Group interviews, July 2007.

⁹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, July-August 2007.

⁹⁷ “JEM veteran rebel establishes collective leadership, confirms split”, *Sudan Tribune*, 7 October 2007, at <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24118>.

⁹⁸ Crisis Group interviews, July-August 2007.

⁹⁹ Some in the SLA have said they do not believe NMRD should have its own seat at the table but should instead merge back into JEM, Crisis Group interviews, October 2007.

¹⁰⁰ Brima has stated that the URFF is against all those who try to divide Darfur, particularly the government, *Al Ayaam*, 21 August 2007. The URFF and RDFF are based in southern South Darfur, near Radom and Dar Rizeigat, at the border with Western Bahr Al Ghazal, Crisis Group interview, August 2007.

¹⁰¹ Crisis Group interview, July 2007. On NMRD see fn. 90 above.

¹⁰² Similar to the situation with the NRF in 2006, reports conflict on how coerced each leader was to join this coalition. Some representatives reported they were forbidden to leave Asmara until they signed up. JEM, because of its distrust of Eritrea and attempts to keep the NRF alive, did not want to go to Asmara for negotiations, though it said repeatedly it might send a delegation. Crisis Group interviews, July-August 2007.

4. Rebel strategies

Even with these divisions, the general strategies of the movements have remained consistent. Despite greater claims, each controls a relatively limited geographical area. They are dependent on raids of government forces – mostly hit and run and many, they say, retaliatory or defensive – and alliances with Chad, Libya or Eritrea for weapons, vehicles and supplies. This typifies the recent JEM attacks close to the border on Adila, a key railway exchange, and Wad Banda, a government garrison in Northern Kordofan. JEM and the G19 have carried out attacks inside Kordofan. Other attacks have reached beyond Darfur. On 23 October, JEM hit a government-run installation in the Diffra oil field, within the contested area of Abyei on the North-South border between Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal, at the heart of the current SPLM/NCP dispute.¹⁰³

The fighting peaked in the 29 September attack on the AMIS base in Haskanita and its aftermath. The site was completely pillaged, and weapons and vehicles, including an armoured personnel carrier, were taken. It remains unclear whether this was a looting incident gone awry, a violent message to the AU, manipulation by Khartoum, an outburst by unhappy forces affiliated to SLA/MM or an attempt by a new rebel splinter group to announce its presence.¹⁰⁴ Subsequently, the army razed the town. A week later, SLA/MM accused the army of entering rebel-held areas, extending its offensive to Muhajirya and killing 48 people.¹⁰⁵ These attacks show that all parties continue to violate the ceasefire and suggest the conflict may widen to include DPA signatories.

Rebel factionalism along ethnic and tribal lines remains a major obstacle to a sustainable settlement. The AU/UN mediation team has been challenged in the run-up to the peace talks to determine which of the multitude of rebel movements to invite. Neither the Arusha, N'Djamena, nor Juba meetings provided an answer. Invitations were distributed only days before the talks were to begin, and the larger rebel factions were upset at the inclusion of smaller groups.¹⁰⁶

The SPLM decision to suspend its participation in the national unity government in Khartoum reinforced rebel reticence to negotiate with the NCP. Abdel Wahid has always refused to negotiate until his pre-conditions were met, such as security for the IDPs, because of his lack of faith in the ruling party. He recently said that the SPLM's decision was further proof that the NCP could not be trusted as a peace partner.¹⁰⁷ Sharif Harir of SLA/Unity and others have said they will not negotiate with half the national unity government and will only start talks once the NCP/SPLM crisis has been resolved.

In any case, the factions need to formulate a common vision that the people of Darfur can rally behind. While all agree on Khartoum's responsibility for Darfur's marginalisation, opinions diverge about how best to change this. The Arusha communiqué contained the skeleton of a common platform but subsequent attempts to flesh out details have been unsuccessful. With an increasingly shaky connection to the civilian population, constant fragmentation and no clear program, the rebels risk becoming little more than weaponised groups seeking gains on a tribal and personal basis.

That is why the initiative underway in Juba must be encouraged. There are glimmers of hope: nine factions, including those of Abdelshaafie and Jar el Nebi, have come together; a further five groups – two SLA factions, one JEM faction, the NMRD and the URFF – have joined under the umbrella title of the "United Resistance Front"; the presence of so many factions is very positive. However, Abdel Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim remain away, and SLA/Unity continues to pursue a separate unification process inside Darfur. The idea that one SLA and one JEM group can emerge from Juba is probably too ambitious, and it is likely that in order to finalise participation and modalities, the AU/UN mediation will need to convene another meeting, similar to the August session in Arusha, before the talks.

Neither the NCP nor the rebel movements appear to be particularly committed to the talks in Libya.¹⁰⁸ If they are to make progress, the sides need to agree to make goodwill gestures to show their commitment to the peace process. The AU/UN mediation must allow rebel unification

¹⁰³ See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°47, *Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock*, 12 October 2007.

¹⁰⁴ On-going investigations indicate that the attacks were carried out by rebels with JEM insignia on their vehicles. "Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur", UNSC S/2007/653, 5 November 2007.

¹⁰⁵ In an interview with Al Jazeera (Arabic), 9 October 2007, Ali Mahmud, the governor of South Darfur, denied any army presence in Muhajirya, saying it was a group on camel and horseback.

¹⁰⁶ Members of the mediation team later said these invitations were only for the opening ceremony, not necessarily for the negotiating table, Crisis Group interviews, October 2007.

¹⁰⁷ "SPLM decision shows NCP not trustworthy: Darfur rebel leader", *Sudan Tribune*, 11 October 2007.

¹⁰⁸ On the NCP side, the same day that the government declared a unilateral ceasefire, government helicopter gunships attacked a water point near Jebel Moon. "Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur", op. cit. As for the rebels, there are reports that some of the Darfur groups in Juba are as interested in seeking material support from the SPLM for continued struggle as they are for preparing for the talks. Crisis Group interviews, October 2007. In addition, the NCP hardline newspaper *Al-Intibaha* claimed on 19 November 2007 that the SPLM has opened training camps for the Darfur groups.

efforts to continue before the talks resume and then should put ceasefire arrangements at the top of the agenda. It must also make sure that Minni Minawi and other DPA signatories and affiliated groups do not become spoilers, by guaranteeing them a role at the talks and representation in the final agreement.

IV. SPILLOVER AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

The Darfur conflict has not remained within its own borders. Northern and Southern Kordofan have been increasingly affected. Chad and CAR have felt the impact, with the former receiving the majority of the refugees. The AU/UN mediation has identified Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Egypt all as integral players with considerable influence over either rebel movements, the NCP or both and thus critical to the success of any peace negotiations. They all are also potential spoilers, and it has been a challenge for the mediation to balance their sometimes competing interests. Each has been given a privileged position as part of the regional contact group in the peace talks.

A. NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KORDOFAN

The Darfur rebels, for tactical reasons, are starting to link up with resistance movements in the Kordofans, where tensions are rising.¹⁰⁹ JEM has tried to expand its operations there, connecting with the Misseriya *Shahama* and capitalising on the growing frustrations of some communities and tribes of ex-West Kordofan.¹¹⁰ Just days before talks were to open in Libya, it attacked the Diffra oil field in Abyei, kidnapping five workers (three Sudanese, an Iraqi and an Egyptian). They initially demanded that all oil companies leave Sudan within a week but released their hostages on 20 November.¹¹¹

In the last six months, there has been growing resistance to the NCP in Northern Kordofan, led by the Kordofan Association for Development (KAD) and other groups,¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ SLA/Unity leader Dr Sharif Harir explained the expansion as a response to the government's troop build-up in Kordofan, "Sudan expects full-blown fight", Agence France-Presse, 16 October 2007.

¹¹⁰ Western Kordofan, per the CPA, was merged into Southern Kordofan. The Misseriya are unhappy, because this took them from a majority position to a minority one. They are also unhappy with the lack of benefits from the oil exploration in their areas and the NCP's role in negotiations on an Abyei agreement. For more on Abyei and the risk of new conflict in Kordofan, see Crisis Group Briefing, *Breaking the Abyei Deadlock*, op. cit.; and Crisis Group Report, *A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan*, op. cit.

¹¹¹ A first attempt to release the hostages to tribal elders and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the previous week was reportedly blocked by government troops. "Oil attack hostages finally released", Reuters, 20 November 2007.

¹¹² The KAD was reportedly in Juba during the October meetings of Darfur rebel leaders, Crisis Group interview, Juba, October 2007. It wrote the UN Secretary-General expressing its concerns, noting it had tried to express these to Khartoum peaceably, not

which accuse the NCP of marginalisation policies, particularly over development money and projects, and instigation of tribal fighting. While KAD has claimed it is not using violence, there are reports that groups have blocked the routes to the oil fields and seized trucks carrying generators to the Sharef field and the pipelines. Although the NCP had finally decided to release 2 per cent of the revenues from Sharef, tribal militias are now demanding this money as compensation for their help during the North/South war. Relations between Darfur and Kordofan-based rebel groups are likely to expand, barring an NCP policy change.

B. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

Though it has not been impacted by the Darfur conflict in the same way as Chad, north eastern CAR hosts some 2,660 refugees and has been a staging ground for Chadian rebels.¹¹³ It was used in a similar manner by the SPLA as a safe-haven and resupply point during the 1980s and 1990s and as late as 2004. The Sudanese army also used the region to launch counter-attacks against the SPLA throughout the 1990s and as a passageway into Chad to fight Deby's forces.

In April 2006, a Darfur-based Chadian rebel group, led by Mahamat Nour, attacked the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, after entering the country via CAR; Chadian rebels have also recruited commanders from CAR to fight in Chad and along the Sudanese border.¹¹⁴ President Bozize responded by pledging to close the Sudan-CAR border, a largely symbolic gesture since he lacked the capacity to enforce it. Consequently, more Sudanese troops and munitions were flown into north eastern CAR.

In addition to the Darfur spillover, northern CAR has suffered from its own insurgencies, as government troops and rebels have clashed for more than a decade. In the north east, an umbrella insurgent group, the *Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR), is the largest opponent of the Bozize government. It regularly raids towns and army outposts to capture goods and munitions from poorly guarded government supply depots. Reportedly it has committed serious abuses against civilians.¹¹⁵ Bozize frequently accuses Khartoum of supporting the UFDR but has not broken relations.

Of greater concern is the continuous violence in the north west, where the primary rebel group is the *Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et de la démocratie* (APRD), composed of former guards of the ousted President Patasse and local defence forces. The government's response to its growing strength has been widespread abuses against civilians since 2005.¹¹⁶ While the rebels in the region have also been tied to crimes, the vast majority have reportedly been committed by the army and presidential guard. The government has also been unable to provide security against rampant and increasing banditry.¹¹⁷ APRD is perceived as an alternate security source, so the poorly armed rebels are increasingly gathering support from local militias and self-defence groups.

As a consequence of this volatile situation, at least 291,000 northerners have been displaced since 2005 (212,000 as IDPs, 79,000 as refugees in Chad, Sudan and Cameroon).¹¹⁸ On 25 September 2007, in response to deteriorating security in both Chad and CAR, the Security Council authorised a UN force (MINURCAT) and an EU mission.¹¹⁹ The resolution only calls for EU troops (roughly 500) to be deployed to the north east, the area bordering both Sudan and Chad, which is part of the regional conflict, not to the north west, where much of the recent displacement and fighting has taken place.

C. THE CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMIC

The situation in neighbouring Chad has also deteriorated over the past year. Over 230,000 Darfur refugees are now in twelve refugee camps lining the border. These camps were first established in 2004 and include the mix of non-Arab tribes (Zaghawa, Fur, Massaleit and others) which have fled the violence. The refugees have increasingly found themselves in the midst of another complex conflict.

While the instability in Chad is related to events in Darfur (and has led to over 170,000 Chadian IDPs), it is compounded by Deby's autocratic rule, Khartoum-backed rebels challenging his regime, as well its support for and co-opting of Darfur rebel movements.¹²⁰ Both Deby and Bashir have attempted to use rebel movements, militias, the Janjaweed, regional powers and international peacekeepers to their advantage. Recent initiatives to mend relations

yet by force, as in Darfur, letter, 6 November 2007, in Crisis Group files.

¹¹³ "UNHCR welcomes Security Council resolution on Chad, Central African Republic", UNHCR, 26 September 2007.

¹¹⁴ "A widening war around Sudan: The proliferation of armed groups in the Central African Republic", Small Arms Survey, Sudan Issue Brief, no. 5, January 2007.

¹¹⁵ "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians", Human Rights Watch, September 2007.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ "Central African Republic: Insecurity in north persists – UNICEF", IRIN, 15 October 2007.

¹¹⁹ Resolution 1778, UNSC S/RES/1778, 25 September 2007.

¹²⁰ For more on the Chad-Sudan relationship and internal Chadian dynamics, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°105, *To Save Darfur*, 17 March 2006; and N°111, *Tchad : vers le retour de la guerre?*, 1 June 2006.

notwithstanding, they have hurled virulent accusations against each other over the past two years.

Chad and Sudan signed the Tripoli Agreement in February 2006 under Libyan pressure¹²¹ but it was seriously challenged when the Darfur-based Chadian rebel group, *Front uni pour le changement* (FUC),¹²² tried to capture N'Djamena in mid-April 2006. It failed, thanks in part to French military help,¹²³ and Deby broke ties with Sudan and threatened to expel the Darfur refugees. Despite Khartoum's denials, a senior NCP member said privately, "we made a big mistake when we attacked Chad. But the Government of Sudan feels like it must destroy the Zaghawa tribes, so it must destroy N'Djamena".¹²⁴

Relations fluctuated wildly in 2006, with Deby continuing to portray any Chadian rebel activity as aggression orchestrated by Sudan.¹²⁵ Similarly, he characterised Janjaweed attacks that were starting to cause displacements in Dar Sila as Khartoum-driven. After Deby won a widely boycotted election in May 2006, Bashir attended his inauguration in August, the month in which in a half-hearted attempt to show Khartoum he was pushing the Darfur rebels off his territory, Deby briefly arrested several JEM leaders in N'Djamena. But Chadian rebel offensives from October to December and Sudanese bombing of border towns brought renewed confrontation, with Deby again accusing Khartoum of trying to overthrow him.¹²⁶

With a 2007 budget which includes \$1.9 billion in oil revenue,¹²⁷ Deby has had the capacity to considerably strengthen his military.¹²⁸ That and an accord signed

with the FUC in December 2006 have made him more secure and less reliant on the Darfur rebels. The remaining Chadian rebel movements, however, continued to launch small attacks. In April 2007, Chad pursued them into Sudanese territory and clashed with the army, causing a new low in bilateral relations.¹²⁹ In a renewed attempt at reconciliation, the governments signed an agreement in May 2007 in Riyadh, which Libya dismissed as little more than a repeat of the Tripoli accord.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, many Darfur rebel groups subsequently left Chad, which recently has been trying to stay involved with the attempts to build unity among the rebel factions ahead of the peace talks. It hosted a poorly attended and unproductive meeting of factions in September. Under Libyan pressure, Sudan reportedly recently stopped funding the Chadian rebels and pressed them to join the government for negotiations in Tripoli. After several attempts, an agreement was finally signed on 25 October 2007 in Sirte, bringing together the four main remaining rebel groups in the east: the *Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie* (UFDD), the *Rassemblement des forces pour le changement* (RFC), the *Concorde nationale tchadienne* (CNT), and the *Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie fondamentale* (UFDD-F). It calls for a ceasefire and amnesty and includes provisions for disarmament, reintegration and appointment of rebel leaders to government posts.

Despite the agreement, unrest and violence continue in the east, particularly between the Tama and Zaghawa. Deby called a twelve-day state of emergency on 17 October, which parliament extended on 26 October for a further 45 days. Among other things, the declaration restricts civilian movement as well as the press. Nouri, the UFDD leader, has publicly expressed reservations on the agreement's disarmament and reintegration provisions.¹³¹ Just as the lack of integration of the FUC has contributed to instability in the east and kept Nour's options open, so could non-integration of the other rebel groups. Nevertheless, outright war at this point is highly unlikely, though much depends on how quickly international peacekeepers arrive on both sides of the border.¹³²

¹²¹ This agreement included a regional monitoring mechanism for the Chad-Sudan border, which would ostensibly eliminate the need for any international presence.

¹²² The FUC, of Mahamat Nour, a Tama, was formerly known as the *Front uni pour le changement démocratique au Tchad* (FUCD); Nour had led the *Rassemblement pour la démocratie et la liberté* (RDL), which merged with other groups to form the FUCD/FUC.

¹²³ Patrick de Saint-Exupery, "The French army helped the Chadian government", *Le Figaro*, 19 April 2006.

¹²⁴ Crisis Group interview, June 2006.

¹²⁵ Deby, in an apparent play to Western concerns, complained that Bashir, in addition to persecuting the Zaghawa, was pursuing an "Islamic agenda", Crisis Group interview, June 2006.

¹²⁶ "Chad Says World has 'Head in Sand' on Darfur", Reuters, 30 January 2007.

¹²⁷ The greater oil revenue is specifically from corporate taxes on the Esso Chad consortium, "Chad Country Report", Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2007.

¹²⁸ Minister of Infrastructure Adoum Yanousmi said, "like all states, Chad must have arms to defend the integrity and sovereignty of its territory". An International Monetary Fund report said Chad has spent 12 per cent of its budget on the military, not including salaries, and reportedly recently ordered five new combat helicopters. "Month two of general strike

threatens people more than government", IRIN, 4 June 2007. The government also has purchased four C-130s from the U.S., "Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict", Human Rights Watch, July 2007.

¹²⁹ This apparently caused Sudan to realise how impotent its Chadian rebel proxies were, "Divisés, les rebelles tchadiens signent une trêve avec N'Djamena", *Le Monde*, 6 October 2007.

¹³⁰ "Qaddafi calls latest Darfur agreement 'laughable'", Reuters, 18 May 2007.

¹³¹ "Chad extends emergency despite peace accord", Reuters, 26 October 2007.

¹³² "Sudan criticises plans for EU-UN force in Chad and CAR", *Sudan Tribune*, 29 August 2007. With Deby supporting the force,

D. LIBYA

Libya has played a highly significant, albeit inconsistent, role in Darfur since the conflict began, culminating in its function as host of the peace talks. At various times it has shown a significant ability to influence all rebel groups and push them toward participation in a broader political process. Simultaneously it has given the NCP diplomatic cover to resist international pressure and efforts to strengthen the peacekeeping operation. As elsewhere in Africa, Libyan actions have been motivated in part by Qaddafi's desire to be a powerful regional player and mediator but the proximity of the conflicts in Chad and Darfur and their domestic impact have triggered a more sustained effort than elsewhere.

Libya has hosted numerous Darfur meetings and brokered agreements between Chad and Sudan, as well as the Chadian government and Chadian rebels. It has sought to limit non-AU involvement but its efforts have mostly been disruptive of the AU-led political process. As noted, in February 2006 it facilitated the Tripoli agreement between Khartoum and N'djamena. Though there have been several follow-ups, including the most recent facilitated by Saudi Arabia, none has significantly changed the animosity between the two or definitively halted the support given the other's rebels.

The Tripoli agreement included a border monitoring mechanism, backed by Libyan military, but it never got off the ground and was seen by many internationals as simply an attempt by Libya to ward off a possible deployment of UN forces along its borders. Libya then tried to support a quadripartite monitoring mechanism including also Eritrean, Chadian and Sudanese observers. While there were reports earlier in the year of a small number of Eritrean and Libyan observers in Adre (Chad) and Geneina (Sudan), nothing substantial has come of this. Libya also helped broker the 25 October deal between Deby and the Chadian rebels just ahead of the opening ceremony of the Darfur peace talks.

Hosting the Darfur talks was a diplomatic coup for Qaddafi – other options included Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa – but has been regarded with suspicion by many in the international community and among the rebel factions. Several of the latter have questioned Libya's neutrality; one faction claimed Libya cannot be an honest broker given its involvement in supporting Arab militias and negotiation of protocols with non-signatories.¹³³ Nevertheless, the AU/UN mediation apparently counted on its ability to convene many of the rebel groups, something which the

poor attendance in Sirte has called into question. Qaddafi further estranged the rebels by referring to the Darfur crisis as a "quarrel over a camel".¹³⁴ At this point, it appears the mediation intends to reconvene talks in Libya but with Sudan's recent request for South African mediation and rebel demands for a different location, a shift in venue may be in the works.¹³⁵

Libya has certainly at times played a positive role in Darfur. The meetings it organised in late 2004 and 2005 for tribal and civil society leaders remain unique in offering an independent forum for key Darfurians to meet and discuss the conflict, beyond the NCP's reach. The later rounds, which included both rebels and NCP, were of limited value precisely because the NCP was able to limit independent dialogue. When the peace talks resume, it should be kept in mind that the December 2005 Tripoli meeting, which included several hundred participants from across Darfur's political and tribal spectrum, concluded that Darfur should be reunited as a single region within its 1956 borders.¹³⁶

E. ERITREA

Eritrea has a long history of involvement in Sudan's conflicts, supporting both the SPLA and various Darfur rebel factions. Nevertheless, given its tense relationship with Ethiopia, it has tried to regain favour with the NCP, as shown in the way it brought the Eastern Front to closed talks with the ruling party in 2006, resulting in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. Like other regional leaders, President Isaias Afwerke is keen for his country to be regarded as an important player.

After the DPA failed to bring all rebel factions into a peace deal, Eritrea actively sought to establish effective rebel coalitions. As noted above, it first helped create the National Redemption Front (NRF), which had some military success in late 2006 but alienated Abdel Wahid and Abdelshaafie, who claimed it tried to coerce them into joining.¹³⁷ As the NRF unravelled, it facilitated a new umbrella grouping, the UFLD in July 2007. It has reportedly been unhappy with the choice of Libya for the peace talks and feels sidelined by the AU/UN mediation and its decision to hold preparatory rebel meetings in N'Djamena and Juba, but not Asmara.¹³⁸

Sudan apparently has sought CAR help to block it, Crisis Group correspondence, August 2007.

¹³³ Crisis Group interview, October 2007.

¹³⁴ "Darfur a 'quarrel over a camel'", BBC News, 23 October 2007.

¹³⁵ "Sudan demands South Africa mediation in Darfur", Associated Press, 7 November 2007.

¹³⁶ Crisis Group interviews, January 2005, cited in Crisis Group Africa Report N°89, *Darfur: The Failure to Protect*, 8 March 2005.

¹³⁷ Crisis Group interviews, November 2006.

¹³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, October 2007. The AU/UN mediation team held a regional partners meeting in Asmara on 14 November 2007.

It would be difficult for the mediation to use Eritrea as a host, however, because while it retains influence with a few rebel factions, others refuse to go to Asmara. Eritrea now needs to encourage those it has influence with to take part in the SPLM talks in Juba.

F. EGYPT

Egypt has always been concerned about the Darfur crisis, because it quickly perceived the potential for it to lead to fragmentation in Sudan with serious impacts on its own national security.¹³⁹ It is eager to prevent any developments which might lead to the disintegration of its southern neighbour or the emergence of a hostile regime in Khartoum, including the possibility of a return of one with an Islamic extremist agenda. It is particularly concerned about preserving access to its share of the Nile, so has been consistently supportive of the NCP in exchange for accommodation of its water interests.¹⁴⁰

Egypt has opposed sanctions against Sudan and attributed most of the blame for ongoing violence in Darfur to the rebel non-signatories. It has attempted on various occasions but with limited success to kick-start rebel unity initiatives by bringing leaders to Cairo and reportedly contacting SLA commanders during their discussions in Um Rei.¹⁴¹ Most recently, it tried to convene leaders in Cairo in early October – independent of AU/UN planning – at around the same time that the SPLM was inviting them to Juba.

It did have a part in getting Khartoum to agree to the deployment of the hybrid peacekeeping force, mainly by a quiet mediation effort between it and the U.S. It continues to offer that service when called upon by either party. It provides troops for AMIS and recently contributed 2,100 personnel, including soldiers, police and military observers, to UNAMID.¹⁴² But it has also backed Sudan's opposition to non-African forces in UNAMID. Rebel factions react strongly to major Egyptian participation in that force,

claiming it is too close to Khartoum.¹⁴³ Egyptian influence on the rebels, and thus its ability to play a significant role in the political process, is also limited because it has never given them active support.

Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Egypt all have strong interests in what happens at the peace talks, as well as in the modalities of UNAMID. The AU/UN mediation has prudently included them in the approaching negotiations but must spend more time working with them, especially in the current climate in which the SPLM/NCP dispute may impact on all calculations. Close attention is also needed to the growing crises in the Kordofans.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abu Gheit recently said the Darfur crisis threatened Egypt's national security. Al Jazeera, 12 October 2007.

¹⁴⁰ The Nile Water Agreement, signed by Egypt and Britain in 1929, also bound eight other parties: Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1959, Egypt and Sudan renegotiated it to increase their shares: Egypt has guaranteed access to 55.5bn cubic metres of water, of a total 84bn cubic metres, Sudan to 18.5bn. Egypt does not want the other parties to renegotiate their shares; Sudan agrees. The text of the agreement is at www.fao.org/docrep/W7414B/w7414b13.htm.

¹⁴¹ Crisis Group interview, March 2007.

¹⁴² "Egypt to send peacekeepers to Darfur", Reuters, 25 September 2007.

¹⁴³ Crisis Group interviews, August 2007.

¹⁴⁴ The situation in Northern and Southern Kordofan will be examined in greater detail in a future Crisis Group report.

V. TOWARD A SETTLEMENT

Since the DPA was signed, the international community has struggled to unify its approach toward a Darfur settlement. On the peacemaking side, it first tried to promote DPA implementation, hoping that the non-signatories would eventually join. When this did not happen, and the non-signatories became militarily active again, it realised that a new negotiating process was needed. It first looked at simply expanding the DPA but an understanding has grown that a long-term solution must deal with all of the conflict's root causes and incorporate many views, not just of those with arms. The renewal of talks is an important opportunity. If the peace process is inclusive and broadly accepted, the agreement it reached will have a chance to be implemented. If its scope or participation is narrow or it results in an agreement signed only by a few, UNAMID will be in the same untenable position that AMIS has found itself.

The Security Council resolution authorising UN peacekeepers to replace the beleaguered AU mission was championed by the U.S., UK and France, while China, Russia and Qatar abstained, giving cover to Sudan's subsequent rejection. A year and laborious negotiations later, the UN/AU hybrid, UNAMID, is preparing to enter Darfur but there is still no viable peace agreement, and the conflict has developed several new layers. When UNAMID finally deploys, it will have to adapt to the new security reality. At the same time, it should be involved from the outset with the peace talks because it will have so much responsibility in ensuring that any new agreement is implemented. It must make certain that the expectations coming out of the negotiations are in line with its own "Concept of Operations" and mandate.

A. EFFORTS AT PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

1. Peacemaking

The opening of peace talks in Libya was the culmination of the three-phase roadmap presented by the AU/UN mediation in June 2007.¹⁴⁵ Phase one focused on bringing together the multitude of initiatives, including competing negotiating forums, as well as efforts to unify the rebel factions, particularly the severely divided SLA. Parallel

efforts by Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, the U.S. and the EU, as well as NGOs such as Justice Africa and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, all eventually failed. The SPLM offered to help organise a unification conference in June but it too failed due to inadequate focus, resources and internal commitment. The NCP encouraged divisions and frustrated the unification efforts.

Though there had been little progress apart from a shaky coalition created by Eritrea, the AU/UN declared the first phase closed in July and launched the second phase (pre-negotiations). All the rebel groups were invited to Arusha in early August to unify their positions ahead of negotiations. Abdel Wahid refused but certain new factions, such as the RDFF, were included and thus gained legitimacy, to the concern of other movements. Arusha produced an understanding on some common points, including a commitment to the talks, but the session was too brief to enter into specifics and, as developments showed, its communiqué portrayed only a façade of rebel unity.

A subsequent attempt to build upon Arusha and bring the factions together in Chad in mid-September was plagued by absences. While the AU/UN mediation sought to assist SPLM-led unification efforts in early October, Egypt held a competing meeting with several factions in Cairo; Eritrea called rebels to Asmara, while JEM splintered into two main groups and several smaller ones.

Phase three, the true peace negotiations, began formally on 27 October in Libya but is now in recess. The roadmap promoted the idea of broad consultation with constituencies in Darfur, including IDPs, women and other members of civil society, and a mechanism has been developed for incorporating their voices. But this mechanism has only been recently introduced, and the extent to which civil society will actually be able to participate is unclear.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, there is recognition that the talks cannot just be a repeat of Abuja, the situation has evolved on the ground, and the rebels and the NCP represent only those actors in Darfur with military might.

There are numerous challenges. The Government of National Unity in Khartoum is in crisis because of the SPLM/NCP stand-off, with potentially fatal consequences for the peace talks. There is concern about the NCP

¹⁴⁵ For more on the evolution of the current Darfur peace process, the weaknesses of the Abuja process and the DPA and lessons learned from Abuja and the CPA negotiations, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°39, *Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement*, 20 June 2006; and Crisis Group Reports, *Revitalising the Peace Process* and *A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan*, both op. cit.

¹⁴⁶ Only a small number of Darfurian civil society delegates invited to Sirte as part of this mechanism actually attended. While those invited are a good start, they are not a fully adequate representation of Darfur society, particularly with regard to traditional leaders. The Darfur civil society members themselves declared that while they were happy to be in Sirte, their role in the talks was still unclear. Crisis Group interview, November 2007. See also "Les Groupes non-armés du Darfour veulent participer à la paix", *Jeune Afrique*, 29 October 2007.

negotiating in Sirte without the SPLM, as well as about the status of Sudan's interim national constitution and democratisation process, both of which are core pillars for Darfur peace talks but are based on the CPA. Without CPA implementation and a functioning national government, the parameters for national-level political discussions are highly uncertain.

Many of the main rebel groups refused to go to Libya in October either because of the Khartoum governance crisis or because they wanted to continue the unification discussions. Abdel Wahid reiterated his refusal to attend until UNAMID deployment improves security on the ground, while Khalil Ibrahim said he would only take part in talks that involved the original DPA non-signatories: his JEM and a unified SLA. The regional states continue to pursue efforts independent of the AU/UN, and the selection of Libya as site for the talks has been polarising among the rebels.

The period leading to the resumed talks has been marred by continuous attacks, from both rebels and government, making the need for a comprehensive ceasefire daily more evident. The mediation has been criticised as start-and-stop and disorganised. Just as relations between the AU and UN have been difficult at times over UNAMID deployment, so they have been at times during the run-up to the mediation.

Ultimately, however, success in the Darfur process can only come if the broader national peace process underway in Sudan takes permanent root via full implementation of the CPA. Unfortunately, the international community continues to lack a coherent and comprehensive national strategy. While attention must remain on Darfur, of course, it would be counter-productive if it were allowed to be at the expense of the CPA crisis and the broader national democratisation process.

2. Peacekeeping

While agreement was sought on a hybrid UN/AU force, AMIS failed to stem the violence on the ground. Its mandate and responsibilities increased extensively after the DPA was signed but its capacities were not comparably augmented. In the meantime, there was no peace process, except for attempts to convince rebels to sign the agreement they had already rejected. AMIS expelled from the Ceasefire Commission two groups which did not sign but they remained active. To deal with the anomaly of having to monitor a ceasefire that excluded them, a two-chamber ceasefire commission was established, one for DPA signatories, one for non-signatories. With the proliferation of rebel groups, even this became problematic. Ceasefire violations continued, and the two chambers were hamstrung

by lack of good-faith and ineffective monitoring, investigating and sanctioning mechanisms.¹⁴⁷

The continuing violence also severely restricted AMIS's capacity to manoeuvre, bringing it practically to a standstill in many locations. Attacks against its personnel have been numerous and deadly in 2007. Eleven were killed from January until July and ten more in the September attack on Haskanita. Others have been wounded, and vehicles, arms and ammunition have been taken. Attacks have been perpetrated by both DPA signatories and non-signatories; often AMIS could not determine responsibility.

Because of the widespread violence, AMIS patrols have had to be suspended at times, or have remained in their compounds; there are many "no-go" areas. For example, during the September attacks on Haskanita, the AU forces were unable to respond adequately because they had been confined to their compounds since June.¹⁴⁸ Similarly during the August attacks in Adila, AMIS was unable to verify the situation because it involved a "no-go" area.¹⁴⁹ It has not been able to patrol the unrest in Zalingei during the past several months, and its previously praised firewood patrols have been stopped.¹⁵⁰

On the ground, AMIS troops have become increasingly equated with the forces of the government or of the DPA signatories; their efforts to promote the unpopular DPA have poisoned relations with many IDPs who do not support that agreement. Similarly, attempts to promote the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation were undermined by IDP perception of it as a government-directed endeavour. AMIS has also not been able to set up the effective community policing in IDP camps the DPA had anticipated.¹⁵¹

In July 2006, the UN Secretary-General proposed two assistance packages to AMIS to help what was thought then to be the eventual full transition to a UN mission. When Khartoum rejected Resolution 1706, authorising a robust expansion of the UNMIS mandate to Darfur, and eventually accepted Resolution 1769 (July 2007) with its hybrid operation, the "light support package" (LSP) and "heavy support package" (HSP) became the first two phases of the three-phase agreement to turn AMIS into UNAMID.

Following twelve largely ineffective Security Council resolutions on Darfur over three years, Resolution 1769

¹⁴⁷ See Crisis Group Report, *Revitalising the Peace Process*, op. cit.

¹⁴⁸ "Darfur rebels down two choppers in Sudanese Army attack", *Sudan Tribune*, 10 September 2007.

¹⁴⁹ "Sudan, rebels resume heavy fighting in Darfur", Associated Press, 10 August 2007.

¹⁵⁰ Crisis Group interview, August 2007.

¹⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, September 2007.

has some promise. While weakened to accommodate all members of the Security Council, it was adopted unanimously and thus has more weight than Resolution 1706, on which Russia, China and Qatar abstained. It gives the hybrid force a reasonably strong mandate to protect civilians as well as the benefit of the more tested UN administrative and command and control structures.

UNAMID's authorised levels – 19,555 troops, 3,772 civilian police, and nineteen formed police units – are higher than those set out in Resolution 1706.¹⁵² Khartoum accepted this but the history of the conflict indicates a robust peacekeeping mission will be a challenge both operationally and politically. The resolution contains provisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, mandating the new force “to take necessary action” to protect civilians but it comes with restrictions Khartoum could easily exploit.

The price of Council unanimity was compromise on a number of levels. First, the force will only be able to monitor, not seize, weapons present in Darfur in violation of the Security Council's arms embargo on the region – a significant weakening of earlier drafts and of 1706.¹⁵³ This is especially unfortunate given the proliferation of weapons and armed groups in Darfur. Secondly, it prescribes no consequences for non-compliance. There is no mention of punitive actions if Khartoum – or any other actor – fails to cooperate. Also, of course, the resolution is still based on the unfortunate DPA, though there are frequent references to “any subsequent agreement”.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps UNAMID's biggest problem is that it is more than one year late – the NCP has been able to continue its divide-and-rule policies, leading to the complicating new dynamics of Arab-Arab fighting and highly militarised IDP camps.

The resolution includes an ambitious implementation schedule, with the “initial operational capacity for the headquarters” established as of late October¹⁵⁵ and “all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate” to be completed by 31 December, “with a view to achieving full operational capability and

force strength as soon as possible thereafter”.¹⁵⁶ While the deadlines appear strict – and were meant to signal urgency and, some say, to appease donors weary of paying AMIS's bills – the language is vague enough to allow for expected delays.¹⁵⁷

There are already difficulties. On a recent Khartoum trip, AU Commission Chairperson Konare said there were enough troop pledges from Africa and no need for contributions from outside the continent.¹⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the UN had been saying military assets – particularly aviation and transport – will have to come from non-African countries.¹⁵⁹ The UN and broader international community need to maintain focus and pressure on this point and not allow Khartoum to handicap UNAMID by delaying tactics designed simply to weaken the force. The high-level Darfur meeting in New York on 21 September highlighted again the disagreement over the force's “African nature”, though Konare and Secretary-General Ban both insisted the differences between AU and UN were “technical”, not “political”.¹⁶⁰

Nevertheless, Sudan, with support from allies like Egypt, refused an offer from Thailand as well as a Scandinavian engineering unit.¹⁶¹ About three quarters of the troops committed are from Africa¹⁶² but Khartoum still has not agreed to the final list submitted by the UN and AU on 2 October.¹⁶³ Troop shortfalls remain, including critical needs for eighteen attack and tactical helicopters. The UN Secretariat's peacekeeping unit (DPKO) has approached some non-African countries about these assets but must await clearance from Khartoum. On his return from a

¹⁵² Resolution 1706 authorised UNMIS to be strengthened by up to 17,300 military, 3,300 civilian police, and sixteen formed police units, UNSC S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006.

¹⁵³ “UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in violation of the Agreements”, Resolution 1769, UNSC S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007. Earlier Chapter VII language proposed would have allowed it “to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related material whose presence in Darfur is in violation of the Agreements”.

¹⁵⁴ The bulk of the mandate is “set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007”, Resolution 1769, *ibid*, operative para. 1.

¹⁵⁵ UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher were operational and an opening ceremony took place on 31 October 2007.

¹⁵⁶ Resolution 1769, *op. cit.*, operative para. 5 (a) and (c).

¹⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, August 2007.

¹⁵⁸ “AU says enough African troops for Darfur force”, Reuters, 13 August 2007.

¹⁵⁹ Diplomats have also stressed the importance of including troops from a wide spectrum of nations to ensure wider political buy-in, Crisis Group interviews, August 2007.

¹⁶⁰ “Secretary-General's press encounter with African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare, following the second high-level consultation on Darfur”, New York, 21 September 2007.

¹⁶¹ “Egypt backs rejection of non-Africans in Darfur peacekeeping force”, *Sudan Tribune*, 23 September 2007; and UN DPKO reports, October 2007. President Bashir said he was refusing the Scandinavian engineers because he was “convinced that the elements whom they insist to send to us from Sweden and Norway are intelligence elements; namely, Mossad [and CIA]”. “Sudan president accuses UN of trying to send intelligence units to Darfur”, *Sudan Tribune*, 11 November 2007.

¹⁶² Troop contributors include Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Bangladesh, Jordan, Nepal, “Nordics” and Thailand. Africans have committed 15,795 troops, non-Africans 3,770.

¹⁶³ “UN chief urges Sudan to approve Darfur force composition”, Reuters, 8 November 2007.

meeting with Sudanese military planners on 14 November, DPKO head Jean-Marie Guehenno stated that unless the situation was resolved, UNAMID would “not be able to make the difference that the world wants it to make and...it may become a failure”.¹⁶⁴

Deployment has also been hampered by logistical problems. The light and heavy support package implementation is not complete, with many of the police personnel still to be deployed.¹⁶⁵ Some of the logistical problems for UNAMID deployment are inherent to the difficult environment: adequate water supplies are an ongoing concern, as well as arrangements for getting supplies to Darfur. But Khartoum has also created difficulties about land use and by refusing to allow UNAMID to fly at night or refurbish airstrips.

Whether “technical” or “political”, the differences the AU and UN have had to work through together are likely to continue with deployment of a hybrid mission that is, after all, unique. UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher will have to report to two headquarters, New York and Addis Ababa, while the UN and EU forces to be deployed in Chad and the CAR will report to New York and Brussels, as well as the EUFOR operational headquarters in Paris. Coordination and communication could easily plague the complex and untested structures of all these missions. Disputes over mandate interpretation could also emerge because of the different institutional characters of and personalities within the AU and UN.

By virtue of its proposed numbers, technical expertise, assets, financing and potentially greater political independence from Khartoum, UNAMID should prove stronger than AMIS. While there are some limitations in its formal mandate, its effectiveness in protecting civilians will depend greatly upon the willingness in New York and Addis Ababa to give it sufficient political support and upon the political and military judgments of the UN-AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, and Force Commander Martin Agwai.¹⁶⁶ Hopefully, UNAMID will build upon lessons learned from AMIS.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, because of the difficulties inherent in deploying what will be the world's biggest peacekeeping

operation into a politically and physically challenging environment, UNAMID is unlikely to be fully operational before well into 2008. Until then, the international community must ensure that AMIS is reinforced as quickly as possible with the light and heavy support packages. Even then AMIS's weaknesses will still be such that the mediation must make negotiation of a ceasefire a priority if it is to resume patrolling and other protection activities.

B. THE WAY FORWARD

The expectations around the peace talks in Libya grew over the past several months, while the situation on the ground deteriorated. The international community was determined to press on with the talks despite lack of interest by the main parties: many rebel groups boycotted and/or were unprepared, and the Sudanese government continued military actions in Darfur, despite the declaration of a ceasefire. The talks have had to be suspended after their ceremonial beginning, although this is not the language used by the mediation team.

Meanwhile, the NCP continues to strengthen its formal and informal military assets in Darfur and pursue divide-and-destroy tactics against the rebels, while inciting fresh tribal conflict. Its resettlement of allied tribes on cleared land is sowing the seeds of the next civil war. The rebel groups continue to struggle to find a common platform and leadership structure. New insurgent groups may emerge, and the chance that these will incorporate both Arab and non-Arab groups is growing. Likely the Arab-NCP struggle will become more intense, as will fighting among Arab tribes. In this fluid environment, the DPA signatories remain potential spoilers, while additional SLA/MM commanders can be expected to break away. The glue that holds the country together – the CPA – is facing its greatest crisis, with the most contentious issue, Abyei, unresolved. UNAMID is almost certain to enter on its task without a peace to keep.

The undoubtedly growing pressure within the international community for a settlement comes up against these negative trends. Nevertheless, the internationals must give time for several things to happen before they resume the broad political negotiations. First, the AU/UN mediation should use the present delay to adapt to the changing reality on the ground by working to genuinely broaden participation in the talks, giving voice to Darfur's silent majority. It must use the mechanism it established to involve civil society and tribal leaders and make certain it is more than window-dressing. This can be done either by convening a Darfur-wide forum with representatives of all constituencies or expanding the consultations conducted earlier in 2007 through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDD-C) process.

¹⁶⁴ “Darfur force could fail if problems not settled – UN”, Reuters, 15 November 2007.

¹⁶⁵ “Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur”, op. cit.

¹⁶⁶ Adada was foreign minister of the Republic of Congo until his appointment as joint special representative in May 2007. Agwai was chief of defence staff of the Nigerian Armed Services until his appointment with AMIS also in May, and formerly served as Nigeria's chief of army staff.

¹⁶⁷ See “Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design”, Human Rights Watch, September 2007.

In either case, the concentration should be on nominating representatives to come to the talks when they resume and creating common positions on all of the conflict's root causes, such as the land tenure system, grazing rights and the Native Administration. The mediation should also seek a commitment to cessation of hostilities. The DPA logic was to postpone systemic causes of conflict to the process' non-binding second phase, the DDD-C. That approach has proven unworkable. The issues are core challenges to local peace, and tackling them requires involving the affected communities. Bringing communities and constituencies outside the increasingly narrow rebel factions meaningfully into the peace talks can also help contain the emergence of new armed groups; IDP voices could mitigate Abdel Wahid's absence.

Secondly, the SPLM efforts to unify all movements – SLA and JEM factions, as well as others – appear to be more positive than previous attempts and should be supported. A wider spectrum of rebels is meeting in Juba, and the SPLM has been able to capitalise on its own insurgent experience to conduct training workshops on negotiations and unification with them. Several SLA factions have come together but more work is needed. The international community must allow further time for this, as well as strongly encourage Abdel Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim to attend or send delegations. The mediation also needs to outline a clear role for Minni Minawi and other DPA signatories, including fair representation in any subsequent power-sharing agreement and a share for their forces in any future disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process.

Women's voices are also important. As the majority of IDPs and having borne great hardship, they are increasingly taking on new roles as heads of household and leaders in their communities. They have also demonstrated a willingness to come together across conflict lines to work for peace.¹⁶⁸ Women can bring vital perspectives to the negotiations, including on core issues such as compensation, return of IDPs, power sharing and reconstruction.

The initial round of talks should focus on a new ceasefire agreement to calm the situation on the ground, give AMIS and UNAMID political cover and allow AMIS to reactivate its protection measures such as firewood patrols. Such a ceasefire should scrap the two-chamber commission system and allow representatives from all parties to take part in monitoring and investigation so as to end impunity for violators. Only an agreement with comprehensive

mechanisms will be attractive to the rebel movements, which have said they have little faith in declarations by Khartoum unless there is an overhaul of the entire ceasefire system. Lessons need to be learned from the failures of the two-chamber commission, and once a ceasefire is established, UNAMID will need to take a firmer, more pro-active approach than AMIS toward investigating violations and recommending penalties for violators.

The mediation should identify goodwill gestures expected from the parties to create a more positive atmosphere for the coming negotiations. From the NCP, this should include:

- ❑ an immediate cessation of military activity;
- ❑ appointment of more neutral governors;
- ❑ allowing UNAMID to monitor its state security committees to ensure adherence to international humanitarian law, agreed humanitarian protocols and ceasefire agreements;
- ❑ curbing militias which are now part of the official security apparatus, such as the Border Guards and the Central Contingency Forces;
- ❑ stopping arms distributions to militias and IDPs;
- ❑ immediately halting and reversing occupation of cleared land;
- ❑ cancelling post-DPA administrative units;
- ❑ desisting from forcible displacement of IDPs from the camps; and
- ❑ ceasing immediately all violations and recommitting to the full implementation of the "Joint Communiqué" signed with the UN on the facilitation of humanitarian activities.

Rebel groups should declare and respect an immediate cessation of hostilities and give full cooperation and protection to humanitarian operations in their areas.

Future rounds will also need to look at the impact of the creation of new localities and other demographic manipulation on the census and elections. The chaos, administrative manipulation that has already occurred, and massive displacement mean much work must be done to get Darfur ready for elections in 2009.¹⁶⁹ Peace talks will also eventually need to focus on IDPs' right of return and mechanisms for handling land disputes.

The DPA already has created a mechanism, the Darfur Land Commission, to revise land tenure/use policies and rules, as well as to arbitrate land disputes. However, the

¹⁶⁸ In September 2007, 25 influential women from diverse political, geographic and professional backgrounds formed a coalition, which articulated common priorities and developed models for women's inclusion in the peace process during a consultation organised by The Initiative for Inclusive Security.

¹⁶⁹ Issues related to the elections will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent Crisis Group briefing.

negotiations should expand its power to incorporate a commission of inquiry with a clearly defined mandate and backed by laws enabling it to address land expropriation and augment the local courts and the land commission's arbitration function.

Related to this, the new talks will have to establish mechanisms for justice and accountability that go beyond simple monetary compensation. The Abuja talks purposefully avoided dealing with accountability because the AU mediators did not want to deal with that challenging and complicating issue, preferring to leave it to the International Criminal Court (ICC). But this is not a comprehensive solution. To date, the ICC has issued indictments against only two individuals in Darfur. While those prosecutions must continue, with much stronger international support to overcome the government's adamant refusal to cooperate with the Court, additional robust justice and reconciliation processes will be necessary to address the grievances of all of victims of the conflict. Allowing broader representation in the talks should help stretch the accountability discussion beyond compensation, but the mediation must also be willing to support this shift.

The Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor in March 2005. It explicitly directed the "Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict...[to] cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor".¹⁷⁰ Yet the government did the opposite when the Court issued its first two arrest warrants in the investigation in April 2007 – for former State Minister for the Interior (and current state minister in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs) Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed/militia commander Ali Koyshab.¹⁷¹ Khartoum has refused to turn either individual over to The Hague. Worse, it has permitted Haroun to remain in a post in which he handles Darfur issues, such as the reconciliation attempt between Arabs and Fur/Massaleit in West Darfur in June which he thwarted, and it has released Koyshab, who purportedly had been under investigation, from custody.

Sudan's decision to ignore the warrants needs to be met with unequivocal messages from the Security Council, parties to the ICC's Rome Statute and others that it comply with the Court process and turn over the two indictees.¹⁷²

The Court is a powerful tool that can force the regime and others to answer for conscience-shocking atrocities and think twice before committing them again. But to have such effect its warrants must be executed. Sudan's stance on this issue is consistent with its overall strategy of extending the state of unrest in Darfur as long as possible, continuing to fragment society and hinder UNAMID deployment. The international response similarly needs to be consistent, and punitive measures should be applied if obstruction continues, just as they should be applied to any party – whether government or rebel movements – found to be obstructing the negotiations or UNAMID deployment, or violating the arms embargo or international humanitarian law.

It is also essential that the ICC continue to seek evidence and open additional investigations, including against those most responsible for the atrocities committed in 2003 and 2004. To stop with only two prosecutions from that period – the height of the government's ethnic cleansing campaign – suggests that responsibility for the crimes committed ended with one Janjaweed commander and a single government minister. To fulfil its obligations under the Security Council referral and the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must investigate further, including individuals within President Bashir's inner circle responsible for the government's Darfur strategy. The Prosecutor must also investigate those most responsible for recent atrocities – whether from the government or rebel movements.

Finally, if an agreement is to be sustainable, UNAMID must be closely involved in its negotiation. While the AU and UN are represented at the talks, it is critically important that both Joint Special Representative for Darfur Adada and Force Commander Agwai are as active as possible and remain engaged throughout the process. Their presence would provide added value in two ways: first, they would be able to contribute their expertise and UNAMID perspective to the negotiation of security arrangements and other provisions requiring UNAMID involvement; secondly, they would be able to adjust UNAMID deployments more rapidly and efficiently to the agreement's requirements.

¹⁷⁰ Resolution 1593, UNSC S/RES/1593, 31 March 2005.

¹⁷¹ Haroun and Koyshab have been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity – including mass killings, rape and displacement – committed in Darfur in 2003 and 2004.

¹⁷² For actions that should be taken in the weeks before the Prosecutor reports to the Security Council on the situation in Darfur on 5 December 2007, see the 2 November Human Rights Watch letter to the EU foreign ministers regarding the need for the EU to take a strong stance in response to Sudan's continued refusal to cooperate with the ICC.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Darfur conflict has not lent itself to quick solutions. It has evolved from a rebellion with relatively defined political aims to a conflict increasingly overshadowed by shifting alliances, defections, regional and international meddling and a growing, complex tribal dimension. This is particularly true since the signing of the DPA. The NCP is behind this transition and the continued tribalisation of the conflict; it has been deft at pulling strings to divide the rebels, empower Arab allies, generate mistrust, and minimise the space for Darfurians to unite around a common political vision and oppose the regime in upcoming elections. It has also expanded its control by institutionalising the demographic shifts and creating new localities.

The rebel factions have been unable to maintain a unified focus and have instead descended into a spiral of infighting and splintering, exasperating outside attempts to bring them together. They, like the NCP, have refused to adhere to previous ceasefires. Some have even tried to widen the conflict into the Kordofans, encouraging local uprising and insurgency. Many Arab groups, previously engaged in the conflict solely as elements of the counter-insurgency, have also entered the fray, as they have grown more frustrated with the NCP or have wanted to secure their gains in Darfur. The DPA signatories, despite signing up to a peace deal, have been a generally destabilising presence on the ground as well. The consequences of all of this have been felt the hardest by the millions of Darfurians who continue to be displaced, as well as by the humanitarian agencies that are increasingly under siege.

For some time, there was a lack of sustained international peacemaking engagement – beyond rhetoric – with most efforts focused on peacekeeping. Much energy was spent, commendably, to ensure that a hybrid operation would be able to take over from the ailing AMIS but there is now the risk that the stronger UNAMID force will arrive in Darfur with no peace to keep. Nevertheless, this is not a reason to rush; for the AU/UN mediation effort to be successful, it must avoid the trap of thinking there are quick fixes. Peace talks are the first step in a long process but they require broader participation, including that of women, to be successful.

International efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping must take advantage of the delay in the Libya talks and adapt to the changes in the nature and dynamics of the conflict. They must also effectively pressure the NCP to cease its devastating policies of demographic manipulation. To date, little has been done to hold the NCP accountable. Failure to respond appropriately would leave the international community as an unwitting accomplice to the beginnings of Sudan's next civil war.

Nairobi/Brussels, 26 November 2007

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SUDAN



APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
APRD	<i>Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et de la démocratie</i> (CAR rebel group)
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CNT	<i>Concorde nationale tchadienne</i> (Chadian rebel group)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDD-C	Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DLC	Darfur Land Commission
DoC	Declaration of Commitment
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRRC	Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission
EUFOR	European Union Force
FUC	<i>Front uni pour le changement</i> (Chadian rebel group, formerly FUC)
FUCD	<i>Front uni pour le changement démocratique au Tchad</i> (Chadian rebel group)
HSP	Heavy support package
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JEM-CL	Justice and Equality Movement – Collective Leadership
KAD	Kordofan Association for Development
LSP	Light support package
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
NCP	National Congress Party
NMRD	National Movement for Reform and Development
NRF	National Redemption Front
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
RDF	Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces
RDL	<i>Rassemblement pour la démocratie</i> (Chadian rebel group, merged to form FUCD/FUC)
RFC	<i>Rassemblement des forces pour le changement</i> (Chadian rebel group)
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces

SFDA	Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA/MM	Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi
SLA/AW	Sudan Liberation Army faction of Abdel Wahid
SOAT	Sudanese Organisation Against Torture
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
TDRA	Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
UFDD	<i>Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie</i> (Chadian rebel group)
UFDD-F	<i>Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie fondamentale</i> (Chadian rebel group)
UFDR	<i>Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement</i> (CAR rebel group)
UFLD	United Front for Liberation and Democracy
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
URFF	United Revolutionary Force Front